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ABSTRACT 
Over the past two-plus decades, corporate mergers, government consolidations, 
workforce downsizings and plant closures have increased dramatically; as a consequence, 
millions of workers around the nation have lost their jobs. Not surprisingly, researchers 
have begun to focus considerable attention on downsizing, restructuring and 
revitalization efforts as a means for understanding organizations undergoing major 
transformation. Although the studies that have been conducted have dealt with a wide 
range of issues associated with organizational downsizing and restructuring, there is an 
absence of research examining mid and upper level managers' perceptions of the efficacy 
of their efforts to revitalize their downsized organizations and, in particular, their 
surviving subordinates. Likewise, empirical research into public sector downsizing and 
restructuring has been sparse. This study was designed to respond to these gaps in the 
literature. 
More specifically, the research studied fiscally driven change efforts in two cities 
over a period of four years. Both individual interviews with key participants and 
stakeholders and extensive analysis of government documents and newspaper accounts 
were used to reconstruct what happened in the financially stressed cities. The technique 
of narrative analysis, which involves reconfiguring data as a story complete with plot and 
literary-like themes, was used to analyze the data. 
The stories suggest that, in most instances, government officials in both cities did 
not so much downsize their organizations as find ways to avoid the need for downsizing. 
The methods ranged from convincing voters to approve a sales-tax increase to 
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restructuring departments to decreasing the number of city employees by not filling 
positions when retirements or departures occurred. 
Despite the absence of substantial downsizing efforts, employee morale in each 
city suffered. The study documents leaders' attempts to confront the morale problem. 
Strategies employed included leaders: keeping employees informed about the fiscal crisis 
and what was being done about it; soliciting employee input and feedback about what to 
do to respond to crisis situations; redesigning jobs and providing professional 
development opportunities related to an employee's new responsibilities and long-term 
career aspirations; and articulating a positive vision of the future and the reasons that this 
vision would likely come to pass. 
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INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY 
Background to the Study 
Over the past two-plus decades, corporate mergers, government 
consolidations, workforce downsizings and plant closures have increased dramatically; 
millions of workers around the nation have lost their jobs. A New York Times Poll 
conducted on issues of economic security in December 1996 with nearly 1300 adults 
throughout the United States revealed that during the previous 15 year period: (a) 20% of 
the respondents were casualties of permanent layoff at some time; and (b) 72% of the 
respondents were victims of layoff themselves or had a household member or someone 
close to them who was also a victim of a layoff. Equally important are the following 
facts: (a) between 1979 and 1993, more than 450,00 public service jobs vanished 
nationwide (New York Times, 1996); (b) between 1980 and 1995, 39 million Americans 
were caught up in one or another corporate downsizing programs (Sennett, 1998, 
McCann et al., 2004); (c) between 1987 and 1997, fifty Fortune 500 firms with over 
50,000 employees reduced their workforce by more than 1.2 million people (Schultze, 
2000; Tourish & Hargie, 2004); (d) more than 3 million jobs were eliminated in the 
United States between 1990 and 1996 (Robbins, 1999); and (e) at the end of 2001, 
Fortune 500 companies reported cumulative layoffs of 1,040,466 positions for the year 
(Davis et al., 2003, Florian, 2002a). 
Furthermore, this trend shows no sign of waning as evidenced by Challenger, 
Gray & Christmas, Inc.'s December 7, 2004 report that 930,690 job cuts were announced 
by Fortune 500 companies for 2004. Essentially, this reputable international consulting 
firm, which has been tracking these trends for several years, projected over 1,000,000 
announced job cuts for 2004 and the "fourth successive year with 1,000,000 or more 
announced cuts." (Challenger, Gray & Christmas, 2004) On the whole, these statistics 
and a myriad of similar data and recent major merger announcements point to the 
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possibility that restructuring, mergers, downsizing and displacement of workers may 
continue around the country into the foreseeable future. 
Statement of the Problem 
Not surprisingly, in the literature on organizational change, considerable attention 
has been given to organizational downsizing, restructuring and revitalization as a useful 
means for understanding organizations undergoing major transformation (Gutknecht, 
1988; Tomasko, 1990; Noer, 1993; Johansen & Swigart, 1994; Burke & Nelson, 1998; 
Kammeyer-Mueller et al., 2001; De Meuse & Marks, 2003; Davis et al., 2003; Tourish & 
Hargie, 2004; Mirabal & DeYoung, 2005). This increased focus on organizational change 
is largely due to corporate cost cutting and organizational downsizing over the past two 
decades. The elimination of substantial numbers of workers within organizations often 
affects the surviving workforce in a variety of significant and undesirable ways. Beyond 
the painful grieving over laid-off coworkers, the survivors of downsizing may experience 
the post-traumatic stresses of increased individual workloads, demands for greater 
organizational productivity, and growing personal and organizational uncertainty about 
the future (Cohen & Cohen, 1993; Noer, 1993; Hecksher, 1995; Capelli, 1999; Burke & 
Greenglass, 2000; Applebaum & Donia, 2001; De Meuse & Marks, 2003; Amundson et 
al., 2004; Mirabal & DeYoung, 2005). 
Moreover, the reduction of formerly viable positions and functions commonly 
creates serious gaps in an organization's capabilities and infrastructure that can cause 
major problems affecting the efficiency, vitality and well-being of the organization 
(Tomasko, 1990; Cascio, 1993; Hecksher, 1995; Burke & Nelson, 1998; Dunford & 
Devine, 1998; Freeman, 1999; Davis et al., 2003; McCann et al., 2004; Mirabal & 
DeYoung, 2005). Included among the most critical gaps and problems arising from 
organizational downsizing and restructuring are: lowered levels of creativity and 
innovation; loss of continuity and historical and procedural knowledge; decreased 
communication vital to both internal functions and external relationships; diminished 
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commitment, loyalty and trust; and lowered employee morale and satisfaction (Tomasko, 
1990; Noer, 1993 & 1998; Johansen & Swigert, 1994; Capelli, 1997 & 1999; Mishra & 
Spreitzer, 1998; Leana & Van Buren, 2000; Tourish & Hargie, 2000 & 2004). In light of 
these undesirable consequences of downsizing and restructuring, it is apparent that 
surviving leaders face tremendous challenges in revitalizing, reinvigorating and 
motivating the surviving employees in their downsized and restructured organizations 
(Tomasko, 1990; Noer, 1993; Bridges, 1991 & 2003; Kotter, 1996 & 2002; Applebaum 
et al., 1998; Rosen, 1998; Mishra et al., 1998; Alkhafaji, 2001; Evangelista & Burke, 
2003). 
Some studies have attempted to describe the organizational and individual effects 
of corporate downsizing and restructuring by examining the diverse personal experiences 
of surviving employees and leaders in various organizational settings (Noer, 1993; Stoner 
& Hartman, 1997; Robbins, 1999, Maki et al., 2005). Some scholars have investigated 
the leadership and management practices of large organizations that have undergone 
extensive organizational change efforts involving one or more major downsizings 
(Freeman, 1993; Noer, 1993; Hecksher, 1995; Gurin, 1998; Balogun, 2003; Davis et al., 
2003; Amundson et al., 2004; Mirabal & De Young, 2005). Other studies have examined 
the organizational change and corporate revitalization efforts of large private and public 
organizations in attempts to depict how sustainable revitalization can be accomplished in 
spite of massive downsizing and major restructuring efforts (Freeman, 1993; Graddick & 
Cairo, 1998; Pascale et al., 1997; Lewin & Johnston, 2000; Balogun, 2003; Mirabal & 
DeYoung, 2005). Many studies of organizational downsizing and restructuring have 
focused on the effects of these initiatives upon laid-off workers and their respective 
communities (Hecksher, 1995; Downs, 1995; New York Times, 1996; Noer, 2000; 
Feldman, 2000). 
Recent studies have also endeavored to broaden our understanding of 
organizational downsizing and revitalization as change management processes and 
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intervention strategies having predictable organizational consequences (i.e., performance 
and resilience) and survivor reactions (Benson, 1994; Grove, 1997; Duran, 1998; 
Hayden, 1998; Unckless, 1998; Noer, 2000; Balogun, 2003; Amundson et al., 2004). 
Other recent studies have expanded scholarly inquiry into other salient dimensions of 
corporate downsizing and restructuring. Recent research topics have included individual 
perceptions of and affective behaviors associated with downsizing, as well as gender and 
ethnic group experiences and concerns (Brockner et al., 1985; Bailey, 1997; Forst, 1996; 
Buford, 1997; Burt, 1997; Robblee, 1997; Bailey, 1999; Lewin & Johnston, 2000; 
Brockner et al., 2004; Maki et al., 2005). Likewise, several recent studies have explored 
the problems and issues associated with organizational communications within 
downsized organizations and survivors' career management efforts (Hecksher, 1995; 
Aguh, 1996; Bonner, 1998; Egdorf, 1996; Mundhenk, 1997; Susskind, 1996; Wong, 
1999; McCann, 2004; Maki et al., 2005; Paulsen et al., 2005). 
Although the aforementioned studies have dealt with a wide range of issues 
associated with corporate downsizing and restructuring, there is an absence of research 
which examines mid and upper level managers' perceptions of the efficacy of their 
efforts to revitalize their downsized organizations and, in particular, their surviving 
subordinates. Likewise, empirical research into public sector downsizing and 
restructuring has been sparse. Moreover, there remains a need for rich information on 
best practices utilized in the effective revitalization and motivation of surviving 
workforces within a downsized and restructured organization. Hence, there is a need for 
further study. 
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this research is to investigate mid and upper level managers' 
perceptions of the efficacy of their methods for revitalizing their organizations and 
motivating those who remain in the organization after major change, restructuring and/or 
downsizing has occurred. The focus will be in two local government organizations 
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located in Southern California. This study will devote particular attention to the 
strategies, methods and leadership approaches employed in the revitalization and 
motivation_efforts and managers' perceptions of the efficacy of these strategies, methods 
and approaches. Five goals have been established for this research and they are as 
follows: 
1. To identify the strategies, methods and leadership approaches mid and upper 
level managers use to revitalize their organizations and motivate those who remain in the 
organization after major change, restructuring and/or downsizing. 
2. To gather perceptions about the efficacy of those methods and approaches 
and what formal assessment mechanisms were employed and any data that are available 
as a result of formal assessment strategies that were implemented. 
3. To gather mid and upper level managers' perceptions and ex post facto 
assessments of the efficacy of their own efforts to revitalize their organizations and 
motivate the survivors of the downsizing. 
4. To gather mid and upper level managers' descriptions of the strategies, 
methods and approaches used to revitalize their organizations and motivate those who 
remain in the changed, restructured and/or downsized organization. 
5. To determine if the mid and upper level managers' descriptions of the 
strategies, methods and approaches used can be linked to one or more leadership 
approaches or orientations in the literature. 
Research Questions 
The following questions will be used to guide this study, at least initially: 
1. What are the strategies, communication methods and leadership approaches 
mid & upper level managers use to revitalize their organizations and motivate those who 
remain in the organization after major change, restructuring and/or downsizing and how 
do those managers describe those strategies and methods? 
2. What are the mid and upper level managers' perceptions and ex post facto 
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assessments about the efficacy of their approaches and what data and assessment 
mechanisms were used in these assessments? 
3. Can the mid and upper level managers' descriptions of the strategies, 
methods and approaches be linked to one or more leadership approaches or orientations 
in the literature? 
4. To what extent are the research participants' perceptions congruent? Are 
managers' perceptions similar or different than those of their subordinates? 
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CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
This chapter discusses the literature that was reviewed as part of this research. In 
this chapter, I will focus the review on four broad topics that appear to be relevant to the 
study conducted. These topics are: (a) the literature on the organizational change 
construct, (b) the literature on the specific organizational change intervention of 
organizational downsizing, (c) the literature on motivating workers, in general, and the 
literature on motivating workers who are survivors in downsized organizations, in 
particular, and (d) the role of leadership in changing and revitalizing organizations. 
The Literature on the Organizational Change Construct 
In this section, I discuss the development of the organizational change construct 
within the literature. Essentially, this discussion expands the discussion found in the 
"Background to the Study" section of Chapter I. This will be done by providing some 
background about the major theories and concepts and the different methods and 
approaches involved in organizational change. This section is divided into three 
subsections and discusses what the literature says about: (a) the origins and emergence of 
the organizational change construct, (b) the major theories, models, approaches and 
various strategies involved in implementing organizational change, and (c) the empirical 
studies examining seminal theories, models, approaches and successful practices of 
organizational change in business and governmental settings. 
The Origins and Emergence of the Organizational Change Construct 
In this opening subsection, I will discuss how the organizational change construct 
emerged from the field of social science and, in particular, Kurt Lewin's "pioneering 
work on change" (Bernard Burnes, 2004). Most current organizational theorists attribute 
the early growth and development of organizational change theory to Kurt Lewin's 
seminal research work as a "refugee scholar" from Nazi Germany at Cornell University 
and University of Iowa from the mid 1930s to the mid 1940s (Burnes, 2004). For 
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instance, Burnes, a notable researcher in the U.K., writes in one of his articles in the 
Journal of Management Studies (September 2004) on Kurt Lewin's remarkable works: 
To many people today it will seem strange that Lewin should have been given 
equal status with Freud. Some 50 years after his death, Lewin is now mainly 
remembered as the originator of the 3-Step model of change.. .and this tends often 
to be dismissed as outdated... Yet, as this article will argue, his contribution to our 
understanding of individual and group behaviour and the role these play in 
organizations and society was enormous and is still relevant...Few social 
scientists can have received the level of praise and admiration that has been 
heaped upon Kurt Lewin (pp. 977-978). 
Likewise, Lewin's work has had a profound and continuing influence on current 
theoretical understanding and is repeatedly referenced in the literature (French & Bell, 
1999; Burke, 2002: Beitler, 2003; Burnes, 2004). For example, Burnes points out that 
"Lewin undoubtedly had an enormous impact on the field of change" (p. 995); he further 
noted that "the last decade has also seen a renewed interest in understanding and applying 
his approach to change" (pp. 997-998). Furthermore, Burke (2002), a renowned 
organizational theorist and consultant, states that Lewin was "one of the first 
psychologists to help us understand organization change at the larger-system level" (p. 
106); he also noted that Lewin's "rather simple three-phase model set the stage for the 
more elaborate and comprehensive models we embrace today" (p. 106). Moreover, 
Beitler, another accomplished theorist and consultant, extends Burke's comments by 
crediting Lewin with providing "three of the ten [major] concepts that support effective 
OC [organizational change] practice: Forcefield Analysis, The Three-Stage Model of 
Change, and the Action Research Model" (p. 12). Before describing Lewin's three-stage 
model of the change process, I will briefly discuss Lewin's forcefield analysis and action 
research models in order to provide a fuller, grounded understanding of Lewin's 
comprehensive action research framework derived from the theoretical tradition of 
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applied social psychology. 
Forcefield Analysis 
Researchers generally identify Lewin's field theory as the earliest approach to 
understanding group behavior through empirical research intended to influence and 
initiate planned change, whether at the level of the individual, group, organization or 
even society. In discussing Lewin's introduction of the force-field model, Lippitt, 
Langseth and Mossop (1985) noted that it "has long been helpful in understanding the 
pressures and counterpressures of various impediments and inhibitions, supports and 
motivators that act to block or bring about change (p. 102)." In describing Lewin and his 
force-field concept, Lippitt et al. further noted that "he looked on a level or phase of 
behavior within an institutional setting, not as a static habit or custom, but as a dynamic 
balance of forces working in opposite directions within the social-psychological space of 
the organization (p. 102)." Likewise, French and Bell (1999), in their description of 
force-field analysis, supported a popular practitioner's perspective that it is a useful 
technique through which "we can identify the major forces that make up the field of 
forces and then develop action plans for moving the equilibrium point in one direction or 
the other;" and it is also "useful for thinking about the dynamics of change situations 
(p.74)." Following these and other researchers' representations, Burnes (2004), in his 
discussion about Lewin's field theory, succinctly sums up the essence of force-field 
analysis: 
This is an approach to understanding group behaviour by trying to map out the 
totality and complexity of the field in which the behaviour takes place.. .Lewin 
maintained that to understand any situation it was necessary that: 'One should 
view the present situation- the status quo- as being maintained by certain 
conditions or forces.' Lewin postulated that group behaviour is an intricate set of 
symbolic interactions and forces that not only affect group structures, but also 
modify individual behaviour. Therefore, individual behaviour is a function of the 
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group environment or 'field', as he termed it. Consequently, any changes in 
behaviour stem from changes, be they small or large, in the forces within the 
field.. .Lewin's view was that if one could identify, plot and establish the potency 
of these forces, then it would be possible not only to understand why individuals, 
groups and organizations act as they do, but also what forces would need to be 
diminished or strengthened in order to bring about change (pp. 981-982). 
Beitler (2003), in his explorations into the conceptual nature of Lewin's force-
field analysis, points out that "Lewin believed the status quo is a result of driving forces 
and resisting forces (p. 12)." Beitler also notes that "driving forces are pushing or 
'driving' for change" and that "resisting forces exist because some parties benefit from 
the current situation, or status quo (p. 12)." Beitler extends this thinking and further states 
that "the status quo is the result of the strengths of the two opposing forces" and asserts 
that "Lewin recommended working to reduce the resisting forces, instead of increasing 
the driving forces" since "he believed simply increasing the driving forces would result in 
an escalation in the resisting forces against the change (p. 12)." In short, in discussing 
their views of force-field analysis, these authors provide a consistent understanding of the 
dialectic nature of field theory and highlight some of the practical aspects of force-field 
analysis that can be useful in understanding situational dynamics within organizational 
settings and, ultimately, in designing and implementing planned change. 
Action Research 
In recent years, organizational researchers and practitioners have given much 
attention to the application of the action research method in different organizational and 
social settings (Huse & Cummings, 1985; Lippitt et al., 1985; French & Bell, 1999; 
Burke, 2002; Beitler, 2003; and Burnes, 2004). Regarded by many organizational 
theorists and researchers as one of Lewin's significant contributions to the study and 
practice of organizational and social change, action research has become an important 
tool in assisting organizations and communities in their efforts to attain 'new desired 
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states' and greater effectiveness. In discussing Lewin's conception of action research and 
describing the individual, organizational and societal implications of the action research 
model, Burnes (2004) states: 
The theoretical foundations of Action Research lie in Gestalt psychology, which 
stresses that change can only successfully be achieved by helping individuals to 
reflect on and gain new insights into the totality of their situation.. .It is an 
iterative process whereby research leads to action and action leads to evaluation 
and further research.. .Action Research draws on Lewin's work on Field Theory 
to identify the forces that focus on the group to which the individual belongs. It 
also draws on Group Dynamics to understand why group members behave in the 
way they do when subjected to these forces.. .Action Research stresses that for 
change to be effective, it must take place at the group level, and must be a 
participative and collaborative process which involves all of those concerned 
(p.984). 
Contemporary organizational researchers, theorists and practitioners have promoted the 
action research model as a proven method of evaluating the usefulness of change in 
different organizational settings. However, as Lippitt et al. (1985) have also pointed out, 
action research "is much more than a technology of evaluation, and it often occurs that 
'the roles of researcher and subject may change and reverse, the subjects becoming the 
researchers and the researchers engaging in action steps' (p. 131)." Lippitt et al. (1985), 
in fact, go on to state: 
If it is considered to be a process, a continuous series of occurrences, action 
research may be defined as the systematic collection of research data about an 
ongoing system relative to some objective, goal, or need of that system: feeding 
these data back into the system; taking actions by altering the selected variables 
within the system based both on the data and on hypotheses; and evaluating the 
results by collecting more data and repeating the cycle (p. 132). 
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Because of its dynamic iterative, feedback and planning features (e.g., researcher 
and participant data collection, evaluation, engagement, and action), the action research 
model has been used to bring new meaning and vitality to static, and often stagnant, 
organizational settings in need of meaningful and necessary change. For example, in 
discussing the conceptual and practical aspects of the action research model, Huse and 
Cummings (1985) inform us that "action research is aimed both at helping a specific 
organization increase its effectiveness and at developing new knowledge that can be 
applied in other settings (p. 21)." Huse & Cummings further note that the "model has 
broad applicability and may be used in overorganized situations or modified to fit 
underorganized situations that are too loosely structured for traditional applications (p. 
21)." To illustrate their point, Huse & Cummings discuss two cases involving successful 
action research projects conducted at notably different settings; a private boys' boarding 
school and an 'underorganized' community development organization in an urban ghetto. 
In terms of providing a better procedural understanding, several contemporary 
researchers have informed us of the various prescriptive steps or techniques entailed in 
the practical application of the action research method (Huse & Cummings, 1985; French 
& Bell, 1999; Burke, 2002; and Beitler, 2003). Of those researchers, for instance, French 
and Bell (1999, p. 5) describe a seven step method for conducting action research as 
applied in organization development (OD) activities (e.g., preliminary diagnosis, data 
gathering, data feedback, data exploration, action planning, action taking and evaluation 
& assessment). Several researchers describe action research methods that are comprised 
of fewer steps but contain essentially the same or similar elements as articulated in the 
French and Bell model. For example, Lippitt et al. (1985, p. 132) and Burke (2002, p. 36) 
write about four-step action research models (e.g., (1) data collection or diagnosis, (2) 
data feedback, (3) data discussion and action planning, and (4) taking those steps or 
action) and Beitler (2003, p. 24) enumerates a six-step model (e.g., data gathering, data 
feedback, diagnosis, action planning, action taking/interventions, and evaluating). 
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Despite the slight differences in applied steps among these descriptions of the action 
research method, on the whole, these researchers provide a consistent description of a 
robust methodology that entails, at its core, a collaborative process of diagnosis and 
intervention. Equally important, in expanding on the collaborative elements of action 
research, French and Bell inform us of the learning elements of the method by writing 
that "action research yields both change and new knowledge; change occurs based on the 
actions taken, and new knowledge comes from examining the results of the actions (p. 
5).. .[and] action research is a method that combines learning and doing- learning about 
the dynamics of organizational change, and doing or implementing change efforts (p. 
100)." Finally, as already noted, Lewin's action research method has become an 
important tool in assisting organizations and communities to attain greater effectiveness 
and in bringing new vitality to organizational and social settings in need of necessary 
change. 
Three-Stage Model of Change 
Certainly the earliest and one of the most influential models of organizational 
change is Lewin's 3-Step Model. The notion of the three stage model of the change 
process has been a key concept used in the study and practical application of 
organizational and social change from its very inception in the 1940s (Huse & 
Cummings, 1985; Lippitt et al., 1985; French & Bell, 1999; Burke, 2002; Beitler, 2003; 
Burnes, 2004). In fact, since that time, Lewin's three step method has not only been 
generally recognized by organizational researchers as the seminal model of planned 
change but it has also been the subject of subsequent extensive scholarly discourse, as 
well as the progenitor of subsequent theoretical expansions and conceptual models (Huse 
& Cummings, 1985; French & Bell, 1999; Burke, 2002; Burnes, 2004). 
In his first published articulation of the three step method, Lewin (1951) laid out 
his thoughts and experiences in working with groups and argued that: 
A change toward a higher level of group performance is frequently short lived; 
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after a "shot in the arm," group life soon returns to the previous level. This 
indicates that it does not suffice to define the objective of a planned change in 
group performance as the reaching of a different level. Permanency of the new 
level, or permanency for a desired period, should be included in the objective. A 
successful change includes therefore three aspects: unfreezing (if necessary) the 
present level LI, moving to the new level L2, and freezing group life on the new 
level. Since any level is determined by a force field, permanency implies that the 
new force field is made relatively secure against change (p. 229). 
Beitler in his description of the three stage method, expands upon Lewin's notion of 
"permanency of the new level" and suggests that "in order to get the change to hold, there 
must be a supportive environment for the change.. .this means management must commit 
resources and reward desired behaviors; otherwise, the organizational members will slip 
back into their old, comfortable ways of doing things (Beitler, 2003, p. 14)." 
Furthermore, Burnes (2004, p. 985), in discussing Lewin's "key contribution to 
organizational change," points out that Lewin intended the three step model to be seen as 
an integral part of his planned approach to change that included his "other three 
elements...Field Theory, Group Dynamics and Action Research." Likewise, in drawing 
attention to Lewin's primary interest in "resolving social conflict through behavioural 
change," Burnes further tells us that Lewin identified two requirements for success: 
(1) To analyse and understand how social groupings were formed, motivated and 
maintained. To do this, he developed both Field Theory and Group Dynamics. 
(2) To change the behaviour of social groups. The primary methods he developed 
for achieving this were Action Research and the 3-Step model of change (p. 
986) 
Other organizational researchers have contributed additional insights to the 
literature by providing further analyses and descriptions of Lewin's three step method. 
For instance, Huse and Cummings (1985), in building upon Lewin's three stage process, 
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suggest that change requires movement from "one equilibrium point to another" and use 
the analogy of a man who wishes to stop smoking. Huse and Cummings write that the 
three stage model requires the smoker to first unfreeze the old smoking behavior (to 
believe it is bad for him, that he should stop), next to move (or change) to the new non-
smoking behavior, and last to refreeze the non-smoking behavior (or new equilibrium 
point) by reinforcing it or "establishing a new field of forces to support the new behavior 
(p. 74)." Likewise, Burke (2002, p. 151) offers practical examples of specific 
organizational behaviors or actions that might be employed within each of Lewin's three 
steps. For example, Burke states that "the unfreezing step could be one of presenting data 
to organizational members that show a sizable gap between where they are and where 
they need to be to meet growing demands [e.g., slipping customer service]." Burke also 
cites other relevant organizational analogies such as: the implementation of action plans 
(i.e., changing work processes, improving information systems) in the moving step; and 
installation of a new reward system to reinforce desired behavior or restructuring parts of 
the organization and implementing new accountability and performance measures in the 
refreezing step (See, also, Huse & Cummings, 1985). 
As noted earlier, by enumerating the three steps of his methodology, Lewin 
influenced a conceptual revolution of thinking about organizational change that has been 
expanded upon and enlarged over the years by many prominent theorists like Edgar 
Schein, Ronald Lippitt and associates, Warner Burke and George Litwin, William 
Bridges, John Kotter and others (See subsequent discussions on organizational change 
models in this literature review). On the other hand, during the 1980s, Lewin's three step 
model, as well as the other elements of his planned approach to change (e.g., Field 
Theory, Group Dynamics and Action Research), had "become unfashionable" and were 
criticized by some organizational researchers such as Rosabeth Moss Kanter, and Robert 
Quinn as overly simplistic and "no longer applicable" (Burnes, 2004, pp. 986 & 996). 
Nevertheless, over the last decade, Lewin's three step model of change and his other 
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planned approach to change work has gained renewed interest particularly with the 
"advent of the complexity perspective" and the "tributes and acknowledgements paid to 
him by major figures such as Chris Argryris and Edgar Schein" (Burnes, 2004, pp. 997-
998). 
Theories, Models, Approaches and Strategies Involved In Organizational Change 
In this second subsection, I briefly discuss other major theories, models, 
approaches and strategies involved in implementing organizational change in the 
literature that might be viewed as part of Lewin's legacy. Building upon Lewin's 
approach to planned change, scholars have attempted to provide organizations and 
organizational development practitioners with various organizational change theories and 
models in order to increase understanding of change processes, as well as to provide 
useful frameworks to facilitate leaders' efforts to initiate and manage change. Among 
these meaningful frameworks are Beckhard and Harris' six phase large system change 
framework (Beckhard & Harris, 1977 & 1987; Burke, 1987), Burke-Litwin's 
organizational performance and change model (Burke, 1987 & 2002; French & Bell, 
1999; Beitler, 2003), Bridges' three phase transition model (Bridges, 1991, 2003; Bridges 
& Mitchell, 2000; Burke, 2002), Michael Heifetz's seven stages of the change cycle 
theory/model (Heifetz, 1993), and Kotter's eight stage change process (Kotter, 1996). 
Likewise, other scholars and organizational consultants have developed various 
organizational change methods, approaches and strategies in similar attempts to further 
our understanding of change processes, as well as to assist change leaders and 
organizational development practitioners in implementing major change initiatives. 
Included in these methods and approaches are the participative change/management 
process (Burke, 1987; Beitler, 2003), the humane approach to managing change (Heifetz, 
1993), the top-down unilateral decree or imposed change method (Burke, 1987; Heifetz, 
1993), the transition management and planning method (Barger & Kirby, 1985; Burke, 
1987; Schein, 1999; Bridges & Mitchell, 2000) and the incrementalist strategy of 
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managing change (Atwater & Atwater, 1994). 
Organizational Change Theories and Models 
As a result of increasing internal and external demands (i.e., environmental and 
regulatory demands, technology advances, social and fiscal constraints, etc.) on 
organizations and executive managers in the late 1960s, the practice of organizational 
development began to change and shift. As the "complexity of tasks" increased along 
with the "need for new forms of organizing work and new organizational structures" and 
the "changing expectations and demands of users of the organization's products and 
services, so did the practice of organizational change (Beckhard & Harris, 1977, pp. 13-
15). As an outgrowth of these changes in organizational life, there emerged an increased 
concern with the "management of change" and "a need for effective strategies for large-
system change" (Beckhard & Harris, 1977). With the convergence of these emerging 
organizational demands and needs, the continued calls for "developing strategies for 
coping with these demands and managing for organizational survival as well as for 
growth" quickly became the new organizational mantra (Beckhard & Harris, 1977). Thus, 
a proliferation of organizational change theories and methods began to influence an 
entirely new breed of organizational theorists and leaders. 
Among the earlier change methods to gain attention, Beckhard and Harris' change 
process in a large complex institutional system made its debut in 1977 and was slightly 
modified in 1987. Following the Lewin tradition, Beckhard and Harris articulated six 
phases of a change process in a large system: (1) diagnosing the present condition, 
including the need for change; (2) setting goals and defining the new state or condition 
after the change; (3) defining the transition state between the present and the future; (4) 
developing strategies and action plans for managing this transition; (5) evaluating the 
change effort; and (6) stabilizing the new condition and establishing a balance between 
stability and flexibility (Beckhard & Harris, 1977 & 1987 and Burke, 1987). Beckhard 
and Harris contended that a good diagnosis of conditions, a detailed picture of a desired 
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end state and an accurate picture of the present were prerequisites for action planning and 
change strategy (1977, p. 17). Essentially, Beckhard and Harris' transition management 
process is about conducting planning activities (i.e., a road map for the change effort) and 
involves determining where to intervene, choosing "transition technologies" (e.g., pilot 
programs, educational interventions, confrontation meetings, etc.), and "creating 
transition management structures" that ensure "getting from the present to the future, the 
transition state" (Burke, 2002). 
Another example of an earlier change model is the Burke and Litwin 
Organizational Performance and Change Model that evolved from organizational 
climate studies conducted by George Litwin in the late 1960s and refined in the late 
1970s and 1980s by Litwin and Warner Burke in their collaborative consulting work with 
Citibank and British Airways (Carr, Hard & Trahant, 1996; French & Bell, 1999; and 
Burke, 2002). Influenced by Lewin's earlier ideas about change, as well as the then 
contemporary thinking of James McGregor Burns about transactional and 
transformational leadership (Burke, 2002, p. 201), Burke and Litwin's empirically based 
model "facilitates an understanding of why change is necessary in the client organization 
and in what specific areas that change must take place" (Carr et al., 1996, p. 146). Burke 
and Litwin proposed that organizational "interventions directed toward leadership, 
mission and strategy, and organization culture produce transformational change or 
fundamental change in the organization's culture.. .Interventions directed toward 
management practices, structure, and systems produce transactional change or change in 
organizational climate" (French & Bell, 1999, p. 78). Moreover, Carr et al. (1996, pp. 
146-147) inform us that Burke and Litwin's "transformational elements are concerned 
primarily with the change itself.. .with the communication of a vision of the future [and 
their] transactional elements focus primarily on the process of change.. .agreeing on 
expectations (as well as a system of rewards and sanctions for degrees of compliance 
with the expectations)." As a result, through their intricately detailed model (See, for 
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example, Burke, p. 199, Carr et al., p. 147, and French & Bell, pp. 77-79), Burke and 
Litwin lay out a highly inter-related system of transactional (first-order change) and 
transformational (second-order change) factors that can successfully guide organizational 
leaders in targeting their intervention efforts toward those factors that will produce 
desired change. 
Michael Heifetz (1993) developed a more recent change model, the Change 
Cycle, which proposed an underlying structure found in all change processes and which 
consisted of seven stages: (1) choosing the target; (2) setting goals; (3) initiating action; 
(4) making connections; (5) rebalancing to accommodate the change; (6) consolidating 
the learning; and (7) moving to the next cycle. Heifetz suggests that using the seven-stage 
Change Cycle helps in: clarifying an organization's issues, tasks, and roles; and showing 
the issues needing to be faced and defining completion points for each stage. Heifetz 
further argues that the "purpose and value of the process is to promote understanding of 
the sequence of events typical of any change effort, and to minimize the inevitable 
surprises along the way"(Heifetz, 1993, p.19). Additionally, Heifetz supports his model 
by providing extensive descriptions of two case studies involving successful use of the 
Change Cycle through all seven stages (e.g., the turnaround of Cunningham Aviation and 
the State Department of Human and Health Services' implementation of a new 
computerized records system). 
Heifetz also examined two other case studies (Iowa Tractor and Farm Equipment-
method for constructing major vehicle components, and Pacific Market Research-
initiation of a quality control program) involving use of the Change Cycle through stage 
four. Lastly, Heifetz identified eight fundamental physical energies that he argues not 
only permeate the world but play vital roles in the Change Cycle by: defining the 
dominant state of being for each stage of the cycle; and influencing the creative process 
which, in turn, is critical for overcoming barriers (e.g., resistance) and producing 
movement in the desired direction (Heifetz, 1993, p. 167-169). These energies or forces 
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include: (1) allowance; (2) will; (3) capability; (4) connectedness; (5) harmony; (6) 
evolution; and (7) transition or chaos. 
A recent change model that has received wide acclaim and application in the 
business world is Bridges' Three Phases of Transition which was first published in 1991 
and later updated in 2003. Firmly grounded in the earlier Lewin tradition and influenced 
by the transition management approach of Beckhard and Harris, Bridges (1991 and 2003) 
articulated a model with three basic phases: 
1. Letting go of the old ways and the old identity people had. This first phase of 
transition is an ending, and the time when you need to help people deal with 
their losses. 
2. Going through an in-between time when the old is gone but the new isn't fully 
operational. We call this time the "neutral zone": it's when the critical 
psychological realignments and repatternings take place. 
3. Coming out of the transition and making a new beginning. This is when 
people develop the new identity, experience the new energy, and discover the 
new sense of purpose that make the change begin to work. (p. 4-5). 
According to Burke (2002, p. 154), Bridges "emphasized the need for people to achieve 
some closure about the past and to celebrate what was good about it" (endings, letting 
go), and described the neutral zone as a "state of limbo and emotional 
disconnection...ambiguous and often anxiety provoking." Burke (2002, pp. 154-155) 
further suggested that the new beginning is a "time when organizational members start to 
focus on new goals and priorities, begin to try the requisite new behaviors, and are 
psychologically prepared to move ahead." Likewise, Bridges and Mitchell (2000, pp. 35-
36) point out that in saying goodbye, people have to let go of the "way that they 
themselves- used to be," and spending time in the neutral zone "is not wasted, for that is 
where the creativity and energy of transition are found, and the real transformation takes 
place." At the same time, Bridges and Mitchell (2000, p. 38) also caution that in the new 
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beginning, people need to "begin behaving in a new way, and that can be disconcerting-
it puts one's sense of competence and value at risk." 
Finally, another recent change model or process that has also gained considerable 
notoriety and wide spread use in both the private and public sectors is Kotter's (1996) 
Eight Stage Process of Creating Major Change. Similar in content to the step-by-step or 
phase approaches developed by Beckhard and Harris (1977) and Heifetz (1993), Kotter's 
change process first offers explanations for eight of the most common change errors and 
then provides a robust series of eight stages or steps designed for practical hands-on 
application. Based on his extensive analysis of change initiatives since the early 1980s, 
Kotter (1996, pp. 4-14)) offered the following descriptions of the eight most common 
errors made in these kinds of initiatives: (a) error #1- allowing too much complacency; 
(b) error #2- failing to create a sufficiently powerful guiding coalition; (c) error #3-
underestimating the power of vision; (d) error #4- undercommunicating the vision by a 
factor of 10; (e) error #5- permitting obstacles to block the new vision; (f) error #6-
failing to create short-term wins; (g) error #7- declaring victory too soon; and (h) error 
#8- neglecting to anchor changes firmly in the corporate culture. Building upon those 
common errors, Kotter (1996, p. 20) developed a change process of eight stages or steps 
"each of which is associated with one of the eight fundamental errors that undermine 
transformation efforts." The steps, in their most essential form, include: 
(1) establishing a sense of urgency; (2) creating the guiding coalition; (3) developing a 
vision and strategy; (4) communicating the vision; (5) empowering broad-based action; 
(6) generating short-term wins; (7) consolidating gains and producing more change; and 
(8) anchoring new approaches in the culture. 
Organizational Change Methods, Approaches and Strategies 
As noted earlier, some of the literature has focused on methods, approaches and 
strategies that serve as tools for organizational leaders and organizational development 
practitioners in their efforts to implement major change initiatives. Participative change, 
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often referred to as participative management, is a method that emerged from one of the 
most important foundations of organization development, the participation/empowerment 
model (French & Bell, 1999). French & Bell state that "increased participation and 
empowerment have always been central goals and fundamental values of the field [of 
organization development]" (1999, p. 87). Beitler (2003, pp. 11, 17), in his ten 
foundational concepts underlying effective organizational change practice, describes 
participative management as "participation and involvement of employees at every level 
of the organization" and notes that they are "critical for organizations to develop and 
maintain a competitive advantage." Another organizational development theorist, Likert 
(1967), best known for his 5-point scale and later known for contributing his four system 
model of management approaches, described his participative management system as 
"decisions involving policy and affecting large numbers of people are made in groups by 
consensus" (Burke, 2002, p. 161; See also Huse & Cummings, 1985). Moreover, Burke, 
in citing earlier case studies (i.e., Harwood Manufacturing- late 1940s) and discussing 
participative management and managers' occasional fears of change attendant to a 
participative approach, advises that "participative communication and choice of an 
appropriate level of participative decision making and implementation are the key issues 
in successful implementation of change" (1987, p. 55). Hence, these authors, in the main, 
suggest that participative change entails engaging the people who will eventually 
implement and make the change work and requires actively involving them in the 
decision-making, communicating and problem-solving associated with the 
implementation of the change effort (See also Huse & Cummings, 1985, pp. 146-147). 
Heifetz (1993, p. 147) explored the value of a humane approach to change and 
argued that such an approach "engages people's will more or less voluntarily" in contrast 
to imposed change which "often opposes people's will." Heifetz describes the humane 
approach to change as one in which the value of other people is kept in mind when 
means are considered. In other words, "humane means that we manage our own actions, 
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according to a sense of responsibility to others as human beings like ourselves" (Heifetz, 
p. 147). Heifetz supports the notion that by treating people humanely during change 
initiatives, positive conditions are created whereby "commitment and internal will to 
accomplish one purpose" are built along side the "receptivity for pursuing other goals in 
the future" (1999, pp. 146-147). However, Heifetz cautions that the success of a humane 
approach to change depends upon people believing in what they are attempting to do, 
committing their free will to the change process or objective, and applying their will and 
capability to the challenges they will encounter. Lastly, Heifetz submits that under most 
circumstances, more can be accomplished through the application of humane methods 
than through the imposition of change by external force. 
Another method of implementing organizational change, the top-down unilateral 
decree or imposed change is provided by Burke (1987) and Heifetz (1993). Burke (1987, 
p. 53) informs us that top-down unilateral decree is still the most frequently used method 
for making change in an organization and is best suited in times of crisis or when there is 
little time for argument or discussion. Burke (1987, p. 54) further states that this approach 
requires an accepted source of authority and cites the military and the "tough American 
manager" as cases in which the top-down decree for introducing change is appropriate 
and an "intrinsically valued and expected mode." However, Burke also suggests that 
despite its utilitarian appeal, the top-down autocratic method is 'dysfunctional in other 
circumstances' or in organizations where more participative structures and methods are 
prevalent. 
Additionally, in his description of imposed change, Heifetz (1993, p. 122) refers 
to such methods interchangeably as the directed change process, externally driven 
change, or forced change. Heifetz (p. 125) points out that imposing change can result in 
considerable difficulties and practical problems (i.e., sustaining changes and changed 
behaviors) when coercive steps are taken with those who don't share management's 
commitment. However, Heifetz (pp. 126-127) also argues that "unwanted change" (e.g., 
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new inventory control system) can be made to stick if management "can sustain its 
emphasis on implementation and full use of the new system long enough" for employees 
"to recognize its benefits, and eventually to accept it." Heifetz (p. 132) concludes that the 
negatives of imposed change are only offset if the "change is important enough" and if 
management believes in it enough and is willing to "shoulder the burden of being the 
external driving force until others take up the banner." 
Over the past thirty years, several organizational researchers/consultants have 
extensively examined and contributed varying yet similar approaches to transition 
management and planning to the growing body of organizational change literature 
(Beckhard & Harris, 1977 & 1987; Burke, 1987; Barger & Kirby, 1995; and Bridges & 
Mitchell, 2000). As noted earlier, Beckard and Harris (1977 & 1987), in their six phases 
of a change process, promoted the notion of developing strategies and plans for managing 
transition while proceeding through those phases of large system change. According to 
Burke (1987, p. 306), Beckhard and Harris identified several important issues to be 
considered during transition management, determining the degree of choice about 
whether to change (i.e., examining intensity of forces pushing for change); determining 
what needs changing (i.e., culture, mission, goals, structure, procedures, etc.); 
determining where to intervene (i.e., list of alternatives provided); and choosing 
intervention technologies (i.e., major alternatives explored). In further articulating their 
ideas on transition management, Beckhard and Harris (1977, p. 51) argued for the 
development of a "road map for the change effort" or a process plan "once the desired 
change objectives have been clarified and the present state of affairs made clear." The 
authors also argued (pp. 51-52) that an effective process plan should incorporate time 
tables (e.g., when moves take place, meetings held, new structure starts, etc.) and have 
certain important characteristics (i.e., purposeful, task-specific, integrated, temporal, 
adaptable, agreed to and cost-effective). The authors further noted (1977 & 1988) that 
devising a commitment plan is vital to the success of a change effort and should include 
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the following action steps: (1) identify target individuals or groups whose commitment is 
needed; (2) define the 'critical mass' needed to ensure the effectiveness of the change; (3) 
develop a plan for getting the commitment from the critical mass; and (4) develop a 
monitoring system to assess the progress. 
Next, in their discussion of strategies for preparing for organizational change, 
Barger and Kirby (1995, p. 109-111) talk about developing a transition plan and 
"designing the transition period" to include such measures as using task forces for 
brainstorming and presenting all possible impacts and interactions of the proposed 
changes, as well as creating information flow activities that create circulation and 
movement and stimulate information exchange. Lastly, Bridges and Mitchell (2000) 
advance a method for managing transition that 'transition advisers' can utilize in helping 
organizational leaders to lead change. In their seven step method, Bridges and Mitchell 
(2000, pp. 42-43) state that 'advisers' must help leaders with the following essential 
steps: (1) learn to describe the change and why it must happen and do so succinctly; (2) 
ensure that the details of the change are planned carefully and that someone is responsible 
for each detail, timeline and communications plan; (3) understand who is going to have to 
let go of what, what is ending, and what people should let go of; (4) make sure that steps 
are taken to help people let go of the past; (5) help people through the neutral zone with 
communication emphasizing connections with and concern for the followers; (6) create 
temporary solutions to problems and the high levels of uncertainty found in the neutral 
zone; and (7) help people launch the new beginning by articulating the new attitudes and 
behaviors needed and then modeling, providing practice, and rewarding those behaviors. 
Finally, various incrementalist strategies for managing organizational change 
have emerged over the past twenty years in response to the growing need for 
implementing change strategies that are "less dramatic, incremental, and evolutionary in 
nature" (Beitler, 2003, p. 16) than other "radical transformations in organizations" 
(Atwater & Atwater, 1994). Also referred to as first-order or incremental change 
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(Gallager, Joseph and Park, 2002; Beitler, 2003), these strategies are intended "to help 
the organization do differently what it has always done" (Gallagher et al., 2002), "should 
be occurring on a continual basis" (Beitler, 2003), and "apply when the organization's 
methods basically fit its current and predicted environment and only minor adjustments 
are needed" (Atwater & Atwater, 1994). In other words, incrementalist strategies are 
slower, smaller, and non-radical/transactional changes that can be applied independently 
(i.e., situations not threatening to the organization's viability) or as a supplement "after 
the dramatic, large-scale, second-order changes have been successfully implemented" 
(Beitler, 2003). Beitler (2003), for instance, points out that interventions to reduce 
intergroup conflict or to build cross-functional teams are examples of first-order, 
incremental changes. Likewise, Gallagher et al. (2002) state that improvements in present 
policies or increased efficiencies through new procedures are other examples of first-
order or incremental changes. 
Summarization of Organizational Change Methods, Approaches and Strategies. As noted 
in the earlier discussion of the various change theories and models, the above cited 
change methods, approaches and strategies possess foundational connections to Lewin's 
approach to planned change and, specifically, his action research model. Indeed, Burke 
(1987) attributed the emergence of the theoretical basis of participative management to 
Coch and French's late 1940s action research study at Harwood Manufacturing. 
Likewise, as earlier noted, Burnes (2004) advised us that the action research model not 
only stresses the importance of the participative and collaborative aspects of planned 
change but it also helps individuals to gain new insights into the totality of their situation. 
In the same way, French and Bell (1999) earlier informed us of the significance of the 
learning elements (e.g., learning and doing) and the benefits (i.e., resultant changes and 
new knowledge) of action research. Equally important, Huse and Cummings (1985), 
offered that the conceptual and practical aspects of action research aid organizations in 
increasing their effectiveness and in developing new knowledge that can be broadly 
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applied in other settings. Hence, the authors suggest that, with the possible exception of 
the imposed change method, when viewed from an integrated and holistic perspective, 
the above cited approaches and strategies for implementing organizational change 
(participative, humane and transition management methods) embody the conceptual and 
practical aspects of Lewin's action research model. In other words, due to their 
participatory, collaborative and action-oriented approaches to learning and implementing 
change, the participative, humane, and transition management strategies are clearly 
related to and are contemporary expressions of Lewin's passionate belief in and 
commitment to the application and permeation of democratic values and principles in 
organizational field work and, ultimately, in resolving social conflict. 
Empirical Studies and Theories, Models and Frameworks Used in Organizational 
Change 
Several important studies in the literature have popularized and focused 
researchers' attention on various theories, models and effective frameworks that have 
been successfully used in the practice of organizational change. In this last subsection, I 
will critique and attempt to synthesize several of these recent empirical studies which 
include Wright and Thompsen's (1997) "Building the People's Capacity for Change," 
Armenakis, Harris and Field's (1999) "Making Change Permanent: A Model for 
Institutionalizing Change Interventions," Woodward and Hendry's (2004) "Leading and 
Coping with Change," and Bruch, Gerber and Maier's (2005) "Strategic Change 
Decisions: Doing the Right Change Right." Through the review of these empirical studies 
and other studies found later in this dissertation, I intend to establish a foundation for 
conceptualizing some 'lessons learned' and 'best practices' of successful leadership in 
the implementation and management of organizational change. 
Wright and Thompsen's (1997) Building thePeople 's Capacity for Change was 
one of a few studies that helped focus attention on the federal government and the 
Clinton Administration's 'reinventing government review' of the early 1990s. Wright and 
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Thompsen's (1997) case study of the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) human 
resources quality alignment project examined individual employee capacity for change 
along a three-stage model or continuum of transitions from inactivity or reactivity to 
situations of proactivity or coactivity. Conducted by quality action teams (QATs) of 8 to 
15 members, the study also incorporated the use of a four-stage model of the desired 
change process (e.g., visioning, planning, installing and anchoring) as a means to put the 
work of the QATs into a behavioural and organization change context. The study also 
presented several recommendations which included: streamlining & reducing position 
descriptions, implementing a training curriculum promoting traits of a model manager, 
and focusing the performance management process on feedback, coaching and people 
development. 
Furthermore, the researchers identified a number of key lessons to draw upon and 
apply to future change efforts which included the criticality and necessity of: (1) a shared 
vision of the project's outcome; (2) support in the form of leadership, resources and time: 
(3) QAT members having opportunity for collegial reflection rather than mere reaction to 
problems; (4) QATs and work teams given ample time for the process; (5) 
comprehensive front-end planning; (6) QATs led by informed and empowered leaders 
who inspire performance; (7) customer input and clarity regarding customer needs; and 
(8) clear commitment to full participation by QAT members. Moreover, the researchers 
argued that a "practical framework can be adopted to engage the people's capacity for 
change" and that process should include the following elements: the establishment of a 
legitimate case for change with measurable parameters of both the current and desired 
future state, a realistic calibration of the degree or slope of the change required, and the 
urgency of the required change must be compared with an assessment of the 
organization's current capacity for change (Wright & Thompsen, p. 40). Lastly, the 
authors suggested that applying this framework with a tool kit approach (using the 
assessment, process and measurement tools described above) "can build the people's 
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capacity for change from a sound foundation of mutual trust and respect" (Wright & 
Thompsen, p. 40). 
A second in-depth study related to this dissertation conducted by Armenakis et al. 
(1999) provides meaningful insight into some successful practices of planned 
organizational change at such noteworthy worldwide private sector companies as 
Whirlpool, Allied-Signal, Merck, GE, GM, Ford, Chrysler and Xerox. The researchers 
looked at these major corporations in an attempt to develop an integrative model of the 
process of institutionalization (or freezing) of planned organizational change that a 
change agent can use as a guide to diagnose and modify change efforts. Based on their 
extensive research and building off Lewin's stages of change and Bandura's social 
learning theory (1986), Armenakis et al. proposed a model comprising the following 
constructs: the three generic stages of change, the change message and its components, 
commitment, the attributes of the change agent and the organizational membership, 
reinforcing strategies, institutionalization and assessment. Additionally, the researchers 
identified the following seven influence strategies to augment the reinforcing strategies 
construct: active participation, persuasive communication, management of 
internal/external information, human resource management practices, formalization 
activities, diffusion practices and rites & ceremonies. Through their in-depth discussion 
and analysis of those influence strategies, the authors provide sound advice to change 
agents while adding considerable depth and breadth to the quality and practical 
applicability of their model. 
In their discussion of the attributes of the change agent and organizational 
membership, they suggested that the single most important attribute a change agent 
should possess is credibility and that listening to organizational members, even those "not 
sold on the change, can result in a better mutual understanding of the concerns" (p. 105) 
associated with change. Likewise, the researchers argued that organizational commitment 
to change efforts can be "generated throughout the organization by peers serving as role 
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models and providing social support and becoming horizontal change agents" (p. 105). 
Furthermore, in their discussion of various institutionalizing or reinforcing strategies, the 
researchers cited participative decision making as an effective method to change 
cognitions and behaviors including: enhancement of members' psychological ownership 
of the changes, self-discovery of a clearer understanding of the problems and issues 
confronting their organizations, feelings of efficacy for the changes and confidence in 
their ability to meet goals they participated in setting (p. 108). 
In addition, Armenakis et al. revealed two symbolically meaningful illustrations 
of persuasive communication strategies employed by Whirlpool and GM in 
communicating the change messages that led to the successful launching of their major 
change and restructuring initiatives during the late 1980s and early 1990s. Moreover, in 
describing how human resource management practices can be effectively used in the 
institutionalization process, the authors (pp. 112-116) cited a number of exemplary 
practices including: selection activities (i.e., hiring and promoting individuals with values 
matching those represented in the organization's changed state), performance appraisal 
(i.e., including change criteria in appraisal systems), compensation (i.e., tying 
compensation to the goals of the change effort and collapsing pay grades into a few wide 
bands), and training & development (i.e., focused training programs to institutionalize 
new behaviors linked to the organizational change). Furthermore, in discussing efforts to 
establish organizational dialogues for spreading change adoption within an organization, 
the researchers pointed out several proven diffusion practices such as: pilot innovation 
programs, respected peer presentations (e.g., GE's successful Exchange of Best Practices 
program), and parallel learning structures (PLS) or transition teams (e.g., Chrysler's 
activity-based costing PLS). The researchers found that "because of the organizational 
responses (e.g., mergers and acquisitions, reengineering, downsizing) to external 
environmental changes, employees are finding less reason to be committed to their 
employer than to some professional or trade organization" (p. 123). Likewise, the 
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researchers also found that change agents: should develop and periodically assess 
commitment; must be credible for institutionalization to occur; and should be able to 
identify the opinion leaders and to anticipate their assessment of and reaction to the 
change. The researchers conclude that human resource practices should be linked to and 
demonstrate support for the change effort (e.g., change criteria included in performance 
appraisal programs, multisource/360 degree feedback programs, and compensation 
packages). 
A third influential study by Woodward and Hendry (2004) provides a more recent 
examination of change management efforts within the UK financial services sector over 
the past two decades of extensive regulatory and structural change. Woodward and 
Hendry's leading and coping with change framework identifies a number of skills and 
competencies for employees and senior managers alike that are crucial for coping with 
and leading and managing change. Somewhat similar to the data collection methods used 
in this dissertation, the researchers undertook two surveys consisting of senior 
management personnel respondents (from 30 firms) responsible for leading 
organizational change, on the one hand, and 198 employee respondents (including 
managers) who executed and/or experienced change, on the other hand. The survey's 
employee respondents specified the following skills and competencies as helpful in 
coping with change: communicating with others holding different perspectives, 
organizing work and managing time effectively, assimilating and interpreting 
information, dealing with people, and innovative problem solving. 
Likewise, the survey's managerial respondents suggested that the following 
personal skills or competencies were key to performing well in a constantly changing 
environment: commitment to change, an understanding of the changing situation, and an 
ability to 'fit' the changed environment. Additionally, the survey found that employees 
saw the following as categorical barriers to coping with change (or ways that change 
leaders make it hard for employees to adapt to change): communicating, the change 
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process itself, relationships, consultation, skills and experience, and motivation for 
change. In contrast, senior managers identified the following as competencies helpful in 
enabling employees to cope with change: strong leadership, clarity of purpose/mission 
coupled with generating enthusiasm, involving employees, and communicating well. 
Moreover, the researchers argued that their leading and coping with change framework 
emphasizes the following key features: as new directions are created, employees assess 
how these affect them; employees continually assess management support, credibility and 
competence in helping them to adapt; and providing support for employees to learn new 
competencies through training or coaching enhances their sense of autonomy and control. 
Essentially, the study found that change leaders "need to become better aware of the part 
they play in the change management process" (p. 175) through workshops engaging them 
in confronting their own assumptions about leading change and what change means for 
their employees. The researchers conclude that: questionnaires could be developed and 
used to assess employees' needs (i.e., skills and competencies to adapt and cope with 
change) and fed into performance management systems; and action learning teams can be 
used for engaging leaders in critically reflecting on practice, collaboratively dialoguing, 
and helping them deal with problems. 
Finally, a fourth influential study by Bruch, Gerber and Maier (2005) provides 
insights into another recent example of a successful strategic change program, Deutsche 
Luftansa Group's D-Check change program, run during turbulent times for the 
international aviation industry (2001 to 2004). In fact, the study's findings also includes 
10 years of research in multi-global companies, as well as Deutsche Lufthansa AG's 
multi-year (1991-2004) series of major change initiatives (e.g., 'Programm 90', 
'Programm 15', 'Operational Excellence', and 'D-Check- Maintaining Leadership' 
program. Specifically, in this significant case study, the authors examine the impact of 
leadership and management decisions and other critical factors involved in the 
implementation of successful strategic change. The authors argue that underlying the 
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primary leadership issue in strategic change- deciding, at the onset of the process, what 
change would be right- there are a number of critical factors that need to be addressed. 
Among those critical factors (pp. 99-101) requiring concerted attention in 
leadership decisions are: designing the right change for the company's situation (i.e., the 
change has been tailored to the company and its particular business situation), focusing 
the change agenda (i.e., companies must systematically define what the focal points of 
the change will and will not entail), doing only what you can really commit to (i.e., top 
management must ask itself what can be credibly committed to, implemented, and 
supported authentically), and doing what is right for the company's culture and energy 
(i.e., traditions, norms and shared values within a company must be included during 
deliberations regarding the change program selection). The authors also argue that 
management must, in doing change right, make decisions that ensure the successful and 
permanent implementation of the change. They also cite (pp. 101-105) the following 
critical factors that need to be given special attention in management decisions: creating 
acceptance (i.e., well thought-out acceptance management that integrates everyone in a 
way that promotes commitment), managing attention (i.e., effective branding of the 
change process, in-depth top management communication, and regular monitoring), 
involving the right people (i.e., having the right people to sell, implement, and drive the 
program from start to finish), and maintaining momentum and sustainable change effects 
(i.e., a large number of visible activities, strategic revitalization and refocus of the 
change, and integrating change results into existing company systems). The authors 
found that Deutsche Luftansa used a survey halfway through the program and a 
comprehensive academic study on the efficacy of the D-Check program, as well as other 
measures (including a year-end bonus) in order to maintain the momentum and ensure 
long-term impact of its D-Check program. Additionally, the authors found growing 
evidence that Human Resources "can make significant contributions toward 
organizational development and strategy by appropriately placing and managing human 
34 
capital" (p. 105). The authors conclude that "change processes require a series of key 
decisions" that must be made in the right sequence (i.e., leadership decisions should be 
made before management decisions) and "managers must orient their decisions toward 
critical factors for success in change processes" (p. 106). 
Summarization of Empirical Studies, Theories, Models and Frameworks. The findings 
from Wright and Thompsen's, Armenakis et al.'s, Woodward and Hendry's, and Bruch et 
al.'s studies have enhanced our understanding of the successful practice of organizational 
change in domestic and worldwide organizations in mostly private companies and one 
government entity. The researchers' findings also provide us with a preliminary 
framework for conceptualizing and organizing some valuable 'lessons learned' or 'best 
practices' of successful leadership in the implementation and management of 
organizational change. For instance, Wright and Thompsen, Armenakis et al., and 
Woodward and Hendry describe similar mechanisms or opportunities that enable change 
leaders to effectively reflect upon and collaboratively dialogue about their ongoing 
practice of strategic change management. Likewise, Armenakis et al., Woodward and 
Hendry, and Bruch et al. similarly cite the critical importance of leaders' credibility and 
commitment to their organizational change initiatives and to their employees' success in 
coping with and adapting to the change. Further, Woodward and Hendry and Bruch et al. 
conjointly point out that employee surveys and questionnaires are important tools for 
leaders to use in assessing employee needs and maintaining the momentum of the change 
effort. Equally important, Wright and Thompsen, Armenakis et al., and Bruch et al. 
similarly articulate the significance of an active Human Resources function, engaged HR 
managers and focused HRM practices and processes in supporting and contributing to 
successful change efforts (e.g., aligned recruitment, performance management, 
compensation and training systems). Thus, given these findings (and others to follow in 
this dissertation), I intend to establish a solid foundation for further organizing and 
presenting additional 'lessons learned' and 'best practices' in the implementation and 
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management of organizational change. 
The Literature on Organizational Downsizing 
In this section, I discuss the development of the organizational change 
intervention of downsizing in the literature and elaborate on the relevant concepts 
discussed within the 'background to the study' section. Although downsizing is a 
relatively recent phenomenon, the amount of literature on the topic is abundant. Hence, 
the major purpose of this section will be to distill an extensive literature. This section will 
be divided into four subsections; they will be: (a) the emergence of organizational 
downsizing as an organizational change intervention, (b) the definition of organizational 
downsizing; (c) approaches to implementing organizational downsizing; and (d) studies 
that illuminate the organizational downsizing intervention. As will be discussed later in 
the definition subsection, I will draw attention to the broader meanings of organization 
downsizing in order to establish the suitability of the concept for this particular study. 
The Emergence of Organizational Downsizing as a Change Intervention 
In this subsection, I will discuss the origins of organizational downsizing and how 
the downsizing concept has emerged as a useful means for understanding organizations 
undergoing major change and transformation (Lippitt & Lippitt, 1984; Gutknecht, 1988; 
Buch & Aldridge, 1990; Rice & Dreilinger, 1991; Brockner, 1992; Noer, 1993; 
Applebaum, Close & Klasa, 1999; Burke & Cooper, 2000). Applebaum, Close and Klasa 
(1999), in their case studies of successful downsizings at two private companies (Compaq 
Computer and Patagonia) and a public organization (the State of Oregon), state that 
"downsizing, re-engineering and re-structuring have been studied in recent organizational 
literature on corporate change as a means to improve organizational efficiency through 
organizational change" (p. 424). These researchers also speculate that environmental 
factors such as "an uncertain economic climate and emerging global marketplace...have 
caused organizations to reevaluate how they function" (p. 424). Indeed, these researchers 
inform us that "organizations are striving to reduce costs and improve efficiency" (p. 
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424). Likewise, Burke & Cooper (2000) talk about how, in the 1980s and early 1990s, the 
"sustained recession, together with the privatizing mentality with regards to the public 
sector, laid the groundwork for potentially the most profound changes in the workplace 
since the Industrial Revolution" (p.4). Moreover, Lippitt and Lippitt (1984) highlight the 
fact that "not only do successful managers have to cope with limited resources, they also 
have to handle the human ramifications of budget restrictions and cutbacks" (p. 15). 
In their presentation of a humane approach to downsizing, Lippitt and Lippitt 
(1984) argued that "coping with limited resources in today's economy requires 
organizational downsizing" (p. 15). They noted that leaders' reactions to demands for 
downsizing can be categorized into two types of responses: "reactive" or "pro-active 
postures" (pp. 16-17). The authors described reactive postures as those that assume that a 
"solution lies in cutting back on quantity or quality of service or product- with little 
regard for human resources." They also argued that pro-active postures in the form of 
"pro-active renewal "can be achieved by constructive downsizing- adjusting to 
circumstances by becoming smaller (thus functioning with less) while maintaining a high 
level of humaneness" (p. 18). With this in mind, they identified (pp. 16-18) the following 
steps entailed in humane downsizing: (1) explaining the rationale for change (i.e., clearly 
as possible and providing opportunities for those affected to discuss all implications and 
results); (2) participating in planning change (e.g., all involved taking part in assessing 
the way things are and the way things might be); (3) participating in projecting alternative 
scenarios (i.e., all affected discussing ways in which necessary change should be brought 
about); (4) clarifying values we need to retain (e.g., basic values that constitute the 
strengths, traditions, and identity of the downsizing organization); and (5) articulating 
ambivalence (e.g., open expressions of concerns, anxieties, fears, hopes, wishes and 
expectations). Lastly, Lippitt and Lippitt (pp. 19-21) cited the case of a manufacturer of 
military equipment used in the Vietnam War as an example of a company that responded 
pro-actively and humanely to an abrupt phase out of its core business activity. Facing an 
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immediate need of a 33% cut in personnel, budget and facilities, the company leaders 
averted an across the board cut and made the following pro-active moves: (1) formed task 
forces from different departments charged with determining where downsizing could be 
expeditiously and painlessly effectuated; (2) introduced career and life-goals planning 
sessions for its at-risk executives; (3) helped line-managers tackle the problem by training 
them in the 'arts of doing without' and teaching them how to plan downsizing and 
regaining stabilization; and (4) explored cooperative lend-lease opportunities and struck a 
deal to lease specialized machines to a local manufacturer. 
During the same time (i.e., the early 1980s), as organizational leaders collectively 
refined their reactions and approaches to wave after wave of downsizing, employers and 
employees alike began to acknowledge the alteration of and departure from the long-
standing psychological contract between employer and employee. Along with this 
apparent breach of the psychological contract and the notion of "hard work and loyal 
service for fair treatment and a sense of security," there emerged a variety of 
"dysfunctional consequences for the survivors of downsizing" (Buch and Aldridge, 
1990). To this end, Buch and Aldridge (1990) identified a variety of psychological and 
behavioral effects associated with corporate downsizing and the managerial challenges 
they present. Like many other authors at that time who addressed the issue of 'survivor 
syndrome' in the downsizing literature, Buch and Aldridge stressed the deleterious 
effects of role ambiguity, overload, increased role expectations, diminished career 
expectations, role conflict, role confusion and job insecurity upon downsizing survivors 
(p. 33). Furthermore, they proposed a number of remedial interventions for consideration 
and implementation by organizations undergoing downsizing. Consequently, they 
presented the following proposed interventions: HRM (e.g., special stress management 
sessions, career planning and development activities such as job rotation, sharing and 
enrichment, etc.), techno structural (e.g., collateral structures- enabling change 
management and innovation without disrupting formal structures- and employee 
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involvement programs- quality circles, labor-management committees, etc.), strategic 
(e.g., culture change efforts- creating vision statements, communicating the new vision 
and building commitment to the new vision and culture), and human process 
interventions (e.g., team building activities- focusing on communication and trust- and 
role analysis technique- helping teams clarify group members' role expectations and 
requirements) (Buch and Aldridge, 1990, pp. 33-36). 
Equally important, Brockner (1992) examined how managers can help 
downsizing survivors cope with negative changes in the workplace and encourage them 
to focus on the positive changes in the workplace. Brockner (1992, p. 10) emphasized 
that the general finding "from numerous studies is that survivors react more favorably to 
the extent that they believe that the layoff is fair." As a result, he laid out a series of 
managerial action steps (categorized as before, during and after the layoff) to elicit 
positive reactions among survivors (pp. 17-26). Concerning before the layoff action 
steps, he listed: (1) evaluate the relationship between the layoff and corporate strategy 
and culture (i.e., layoffs should be a logical consequence of corporate strategy); (2) 
provide ample advance notice so that victims of the layoff can exit gracefully and 
survivors' morale can be preserved; (3) identify key people (i.e., star performers and 
opinion leaders) and solicit their commitment to the new organization (e.g., tell them 
exactly what their role will be and how important it is to the success of the effort); and (4) 
prepare supervisors and managers for the layoffs (i.e., establish committees to develop 
plans of action and rehearsing or role-playing activities). Regarding during the layoff 
action steps, he mentioned: (1) give frill information (e.g., concrete details about the 
immediate future and what they can expect from the organization over time); (2) over-
communicate (i.e, important information should be communicated more than once and in 
different ways, use in-house TV networks or newsletters); (3) provide assistance (e.g., 
severance pay, outplacement counseling, and temporarily enhanced Employee Assistance 
Programs); (4) treat victims and survivors with dignity and respect (i.e., combine tangible 
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forms of caretaking- like severance pay- with intangible forms- humane and dignified 
treatment of victims and survivors); (5) increase managerial accessibility (e.g., increased 
rather than decreased accessibility of management at all levels); and (6) use ceremony to 
facilitate the transition (e.g., people taking time to recognize their changed world and 
acknowledging their grief, anxiety, and guilt). Lastly, he cited the following after the 
layoff action steps: (1) soliciting employee input (i.e., survivors given opportunities to 
play active roles in shaping the post-layoff work environment and in decisions affecting 
them in the aftermath); (2) rightsizing (i.e., evaluating whether survivors' tasks are 
appropriate to the new strategy and eliminating aspects of the workload no longer 
deemed necessary); (3) job enrichment (i.e., creative ways to make the work more 
interesting) and training supervisors to handle their new responsibilities; and (4) make 
certain that survivors recognize new opportunities that may be different from those that 
existed previously (e.g., methods to enhance one's career prospects). 
Definitions of Organizational Downsizing 
Since the early 1980s, researchers and practitioners have discussed the definition 
of organizational downsizing throughout the literature. Even though many definitions 
exist, a few of them are quoted frequently in the literature and also are appropriate for 
this discussion and are quoted frequently in the literature. First, Applebaum, Everard and 
Hung (1999) refer to downsizing as: 
The systematic reduction of a workforce through an intentionally instituted set of 
activities by which organizations aim to improve efficiency and performance.. .as 
a result, the firm's costs, processes and workforce are affected" (Applebaum et al. 
1999, p. 536). 
Next, Cameron (1994) defines organizational downsizing as: 
A set of activities, undertaken on the part of the management of an organization 
and designed to improve organizational efficiency, productivity, and/or 
competitiveness.. .it represents a strategy implemented by managers that affects 
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(a) the size of the firm's workforce, (b) the costs, and (c) the work processes, (p. 
192) 
Cameron (1994) also argues that downsizing is much more than an efficiency-focused, 
cost containment strategy. In fact, he goes on to redefine downsizing as: 
A way of life, as an ongoing process, as a basis for continuous improvement, 
rather than as a program or a target. Downsizing is also equated with 
simplification of all aspects of the organization- the entire system- including 
suppliers, and rules and regulations. Instead of being the first target for 
elimination, employees are defined as resources to help generate and implement 
downsizing ideas (p. 199). 
Finally, Jones (1998, p. 25) contributes to the ongoing scholarly discussion by adding the 
following expansive definition of downsizing: 
Downsizing is an intentional set of activities, usually involving reductions in 
personnel, to improve efficiency and productivity by affecting work processes. 
Downsizing often includes the intended reductions of personnel through the 
planned elimination of positions or groups of positions. Downsizing may occur by 
reducing employees or work; by eliminating functions, hierarchical levels or 
organizational units; and by implementing cost-containment strategies that 
simplify and streamline activities. Downsizing strategies include normal attrition, 
voluntary severance programs, early retirements, buyouts, outplacements, and 
layoffs. (Cameron, Freeman and Mishra 1993, 24-25; Freeman and Cameron 
1993,12-13) 
These and other definitions found in the literature generally share a number of 
elements that are critical to the concept of organizational downsizing. Chief among these 
elements are an organization's desire to improve efficiency, performance and 
competitiveness. Moreover, Jones' definition goes beyond the commonly known 
downsizing interventions generally involving employee layoffs and personnel reductions 
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and introduces an array of cost-containment and cost-cutting measures, certain structural 
and procedural initiatives, and other voluntary mechanisms that broadens our 
understanding of organizational downsizing practices. Because of its suitability to the 
organizational settings and contexts selected for this dissertation, Jones' broad 
description of downsizing served as an operative definition for this research study. 
Likewise, together, Cameron's and Jones' definitions and their views of organizational 
downsizing served as a conceptual framework for this research study. There will be more 
about this in Chapter 3. 
Implementation Types, Best Practices and Lessons Learned from Downsizing 
The literature shows how organizational researchers have conducted 
investigations in public and private sector organizations and how they have used their 
findings to interpret and understand organizational downsizing. Since the late 1980s, 
researchers have paid particular attention to the various types of implementation 
strategies that have been used and, in like manner, they have identified a collection of 
best practices and lessons learned to illuminate the construct of organizational 
downsizing. In the findings from their four-year longitudinal study in thirty 
organizations, Cameron, Freeman and Mishra (1991) revealed six general strategies that 
highlight the best practices that were typical of U.S. automobile industry firms that 
downsized effectively between 1987 and 1991. 
Based on an analysis of extensive survey data and a final ranking of 
organizational effectiveness scores for firms in the study, the four most effective firms 
used all of the following general strategies in their successful downsizing efforts: (1) it 
was implemented by command from the top-down, but it was also initiated from the 
bottom-up; (2) it was short-term and across-the-board, but it was also long-term and 
selective in emphasis; (3) involved paying special attention to those employees who lost 
their jobs, as well as those who didn't; (4) it was surgical and targeted inside the firm, but 
it was also generalized and included the firm's external network; (5) resulted in small, 
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semi-autonomous organizations, as well as large integrated organizations; and (6) 
emphasized downsizing as a means to an end, but also emphasized downsizing as the 
targeted end (Cameron, Freeman and Mishra, 1991, pp. 60-69). Furthermore, in a 
subsequent publication connected with the same multi-case study, Cameron (1994, pp. 
197-199) later identified three types of implementation strategies used by those 30 
organizations: (1) workforce reduction strategies (e.g., early retirements, transfers and 
outplacement, buy-out packages, golden parachutes, attrition, job banks, and layoffs or 
firings); (2) work redesign strategies (e.g., eliminating functions, hierarchical levels, 
groups, divisions, products and redesigning tasks, consolidating and merging units, and 
reducing work hours); and (3) systematic strategies (i.e., focusing on changing the 
culture, attitudes and values of employees- reducing wait time, response time, rework, 
paper, incompatibilities in data and information systems, number of suppliers and rules 
and regulations). Lastly, in identifying typical best practices in downsizing in the U.S. 
auto industry during the investigated time frame, Cameron discovered 30 implementing 
principles or characteristics that emerged among the 5 best performing companies of the 
30 sampled in his study (See Cameron, 1994, pp. 207-210). 
Although sparse, the existing literature on public sector downsizing focused 
initially on the federal government's mandated efforts (Federal Workforce Restructuring 
Act of 1994) to reduce its size, increase efficiency and reinvent itself under the leadership 
of President Clinton and Vice President Gore under the auspices of the National 
Performance Review (NPR) conducted from 1995 to 1999. Two important studies often 
cited in the literature that reflect government researchers' attempts to shed light upon 
some of the best practices and lessons learned from the NPR are "Serving the American 
Public: Best Practices in Downsizing" (Benchmarking Study Report; Gore, 1997) and 
Downsizing the Federal Government: the Management of Public Sector Workforce 
Reductions (Jones, 1998). 
Jones (1998) conducted an in-depth study of federal government downsizing 
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during the Clinton administration's 'reinventing government' program initiated through 
the National Performance Review (NPR) from 1995 to 1999. In this very rigorous 
empirical study, Jones' thematic analysis of qualitative data derived from interviews of 
executives and managers from the Defense Logistics Agency, Bureau of Reclamation, 
and Food and Drug Administration disclosed six cross-case lessons learned from 
executive views of downsizing and nine within-case lessons learned from executive 
management practices during NPR downsizing initiatives (1998, pp. 173-176). The 
lessons learned generated from executive views of downsizing showed that executives: 
(1) had an outlook that reinventing government and downsizing are realities of the 
environment for their agencies; (2) believed downsizing is necessary and essential for 
their agencies when- (a) the mission was changed or curtailed, and (b) downsizing and 
growth were not simultaneous requirements; (3) thought organizational reengineering, 
redesigning, restructuring, and streamlining should precede personnel reductions; (4) 
maintained that workload distribution after downsizing is a critical factor related to 
employee behavior and performance; (5) considered downsizing to be challenging, 
difficult, and painful; and (6) were uncertain of and concerned about the future workforce 
capabilities of their agencies after downsizing. Additionally, the lessons learned for 
executive management practices during downsizing uncovered executives' engagement 
in: (1) more coaching, mentoring, encouraging, and lifting morale; (2) more monitoring 
and evaluating work and performance; (3) more effort to accomplish more difficult work; 
(4) more communication; (5) more delegation of authority and participatory style; (6) 
more attention to internal recruitment and placement of personnel; (7) no change from 
past in terms of specific types of actions; (8) less formality and hierarchy; and (9) more 
visibility. 
The Benchmarking Study Report (Gore, 1997), one of a series of benchmarking 
studies chartered by Vice President Gore's National Performance Review, was part of an 
effort by the Clinton Administration to facilitate its 'reinventing government' initiative 
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by investigating and benchmarking the downsizing experiences of private and public 
organizations. The study included a "mix of federal agencies, state and city governments, 
as well as a foreign government and several private sector companies—all of which had 
been recognized for best practices in some area of downsizing." Equally important, the 
study endeavored to bring to light the best practices associated with downsizing within 
the federal government (e.g., at the federal agencies involved as partners in this 
benchmarking study) and at other agencies mentioned in the literature, as well as to 
surface important lessons learned from those government experiences. 
Included among the study's best practices were: programs to provide career 
transition services to the agency's surplus and displaced employees (e.g., an automated 
resume registry provided to registered employers, an electronic bulleting board of 
employer want ads and the Employee's Guide to Career Transition), policies for 
retraining displaced employees for new career opportunities, and policies that require the 
selection of well-qualified surplus or displaced internal agency employees before 
selecting any other candidates from either within or outside the agency (e.g., an 
automated Priority Placement Program matching separating employees with vacancies 
for which they were qualified). Moreover, included among the study's lessons learned 
were: (a) morale is lowered when there is no clarity regarding the reasons for the 
downsizing; (b) when budget is the only driver behind downsizing, denial can take hold; 
(c) a common mistake is to assume that each part of the organization has an equal share 
of excess staff and erroneously making across-the-board cuts in personnel; (d) 
productivity and quality often suffer when there is no change in the way work is done; 
and (e) when a key portion of the workforce is lost, so too are valuable contacts, 
knowledge and experience. 
Approaches to Implementing Organizational Downsizing 
Alongside the aforementioned definitions, implementation types, best practices 
and lessons learned from organizational downsizing is an assortment of approaches to 
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implementing organizational downsizing. While researchers empirically identified those 
important aspects and outcomes of organizational downsizing, as noted above, they also 
examined and categorized varying approaches to downsizing that have been employed 
since the 1980s. Cameron (1994, p. 210), in his earlier mentioned multi-case study 
(Cameron, Freeman and Mishra, 1991), for instance, found, in general, that 
implementation approaches such as "employee involvement, teamwork, communication 
and information sharing, rewarding, appraising, training, articulating a vision, and 
administering downsizing in a trustworthy and fair manner are all critical aspects of 
successful downsizing and they all lie within the normal responsibilities of the human 
resource professional." Similarly, Mishra, Spreitzer and Mishra (Winter 1998), drawing 
on data from an ongoing research program begun in the late 1980s involving in-depth 
case studies at High Steel Structures, Inc. and two General Motors plant sites, ascertained 
a number of general approaches to downsizing. The researchers stressed the importance 
of implementation strategies such as openness and honesty, over-communicating, helping 
departing employees find other jobs, fairness, involving employees, and providing career 
counseling and survivor training. Lastly, Applebaum, Everard and Hung (1999), in their 
meta-analysis of the downsizing literature aimed at establishing critical success factors of 
downsizing, specifically pointed out two overarching downsizing approaches: 
reorientation (adopting more efficient and effective overall structures following in-depth 
analysis of present mission and strategic direction) and convergence (ways to improve 
productivity, streamlining operations and continually seeking increases in efficiency). 
Empirical Studies & Models that Illuminate the Organizational Downsizing Intervention 
The literature also has shown how researchers have conducted empirical studies 
of organizational downsizing initiatives in efforts to better understand the efficacy of 
downsizing as a change intervention. Indeed, the amount of empirical studies in the 
literature addressing the general efficacy of downsizing has been voluminous and it has 
focused largely on domestic and global initiatives within the private sector. Therefore, in 
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this final subsection, I will provide an overview of a number of those frequently cited and 
are especially relevant to the topic of this dissertation. Those studies that will be reviewed 
here include Mishra & Spreitzer's (1998) "Explaining How Survivors Respond to 
Downsizing: The Roles of Trust, Empowerment, Justice and Work Redesign," Mishra, 
Spreitzer & Mishra's (1998) Preserving Employee Morale During Downsizing, Cascio's 
(1998) Learning From Outcomes: Financial Experiences of 31 lFirms That Have 
Downsized," Applebaum, Close & Klasa's (1999) Downsizing: An Examination of Some 
Successes and More Failures," Applebaum, Everard & Hung's (1999) "Strategic 
Downsizing: Critical Success Factors," De Meuse, Bergmann, Vanderheiden & Roraff s 
(2004) New Evidence Regarding Organizational Downsizing and a Firm's Financial 
Performance," McCann, Hassard & Morris' (2004) "Middle Managers, the New 
Organizational Ideology and Corporate Restructuring: Comparing Japanese and Anglo-
American Management Systems," and Mirabal & De Young's (2005) "Downsizing as a 
Strategic Intervention." To bring some order to this abundance of empirical studies, I will 
organize this discussion around the following significant effects of organizational 
downsizing that are frequently cited in the literature: (a) trust, empowerment and work 
redesign (Mishra & Spreitzer, Mishra, Spreitzer & Mishra and Applebaum, Everard & 
Hung); (b) decreased morale, job security and job satisfaction (McCann, Hassard & 
Morris and Applebaum, Close & Klasa); (c) dealing with survivors' emotions 
(Applebaum, Close & Klasa); and (d) financial performance (Cascio and De Meuse, 
Bergmann, Vanderheiden & Roraff and Mirabal & DeYoung). 
Trust, Empowerment and Work Design in Organizational Downsizing 
There is an abundance of literature on the effects of organizational downsizing 
upon survivors' feelings of trust and empowerment and their experiences of enhanced job 
variety and work redesign. Mishra & Spreitzer (1998, p. 3), building on a substantial 
body of research, argue that "trust, empowerment and work redesign may have important 
effects on survivors during downsizing." In their extensively researched study, they 
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further argue that without: (a) trust, survivors are more likely to withdraw from the 
organization or retaliate against management and the downsizing implementation; (b) 
empowerment, survivors experience a lack of personal control and feel helpless in the 
face of change; and (c) work redesign to minimize overload or reductions in job 
autonomy, survivors will see themselves as having less capacity to cope with the 
downsizing and will be more likely to respond passively (p. 3). They also suggest that: 
(a) trust in management and justice in the implementation process reduce perceptions of 
threat from the downsizing and facilitate more constructive survivor responses; and (b) 
empowerment and work redesign enhance survivors' sense of coping with the 
downsizing and facilitate more active survivor responses. 
In the same way, Mishra, Spreitzer & Mishra (1998, p. 84), drawing on findings 
(as noted earlier) from a longitudinal study on effective strategies for downsizing, 
contended that "maintaining the trust and empowerment of survivors is essential to 
minimize costs and realize the expected gains." At the same time, they determined from 
extensive interviews with top managers, employee surveys and in-depth case studies that 
"trust and empowerment decline considerably during downsizing for various reasons" (p. 
85). Included among those reasons was lack of: credible communication (i.e., withheld 
information); belief that management cares about employees' needs; trust in top 
management's competency; and belief in company's reliability (i.e., promises reneged 
and inconsistent intentions and actions). Furthermore, in their broad study of the 
downsizing literature, Applebaum, Everard & Hung (1999) stated that "a lack of trust can 
lead to increased absenteeism, tardiness, theft, and sabotage which can result in decreased 
workplace cooperation, innovation, productivity and quality performance" (p. 547). In 
addition, they asserted that "building trust among all members of the organization is one 
of the most critical success factors to successful downsizing operations" and concluded 
further that survivors' "feelings of trust and commitment are enhanced... [when they 
know] that their former colleagues [those who have been laid off] have been taken care 
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of ' (p. 548). 
Decreased Morale, Job Security and Job Satisfaction 
Scholars have looked extensively at the effects of organizational downsizing on 
survivors' morale, as well as their perspectives on job security and job satisfaction. In 
their expansive study of widespread corporate and public restructuring and downsizing in 
30 large organizations in Japan, the United States and the UK, McCann, Hassard & 
Morris (2004, p. 27)) argue that middle managers today face heavy workloads and 
limited promotion prospects. In fact, based on interviews with senior and middle 
managers, the researchers found that, over the past two decades, middle managers in 
these three countries have experienced confusion, demoralization and insecurity as a 
result of some major downsizing in the public sector and intense corporate organizational 
restructuring (p. 32). Likewise, they suggest that the confusion and feelings of insecurity 
among the middle management ranks in the US and Japan is the result of the "pace, 
extent and continuous nature of organizational change" and the growing "rate of 
displacement for white-collar workers" (p. 35). They also cite, for example, reports of: 
high staff turnover and low job satisfaction among managers in UK service sector 
organizations; difficulties associated with motivating staff (i.e., with secure employment 
and career progression opportunities) in flattened management structures in the US and 
UK; and American and British middle managers becoming more at risk from job 
redundancies and, consequently, feeling they have little job security (pp. 36-39). In like 
manner, Applebaum, Close & Klasa (1999) attributed poor performance on the part of 
companies that downsize to lack of preparation for the low morale and lower productivity 
experienced by the survivors of the downsizing. Additionally, in their review of selected 
research on organizational change and downsizing, Applebaum, Close & Klasa noted the 
anxiety experienced by survivors who "see that traditional upward career paths in their 
organizations have been indefinitely altered after the restructuring" and "are confused as 
to how they will follow the career paths which had been clear to them before the 
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restructuring" (p. 430). 
Dealing with Survivors' Emotions 
Survivor syndrome and its various symptoms and effects has been extensively 
analyzed and described in the literature by researchers attempting to chronicle many of 
the victims' and survivors' emotional responses to organizational downsizing. Beyond 
the obvious anxiety that employees feel, researchers have reported a myriad of other 
emotional responses that victims and survivors experience because of organizational 
downsizing, restructuring and layoffs. Applebaum, Close and Klasa (1999) advise, in 
their discussion of the "survivor syndrome," that the "psychological state of the survivors 
of downsizing operations is often ignored by top management" (p. 429). They also note 
that survivors "may have difficulty adapting to the emotional, psychological and stylistic 
organizational environment existing after the downsizing" and "rather than being 
thankful to keep their jobs, employees are demoralized and less loyal, more angry, 
cynical and distrustful" (pp. 430 & 435). In like manner, the researchers also mentioned 
other studies, for example Clark and Koonce (1995), that showed "if organizations wish 
to decrease the pain felt by survivors after the downsizing that they must design survivor 
programs which seek to communicate, consistent, and clear information concerning the 
transition plans" (Applebaum, Close & Klasa, p. 431). In particular, the researchers listed 
two such management and employee training programs: Compaq Computer's pre-
downsizing management training program (i.e., concerned with providing supervisors 
with credible information about the layoffs and showing them how to effectively conduct 
their meetings with subordinates); and the State of Oregon's post-announcement 
downsizing workshops (i.e., aimed at encouraging affected employees to discuss their 
feelings of anger and grief caused by the layoffs and accepting the discomfort caused by 
changes in their j obs). 
Financial Performance of Downsized Organizations 
As has been noted earlier, many, if not most definitions of downsizing generally 
50 
include an organization's desire or intent to improve efficiency and performance through 
various cost-containment and cost-cutting measures. Because of its implicit significance 
to a better understanding of organizational downsizing as a viable change intervention, 
the financial performance of downsized organizations has come under considerable 
scrutiny in the literature over the past 15 years. Casio (1998, p. 69), based on his analysis 
of 311 companies that downsized employees by more than 3% in any year between 1980 
and 1990, observed a number of results including: (1) the level of downsizing in any 
given company did not affect post-downsizing company financial performance; (2) the 
level of downsizing did not affect a company's post-downsizing stock performance; and 
(3) employee downsizing per se did not appear to lead to improved company financial 
performance, nor did it have a detrimental effect on company financial performance. 
Adding to these findings, DeMeuse, Bergmann, Vanderheiden & Roraff (2004, pp. 162, 
170-172), in their recent longitudinal study examining layoff and employment levels 
(1989 through 1996) and financial performance measures (1987 through 1998) of the 
Fortune 100 companies, found that: (a) downsizing companies performed significantly 
poorer up to two years following the announcement on several financial indices; (b) 
companies that laid off a relatively small number of employees (3% or less) performed 
significantly better on four of the five financial indices in the year of the announcement; 
and (c) companies laying off 10% or higher significantly under-performed firms laying 
off less on profit margin, return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE), and market-to-
book ratio. On the other hand, the researchers also found that: (a) three years after the 
announcement and for the remaining years investigated, firms that laid off were no longer 
significantly under-performing their counterparts; and (b) the financial performance of 
firms laying off less than 3% were not significantly different than those companies laying 
off 3% or more. 
These new data suggest that "during the initial few years following downsizing 
[as evidenced in Cascio's earlier study data], financial performance is poor but then 
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improves" (p. 174). However, Mirabal & DeYoung (2005, p. 42), in another recent study 
examining a number of empirical studies that looked at the financial performance and 
cost competitiveness of downsizing organizations, reports that one such study 
investigated several organizations over a three year period following the decision to 
downsize (Lowe, 1998). Mirabal & De Young point out that the researchers of that study 
found that: (1) organizations which chose to focus on downsizing as it relates to 
employee headcount over physical assets actually saw a decline in their return on assets 
(ROA) while other organizations saw a negligible decline in ROA; (2) organizations that 
chose to implement downsizing on a larger scale experienced similar results, thus 
indicating that the employment downsizing neither helped nor hindered the 
organization's financial performance. Given all of the mixed findings discussed above, it 
is clear that more research is necessary before it can be determined, with any certainty, 
whether or not the desired or anticipated outcomes in financial performance have been or 
can be successfully achieved through the use of organizational downsizing. 
Summary 
This section of the literature reviewed the development of and contemporary 
approaches to organizational downsizing. Even though the history of organizational 
downsizing is relatively brief, this review discloses that the amount of literature is 
substantial and growing. This section examined four aspects of the downsizing literature 
including the emergence of organizational downsizing as an organizational change 
intervention, various definitions of and approaches to implementing organizational 
downsizing, and empirical studies that clarify our understanding of the organizational 
downsizing intervention. Cameron's and Jones' influential definitions and notions of 
organizational downsizing were presented. In particular, Jones' expansive view of 
downsizing interventions (e.g., reducing employees or work, eliminating functions, levels 
or units and streamlining activities) and strategies (e.g., normal attrition, voluntary 
severance programs, early retirements, etc.) were also reviewed in this section. 
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In conclusion, the literature confirms the need for more research into the 
financial performance of downsizing organizations, as well as the approaches used by 
government entities in implementing organizational downsizing especially at the state 
and local government level. From this review it became evident that no literature exists 
on the subject of organizational downsizing in local government. The next section 
explores what the literature says about the major theories and concepts and different 
methods and approaches to motivating workers. 
The Literature on Motivating Workers, in General, and in Downsized Organizations 
Similar to the literature available on the organizational downsizing construct, the 
literature on the topics of motivating workers, in general, and in downsized organizations, 
in particular, is voluminous. Thus, the purpose of this section will be to distill an 
expansive literature in order to provide some background about the major theories and 
concepts and, in particular, the different methods and approaches to motivating workers. 
This section will be divided into four subsections: (1) the emergence of theories, 
concepts, managerial approaches and practices associated with the notion of motivation 
in the workplace; (2) a review of empirical studies examining various concepts, methods 
and approaches to motivating workers in business and governmental settings; and (3) a 
review of influential empirical research on the different methods and approaches to 
motivating survivors in downsized private and public sector organizations. 
The Emergence of Theories, Managerial Approaches and Practices Used in Workplace 
Motivation 
The construct of work motivation emerged from a variety of psychological 
theories of motivation (Steers & Porter, 1974; Porter, Bigley & Steers, 2003; Steers, 
Mowday & Shapiro, 2004). For example, Steers et al. (2004) point out that most theories 
of motivation have roots in the early Greek philosophical principle of hedonism that says 
that "individuals tend to seek pleasure and avoid pain" (p. 9). In short, Steers and Porter 
argue that hedonistic desires drive "people [to] rationally consider the behavioral 
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alternatives available to them and act to maximize positive results and to minimize 
negative results" (p. 9). Likewise, Steers et al. (2004) trace the evolution of the 
motivation construct beginning with it's migration from the "realm of philosophy to the 
newly emerging science of psychology" at the end of the nineteenth century to the 
instinct theories of the early twentieth century, the drive and reinforcement models of the 
1920s through the 1950s, the content or need theories of the 1950s, the process or 
cognitive theories of the mid 1960s through the 1980s, the seemingly "precipitous 
decline" of "intellectual interest in work motivation theory" of the 1990s, and, finally, to 
the present need to "redirect intellectual energies into discovering.. .new models- of work 
motivation and job performance commensurate with this new era" of organizational 
evolution (pp. 380-384). 
Amidst the development of these theories of motivation emerged various 
managerial approaches to motivation and the development of distinctively different 
managerial practices relative to motivation in the workplace (Porter et al., 2003; Steers et 
al., 2004). Steers et al. (2004) advise that "while psychologists were focusing on instincts 
and drives, managers were focusing on more pragmatic issues" (p. 380). This can be seen 
in the evolution of the three major managerial models of motivation: (a) the traditional 
model as adopted in the early nineteenth century by the proponents of Frederick Taylor's 
"scientific management school," (b) the human relations model as developed in the late 
1920s and refined through the late 1950s by the "human relations school of 
management," and (c) the human resources model as proposed in the 1960s and early 
1970s and which continues to be attempted today in many organizations (Steers& Porter, 
1975; Porter et al., 2003). 
Traditional Model 
Essentially, researchers (e.g., Steers & Porter, 1974, Porter et al., 2003, and Steers 
et al., 2004) agree that Frederick Taylor and his associates saw the inefficiencies of 
factory production during the industrial revolution as a management problem that 
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required a "paternalistic approach to managing workers" (Steers et al., 2004). Indeed, this 
paternalistic approach to motivation rested on the notion that "workers were viewed as 
being typically lazy, often dishonest, aimless, dull, and, most of all, mercenary" (Steers et 
al., 2004; Porter et al., 2003). Likewise, these researchers indicate that the prevailing 
viewpoint of proponents of the traditional model of motivation was simply "to get 
workers to produce, tasks were to be simple and repetitive, output controls were to be 
externally set, and workers were to be paid bonuses for beating their quotas" (Steers et 
al., 2004; Porter et al., 2003). Equally important, these researchers report that, under this 
traditional managerial approach to motivation, management was responsible for hiring 
suitable people for jobs, training them well, supervising them closely, and paying them in 
a manner that enabled them to "maximize their income by doing exactly what 
management told them to do and doing it as rapidly as possible" (Steers et al., 2004; 
Porter et al, 2003). Finally, these researchers agree that this traditional system of 
motivating workers began to decline in the late 1920s as a result of "an increasingly 
sophisticated workforce coupled with company efforts to maximize productivity without 
simultaneously increasing employee rewards" which eventually led to the "widespread 
rise of unionization efforts in the 1930s" (Steers et al., 2004, p. 380). 
Human Relations Model 
As the traditional model began to decline in acceptance in the late 1920s, 
researchers and managers started to argue for the importance of considering the 'whole 
person' in the workplace. In other words, in departing from the pessimistic view of 
workers under the traditional model of motivation, proponents of a new approach (known 
as the human relations model) contended that employees needed to be viewed as 
"complex beings with multiple motivational influences" (Steers et al., 2004, p. 380). For 
this reason, researchers like Mayo (1933) and Roethlisberger and Dickson (1939) and 
their management counterparts began to promote the notion that "management had a 
responsibility to make employees feel useful and important on the job, to provide 
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recognition, and generally to facilitate the satisfaction of workers' social needs" (Porter et 
al., 2003, p. 20). As a result, in addition to managers feeling they "had a new 
responsibility to make workers feel important," other motivational strategies emerged 
such as: (a) organizations opening up information and communication channels 
increasing employee knowledge of the company and opportunities to have their opinions 
heard by management; (b) workers being increasingly allowed to make routine decisions 
concerning their own jobs; and (c) organizations giving greater attention to using group 
incentive systems (Porter et al., 2003, p.20). 
Human Resources Model 
It should be noted that notwithstanding these advances in managerial approaches 
to motivation, at base, the human relations model embraced the same basic goal of 
"securing employee compliance with managerial authority" as did the traditional model 
of motivation (Porter et al., 2003). Porter et al. (2003), in fact, observe that from the mid 
1960s through the early 1970s, the human relations model was widely challenged as not 
only an oversimplified notion of human behavior but also for being as manipulative as 
the traditional model. Accordingly, Miles (1965), along with several other theorists (e.g., 
McGregor, 1960, Likert, 1967, Schein, 1972), proposed a different approach, albeit under 
various titles, which came to be known as the human resources model (Porter et al., 
2003). 
Those theorists who advocated the human resources model advanced the view 
that human beings are "motivated by a complex set of interrelated factors (such as 
money, need for affiliation, need for achievement, and desire for meaningful 
work)... [and] it is assumed that different employees often seek quite different goals in a 
job and have a diversity of talents to offer" (Porter et al., 2003, p.20). In addition, this 
philosophy assumes that people want to contribute on the job, work does not have to be 
distasteful, employees are very capable of making significant decisions affecting their 
work, and increased self-control and direction given to employees can determine the level 
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of job satisfaction (Porter et al., 2003, p. 21). Hence, through its optimistic view of 
workers, this conceptualization holds that "management should attempt to determine how 
best to use the potential resources available to it through its workforce" (Porter et al., 
2003, p.21). In short, Porter et al. (2003) relate that, in contrast to the traditional and 
human relations models, the human resources model encourages management to set up 
conditions that enable employees to meet their own goals while simultaneously meeting 
the organization's goals rather than manipulating them or seeking compliance with 
authority (p. 21). 
Empirical Studies Examining Concepts, Methods and Approaches to Motivating Workers 
in Business and Government Settings 
In this second subsection, I will review three recent empirical studies examining 
various concepts, methods and approaches to motivating workers in the private and 
public sectors. These studies are frequently cited in the literature and have become 
popular and influential sources of ideas about motivating workers in recent years. Also, 
these studies and, in particular, their findings build upon some of the concepts, models 
and practices of organizational change and downsizing discussed earlier in this 
dissertation. First, I review Lee and Koh's (2001) International Journal of Human 
Resource Management study entitled "Is Empowerment Really a New Concept?" which 
is an extensive analysis of the literature addressing the implications of psychological 
empowerment in the workplace. Second, I will review Houkes, Janssen, de Jonge and 
Bakker's (2003) "Specific Determinants of Intrinsic Work Motivation, Emotional 
Exhaustion and Turnover Intention: A Multi-sample Longitudinal Study" which is a 
quantitative study of intrinsic work motivation of employees that tested relationships 
between work characteristics and outcomes. Third, I discuss Perry, Mesch and 
Pearlberg's (2006) "Motivating Employees in a New Governance Era: The Performance 
Paradigm Revisited" which is a "review of reviews" of a voluminous body of social and 
behavioral science research on motivating human performance in public, private and 
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nonprofit organizations. 
In their study, Lee and Koh (2001) reviewed over seventy reference sources to 
explore the concept of empowerment as a new managerial approach rather than an 
extension or component of other similar concepts or approaches like authority delegation, 
motivation, self-efficacy, job enrichment, employee ownership, autonomy, self-
determination, self-management, self-control, self-influence, self-leadership, high-
involvement and participative management. Through extensive analysis, the researchers 
developed a unifying definition of empowerment that integrates aspects of both behavior 
and perception. They define empowerment as "the psychological state of a subordinate 
perceiving four dimensions of meaningfulness, competence self-determination and 
impact, which is affected by empowering behaviours of the supervisor" (p. 686). 
Based on their analysis, the researchers concluded that "empowerment is really a 
new and unique concept...and that the uniqueness denies substitution with any of 
the...nouns" (Lee & Koh, 2001, p. 692) or more specifically, any of the concepts or 
approaches that were discussed above (e.g., authority delegation, motivation, self-
efficacy, etc.). Especially important for understanding the impact of approaches, practices 
and methods to motivating workers, the researchers also found that the "concept of 
empowerment is really a new paradigm shifted from the traditional motivational 
approach" and, undoubtedly, the human relations approach in that it "has been brought in 
as a solution for the motivation issues that could not be settled with old theories" (p. 688). 
However, in contrast, the researchers state that "the empowerment approach is concerned 
with the self-actualization of subordinates as well as organizational performance" (p. 
688). In other words, in the same way that Porter et al. (2003) characterized the human 
resources model (see above), Lee & Koh suggest that the empowerment approach is, 
indeed, an important element of and a practical tool in effectuating the paradigm shift 
from the traditional motivational and human relations models to the contemporary human 
resources model. 
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Houkes, Janssen, de Jonge and Bakker (2003) conducted a longitudinal study 
which tested a theoretically derived pattern of specific relationships between four work 
characteristics (e.g., task characteristics, workload, social support and unmet career 
expectations) and three outcomes (e.g., intrinsic work motivation, emotional exhaustion 
and turnover retention). The researchers used the previously developed research model 
(Janssen et al., 1999; Houkes et al., 2001) at selected organizational settings to test the 
following hypotheses: intrinsic work motivation is primarily predicted by challenging 
task characteristics; emotional exhaustion is primarily predicted by a high work load and 
lack of social support; and turnover retention is primarily predicted by unmet career 
expectations. The researchers selected two different study populations (bank employees 
working at the offices of a large Dutch bank and teachers working at a center for 
technical and vocational training). The researchers found that task redesign may influence 
the intrinsic work motivation of employees in the short-term as well as in the long-term, 
and reducing levels of workload may prevent emotional exhaustion and retention of 
valuable employees might be accomplished by means of paying attention to their career 
expectations (e.g., career development and education programs). The latter findings are 
particularly relevant here in that they mirror some of the previously mentioned best 
practices and lessons learned from organizational downsizing and reinforce some of the 
managerial approaches used in addressing some of the behavioral effects of 
organizational downsizing discussed in the previous section of this literature review. 
Finally, Perry, Mesch and Pearlberg (2006) analyzed over 60 articles reviewing 
the impact of the "four elements of the traditional performance paradigm: financial 
incentives, job design, employee participation and goal setting" (p. 505). The researchers 
reviewed 17 narrative reviews, 15 research syntheses, and 30 meta-analyses of prior 
research on motivation in a wide range of business and government settings. The 
researchers identified 13 broad propositions for consideration by practitioners and for 
further testing and refinement regarding the impact of the four aforementioned elements 
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on employee and organizational performance. 
Of the 13 propositions, five of the most salient have been selected here for 
discussion. First, the researchers found that financial incentives improve task 
performance moderately to significantly, but their effectiveness is dependent on 
organizational conditions such as types of incentives and organizations. Second, they also 
found that individual financial incentives (e.g., merit pay and pay-for-performance) are 
ineffective in impacting employee motivation and organizational performance in 
traditional public sector settings. Third, the researchers ascertained that job redesign and 
alternative work schedules are effective strategies for improving performance, reducing 
turnover and absenteeism, and increasing job satisfaction and organizational 
commitment. Fourth, they determined that participation has a strong positive impact on 
employees' affective reactions to the organization (e.g., higher satisfaction with processes 
and decisions, and stronger commitment). Fifth, participation has a positive but limited 
impact on employee performance and even more limited results on performance can be 
expected in government settings. 
Empirical Research on Methods and Approaches to Motivating Survivors in Downsized 
Organizations 
In this third subsection, I focus more narrowly on downsized organizations. 
Specifically, I discuss what the literature says about the methods and approaches to 
motivating survivors in downsized organizations in both the private and public sectors. 
As such, I examine a number of influential studies that explore the impact of various 
methods and approaches to motivating survivors that leaders in downsized organizations 
have implemented over the past twenty years in response to survivors' concerns and the 
unintended consequences of downsizing (Buch & Aldridge, 1990; Brockner, 1992; 
Cameron, Freeman & Mishra, 1991; Katz, 1998; Gurin, 1998; Lippitt & Lippitt, 1984; 
Lewin & Johnston, 2000). Essentially, these methods and approaches embody many of 
the models, best practices, and approaches employed in organizational change and 
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downsizing interventions discussed throughout this literature review. 
As noted earlier in the background to the study and the previous section of this 
dissertation, the empirical literature on organizational downsizing is vast. Likewise, the 
same is true for empirical studies on the methods and approaches to motivating survivors 
in downsized organizations. Consequently, the abundant empirical literature on methods 
and approaches to motivating survivors in downsized organizations has been organized 
into five of the most commonly reported categories of methods and approaches employed 
in downsizing contexts: job enrichment; reward systems, appraisal systems, training and 
development, career development and planning, and performance management and 
appraisal systems. Hence, in the discussions that follow, I will provide relevant 
references to Rothwell and Kazanas (2003), noted human resource theorists/consultants, 
in order to provide some context and a clearer understanding of each of the reported 
categories. Additionally, I will follow those references with some examples (and brief 
discussions) of empirical studies found in the literature that are directly associated with 
each of those reported categories. 
Job enrichment 
As noted previously, job enrichment, also known as job/work redesign, has been 
used by organizational development (OD) and management practitioners as a tool for 
motivating employees, in general, and, in organizational change and downsizing 
initiatives, in particular. According to Rothwell and Kazanas (2003), noted human 
resource theorists/consultants, "job enrichment involves adding a task or series of tasks 
that require more knowledge, technical expertise, responsibility, or other characteristics 
not otherwise typical of a job generally... [and] it is argued [that] enrichment increases 
employee motivation because it is intrinsically satisfying to be given more responsibility 
and more demanding, challenging work" (pp. 402-403). In terms of related empirical 
studies, Buch and Aldridge (1990), in their previously cited research article, suggest that 
"current jobs may be 'enriched' through the addition of new roles (e.g., mentoring), skills 
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or responsibilities" (p. 34). Likewise, Brockner (1992), in his earlier referenced research 
study, writes that the "post-layoff environment provides an especially fertile ground for 
redesigning the work survivors do so as to make it more psychologically interesting" (p. 
25). Additionally, Brockner (1992) indicates that Kodak involves employees in decision 
making, in working in teams, and teaches them how to check their own work. 
Reward and compensation systems 
The allocation and distribution of rewards for individual contributions of 
survivors of downsizing can be an integral part of an organization's human resources 
strategy for increasing productivity, improving morale and encouraging new behaviors. 
Rothwell and Kazanas (2003) write that reward systems can influence behavior and affect 
"who is motivated to perform, and who is or is not satisfied" (p. 275). They also cite two 
kinds of rewards: extrinsic (outside the individual who takes action- e.g., salary, benefits, 
promotions, and awards), and intrinsic (within and inseparable from the individual- e.g., 
satisfaction with a job well done, or seeing how you helped develop others). In terms of 
relevant empirical studies, Cameron et al. (1991), for instance, in their previously noted 
research project, mention "incentives for learning new tasks and expanding personal 
competencies.. .to motivate survivors who faced new demands" in organizations that 
downsized effectively (p. 65). Also, Brockner (1992) reports that "publicly announced 
rewards are especially needed to encourage survivors to undertake new behaviors" and 
cites an example of a downsizing organization that "financially rewarded survivors who 
made useful suggestions on how to improve productivity" (p. 26). 
Furthermore, Katz (1998) writes about a variety of rewards programs 
implemented at Brooklyn Union Gas Company including: (a) the "Above and Beyond" 
program providing selected employees with $500 to $2,500 for doing outstanding work 
on a special project; (b) a program encouraging managers to reward employees good 
work with something other than money (e.g., a day off, a plaque, theater or baseball 
tickets, public recognition, a kind word, a pat on the back); and (c) an "employee-of the-
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quarter award" providing recipients with a $250 check, a plaque and being taken to lunch 
by a corporate officer (p. 5). He also provides accounts of Brooklyn Union and Bay State 
Gas Company's changes in their compensation systems that included combinations of 
fixed and performance incentive compensation, salary bands in place of salary grades and 
expanded participation in bonus programs. Lastly, Gurin (1998) refers to a benchmarked 
electronics distribution company's elimination of an old commission-based sales 
compensation system and replacing it with a revolutionary salaries and profit-sharing 
system for all employees which created incentives to collaborate across teams. 
Training and development 
Implementation of new training programs and components has been mentioned 
frequently in this dissertation as an effective human resources practice in successfully 
effectuating organizational change and downsizing interventions. Rothwell and Kazanas 
(2003) say that training involves "organized learning activities capable of improving 
individual performance through changes in knowledge, skills, or attitudes" (p. 353). 
Furthermore, they state that "training can help an organization that is moving toward 
implementation of a new strategy in a changing environment" (p. 354). In the same way, 
Lippitt and Lippitt (1984), in their earlier mentioned case study of a military equipment 
manufacturer facing downsizing, describe a program designed to help line managers 
"tackle the problem [of limited resources] by training them in the arts of doing without" 
and "involve them in the process of regaining stabilization" (pp. 20-21). 
Additionally, Cameron et al. (1991) tell about training and development activities 
in one organization in the U.S. auto industry that was begun a year before downsizing 
was implemented and which prepared employees for "changes that would occur in the 
structures and management process" (p. 65). Likewise, Katz (1998) relates the details of 
Bay State and Brooklyn Union's introduction of new training and development 
opportunities that included managerial training in performance management, marketing 
and entrepreneurship courses, leadership development programs for management and 
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supervisory employees, a distance learning program incorporating satellite down-linked 
university lectures and a "visiting professor" program. 
Career development and planning 
As noted frequently throughout the literature and this dissertation, survivors' 
continuous concerns about diminished career opportunities have drawn considerable 
management attention in downsized organizations. For this reason, OD and management 
practitioners have experimented with and adopted different programs focused on helping 
survivors better understand how their careers can be best managed in the new and 
continuously changing organizational environment. Rothwell and Kazanas (2003) 
observe that career development is a "continuous process of improving an individual's 
abilities in anticipation of future opportunities for achieving career objectives" (p. 302). 
They also advance the notion that career planning is an "individual's lifelong process of 
establishing personal career objectives acting in a manner intended to bring them about" 
(p. 302). 
Once again, Lippitt and Lippitt (1984) offered their case study of the military 
equipment manufacturer as an example of how career and life-goals planning sessions for 
"endangered executives" engenders good will by encouraging them "to examine—with 
professional guidance—themselves, their lives, and their careers from an intensely 
personal viewpoint" (p. 20). Moreover, Buch and Aldridge (1990), in developing a 
taxonomy matching specific organizational development interventions to specific 
downsizing challenges, proposed career planning and development interventions that 
included programs that honestly communicate the "realities of the new structure" and the 
internal and external "alternatives to upward mobility" available to employees (p. 34). In 
addition, they propose that organizations consider providing counseling, if necessitated 
by the extent of the restructuring, "to help employees face failed careers" (p. 34). Finally, 
Lewin and Johnston (2000), in their review of numerous research studies and surveys, 
present a new employment model with focused survivor programs among which include 
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career planning and development workshops that communicate the competencies needed 
in the restructured organization, and help "employees identify current professional 
capabilities, potential skill gaps, and short and long term professional goals" (p. 51). 
Appraisal and performance management systems 
The literature has mentioned continuously how successful OD and management 
practitioners have carefully examined and revamped their appraisal processes and 
performance management systems in efforts to motivate survivors and to ensure 
alignment of their human resources practices with their overall restructuring and 
downsizing strategies. In that context, Rothwell and Kazanas (2003) state that 
performance management is the "process of establishing a work environment where 
people want to perform, and where they receive continuous feedback about their 
performance" (p. 105). With this in mind, they make clear that "employee performance 
appraisals assess or measure how well individuals are performing their jobs over a 
specific time period" and affirm that appraisals are "usually included as part of a more 
comprehensive performance-management system" (Rothwell & Kazanas, 2003, p. 105). 
All this considered, Cameron et al. (1991) pointed to one auto industry organization in 
their study that redesigned its appraisal system in advance of downsizing and, to that end, 
held managers "accountable for the extent to which they developed and trained their own 
subordinates in new jobs and functions" (p. 65). Furthermore, Gurin (1998), in a research 
project benchmarking the best leadership and management practices at ten downsized and 
reorganized domestic and international manufacturing, distribution and logistics 
companies, suggests that performance appraisal and reward systems must be aligned by 
ensuring that those systems reinforce clearly defined teamwork behaviors like 
cooperation and collaboration. In conclusion, Lewin and Johnston (2000) put forward the 
robust notion that "new competencies and learning orientations" must be integrated into 
ongoing performance and evaluation criteria, as well as, in a much broader sense, reward 
and recognition systems, and employee training and development programs. 
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Summary 
The third section of the literature reviewed what the literature said about the 
different methods and approaches to motivating workers in the private and public sectors. 
This section presented the emergence of the work motivation construct from its roots in 
early Greek philosophy and the science of psychology to modern theories of motivation 
and managerial practices applied to motivation in organizations. Also, this section 
examined three major managerial models of motivation (e.g., the traditional, human 
relations, and human resources models), findings from three recent empirical studies on 
various methods and approaches to motivating workers in business and governmental 
settings, and five commonly reported categories of methods and approaches to motivating 
survivors in downsized organizations. In particular, the findings from the studies on 
motivating workers, in general, and the categories of methods and approaches to 
motivating workers in downsized organizations, specifically, are important to 
understanding how leaders can effectively motivate survivors and create work 
environments that value and respect employees' contributions in the restructured 
organization. 
In conclusion, the literature substantiates the fact that though there is ample 
research on motivating workers, in general, and motivating survivors in downsized 
private sector organizations, specifically, there is need for similar research at the state and 
local government level. From this review it became evident that no literature exists on the 
subject of motivating workers, in general, and survivors of downsizing, in particular, in 
local government. Likewise, it is further evident that no literature exists on leaders' 
perceptions of the efficacy of their efforts to motivate their surviving subordinates. The 
following section investigates what the literature says about the role of leaders in 
changing and revitalizing organizations. 
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The Role of Leadership in Changing and Revitalizing Organizations 
In this section, I will discuss the role of leaders in changing and revitalizing 
organizations. Here, I will develop in more detail many of the ideas that I introduced in 
the 'background to the study' section and earlier sections of this literature review. The 
purpose of this section will be to provide an understanding of relevant leadership theory 
and some influential empirical research into the ways in which leaders change and 
revitalize organizations undergoing change. Additionally, I will situate the role of leaders 
in private industry and the public sector and provide overviews of the literature on the 
nature of leadership, the process of leading organizational change, and leaders' 
involvement with implementing organizational change efforts. The subsections include: 
(1) the study and concept of leadership; (2) the conceptual notions of leadership in 
relation to effectively leading organizational change and the leadership skills and 
characteristics required in implementing change; and (3) studies that illuminate leaders' 
involvement with implementing organizational change efforts. 
The Study and Concept of Leadership 
In this first subsection, I will focus on the broad discussions in the literature about 
the concept of leadership. Leadership is one of the most studied and discussed topics in 
both popular-press books and in the academic research literature (Burns, 1978; Rost, 
1991; Northouse, 2004). Since the late 1970s, organizational theorists have written 
insightfully on the topic of leadership and its relationship to the construct of change. 
Among the most notable and widely read of these influential theorists, Greenleaf (1977), 
Burns (1979), Rost (1991), and Heifetz (1994) have contributed significantly to the study 
of leadership and, to a somewhat lesser degree, to the evolving construct of change. 
Greenleaf's view of leadership and change 
Greenleaf (1977), a retired AT&T executive, proposed his unique view of servant 
leadership at a time when the qualities of leaders and followers in institutions and 
organizations, within the public and private domains, were being closely examined in the 
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research and popular literature. In laying out the foundation of his unique servant 
leadership paradigm, Greenleaf (1977) said: 
The servant-leader is servant first.. .It begins with the natural feeling that one 
wants to serve, to serve first. Then conscious choice brings one to aspire to lead. 
That person is sharply different from one who is leader first, perhaps because of 
the need to assuage an unusual power drive or to acquire material 
possessions.. .The difference manifest itself in the care taken by the servant-first 
to make sure that other people's highest priority needs are being served (p. 27). 
From the start, the notion of servant leadership was viewed clearly as a revolutionary 
approach to the practice of leadership. In fact, Conger and Benjamin (1999) asserted that 
the servant leadership model "can be represented by turning the traditional hierarchical 
pyramid upside down thereby placing customers and employees at the top and the 
president and CEO at the bottom" (p. 131). However, Greenleaf, in discussing servant 
leadership in an address to the School Sisters of Saint Francis at Alverno College in 
Milwaukee in 1974, also acknowledged that "leadership means that one individual has a 
better than average sense of what should be done now" and recognized that "inspiration is 
usually received by the best prepared individual who, for this immediate act, is the 
leader" (Greenleaf, 1977, p. 256). Greenleaf, in describing followers at that same 
conference, further expressed the notion that "followership is an equally responsible role 
because it means that the individual must take the risk to empower the leader" (p. 256). 
By emphasizing the servant aspect of leadership along with the reciprocally empowering 
nature of followership, Greenleaf clearly postulated, for the first time in the research 
literature, the existence of an interchangeable and dual relationship between leadership 
and followership. 
Another important theme in Greenleaf s work is the servant leader's role in 
responding to or influencing change within an organization or institution. In addressing 
the role of institutional trustees and administrators, Greenleaf (1977) asserted that 
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trustees, as servant leaders, are in a better position than administrators to be open to 
change (p. 118). Likewise, Greenleaf declared that trustees, because of their unique 
position, have the task of revising old goals and/or determining new goals when 
institutional changes must be made in preparation for the future (pp. 118-119). 
Furthermore, in commenting on servant leadership in education and, in particular, the 
pressure for change in schools, Greenleaf stated: 
In our schools we have already changed- sometimes radically- and some of it may 
have been painful. We know we must change some more, and some of us may be 
wondering whether we will survive it, and whether, even if we survive, in good 
conscience we can live with the consequences of the adaptations we make.. .This 
may suggest our place today, to see ourselves as responsible people at the center 
of an organic process of change that at this time, may be strenuous and confused. 
But what is done will be more than a saving action.. .However, if survival alone is 
the aim, it is not likely to succeed. It will include a conserving role; there is much 
that is good in what we now have and it should be saved. More important, it will 
build anew, build something that may not yet be dreamed of. It will be voluntary, 
and it will raise the spirit (p. 185 & 187). 
Through his framing of the Trustees' role in institutional change and his insightful 
description of servant leaders' challenges in responding and adapting to change in 
educational settings, Greenleaf affirmed the emergent notion that leaders play a vital role 
in influencing organizational change. Equally important, through his own practitioner and 
consultant-based observations, Greenleaf laid out the foundation for other practitioners 
and scholars to better understand the environmental conditions that drive change, as well 
as leaders' cognitive and affective responses to the inevitable need for change in their 
organizational settings. 
Burns' view of leadership 
Burns (1978), a political science scholar and well-published chronicler of political 
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leadership articulated his own view of leadership that was both similar to but also, in 
some significant respects, different from Greenleaf s thinking. Among other things, 
Burns emphasized the importance of "leaders inducing followers to act for certain goals 
that represent the values and the motivations—the wants and needs, the aspirations and 
expectations—of both leaders and followers" (p. 19). Burns stated further that "the 
essence of the leader-follower relation is the interaction of persons with different levels 
of motivations and of power potential, including skill, in pursuit of a common or at least 
joint purpose" (p. 19). 
Burns introduced the center piece of his leadership paradigm by arguing that this 
leader-follower interaction takes the forms of either transactional or transformational 
leadership. He described transactional leadership as occurring when there is an exchange 
of valued things (e.g., a swap of goods or money, a trading of votes, etc.) between one 
person (a leader) and others (followers) and where there is no "enduring purpose" other 
than the immediate bargain or transaction (pp. 19-20). Burns contrasted transactional 
forms of leadership with transformational leadership which "occurs when one or more 
persons engage with others in such a way that leaders and followers raise one another to 
higher levels of motivation and morality" and thus transforms all of the parties in the 
relationship (p. 20). Equally important, through the introduction of his transactional-
transformational leadership paradigm, he sparked an ongoing debate over the distinctions 
between leadership (transformation-oriented) and management (transactionally based) 
which continues to this day. 
Like Greenleaf, Burns also addressed the issue of the leader's role in influencing 
change by first stating that "the [transformational] leadership process must be defined, in 
short, as carrying through from the decision-making stages to the point of concrete 
changes in people's lives, attitudes, behaviors, institutions" and then declaring that 
"leadership brings about real change that leaders intend" (p. 414). Next, in contemplating 
the far-reaching nature and significance of the leaders' role in initiating change, he 
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asserted that "leaders may seem to cause the most titanic of changes—such as the human 
and physical wreckage left in the wake of civil war—but that wreckage was not the 
central purpose of the leaders" (pp. 415). Like Greenleaf, Burns recognized that leaders 
exert a profound influence in initiating and influencing broad social changes, as well as 
necessary changes in organizations and institutions. 
Rost's view of leadership 
Influenced considerably by Burns, Rost (1991) constructed a definition of 
leadership that he viewed "as a development of Burns' thought" and which states that 
"leadership is an influence relationship among leaders and followers who intend real 
changes that reflect their mutual purposes" (pp. 102-103). Building upon Burns' notion of 
transformational leadership, Rost (1991) argued that "leadership is about transformation" 
and insisted that transformation should be the cornerstone of a postindustrial school of 
leadership of which he has been a staunch advocate. Moreover, Rost maintained that 
"transformation happens in groups, organizations, and societies when people develop 
common purposes" and, in expanding on his definition of leadership, he held that 
"mutual purposes help people work for the common good, help people build community" 
(p. 124). In the same way as Greenleaf acknowledged the apparent advantage that leaders 
(or individuals having a better sense of what should be done now) have over followers, 
Rost stated that the "influence patterns in the relationship [between leaders and followers] 
are inherently unequal because leaders typically exert more influence than do followers" 
(p. 112). 
Additionally, in joining the debate over the distinctions between leadership and 
management, Rost contended that he, along with several other scholars, "reinterpreted 
Burns' model of leadership to be, in reality, a model of management and leadership" (p. 
132). However, he quickly added that "in personal conversations with Burns in 1989," 
Burns strongly disagreed with this reinterpretation and re-asserted his view that 
"transactional leadership is leadership, not management" (p. 132). Hence, in an apparent 
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effort to reconcile the ongoing debate about leadership and management, Rost suggested 
a corresponding definition of management that claimed that "management is an authority 
relationship between at least one manager and one subordinate who coordinate their 
activities to produce and sell particular goods and/or services" (p. 145). Supplemented by 
his thoughtful discussions of the essential elements of leadership and management (and 
the essential elements that are necessary to distinguish between the two concepts), Rost's 
definitions and notions of leadership and management seem significant and are useful for 
making sense of the subtle distinctions between leadership and management. 
In addition, like Greenleaf and Burns, Rost (1991) dealt head-on with the issue of 
change by purposefully including it in his definition of leadership. In his definition, Rost 
embraced Burns' (1978) notion that leaders and followers intend real changes. He 
declared that the concept of intended, real change is "essential for any human relationship 
to be called leadership" and he further emphasized that "a relationship wherein leaders 
and followers do not intend real changes is not leadership" (p. 114). Rost reasoned further 
that the "word real means that the changes the leaders and followers intend must be 
substantive and transforming" and should result in "changes in people's lives, attitudes, 
behaviors, and basic assumptions, as well as in the groups, organizations, societies, and 
civilizations they are trying to lead" (p. 115). He also explained that including in the 
definition the word changes (instead of the singular form of the word used by Burns) 
allows for the pursuit of several changes at any one time (as is usually the case) or other 
changes that were not originally intended but arose from reassessment, revision or 
reformulation of intentions by those involved in the relationship. However, unlike 
Greenleaf and Burns, Rost emphasized that leaders and followers can fail to achieve real 
changes or achieve only minimal changes and still be in a relationship called leadership. 
To sum up, Rost's reinterpretation of Burns' concepts of real and intended changes 
broadens further our understanding of how leaders influence and moderate changes in 
their organizations and institutions. 
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Heifetz' view of leadership 
Finally, Heifetz (1994), a physician and current professor/director of the 
Leadership Education Project at Harvard University, brings forward his own distinctive 
and influential view of leadership while building upon and expanding Greenleaf s, Burns' 
and Rost's perspectives. In the tradition of Greenleaf, Burns and Rost, Heifetz states that 
"leaders mobilize people to face problems, and communities make progress on problems 
because leaders challenge and help them do so" (p. 15). Unlike Greenleaf, Burns and 
Rost, Heifetz proposes the idea that "rather than define leadership either as a position of 
authority.. .or as a personal set of characteristics.. .it is a great deal more useful to define 
leadership as an activity''' (p. 20). At the same time, he expresses the belief, similar to 
Greenleaf s notion of the interchangeable nature of leadership and followership, that "we 
ought to focus on leadership as an activity- the activity of a citizen from any walk of life 
mobilizing people to do something" (p. 20). Later, he goes on to say that "leadership 
means taking responsibility for hard problems beyond anyone's expectations.. .many 
people wait until they gain authority, formal or informal, to begin leading.. .yet those who 
do lead usually feel that they are taking action beyond whatever authority they have" (p. 
205). In other words, Heifetz, like Greenleaf, believes that leadership can take place with 
or without authority and, certainly, without regard to positional authority. 
Another important element of Heifetz' paradigm of leadership, bearing 
considerable similarity to the views of the other three influential theorists, is his emphasis 
on leaders' engagement in adaptive work which enables them to "address conflicts in the 
values people hold, or to diminish the gap between the values people stand for and the 
reality they face" and provides "the leverage for mobilizing people to learn new ways" 
(p. 22). Indeed, Heifetz draws an essential distinction between adaptive work (demanding 
innovation and learning) and technical work (routine problems) by stating: 
In technical situations, where the authority has the expertise to define and solve 
the problem, people generally opt for autocratic or consultative decision 
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making.. .Adaptive situations, however, tend to demand a more participative 
mode of operating to shift responsibility to the primary stakeholders. Because the 
problem lies largely in their attitudes, values, habits, or current relationships, the 
problem-solving has to take place in their hearts and minds (p. 121). 
Likewise, drawing upon his earlier practice of medicine, he illustrates vividly the 
distinction between technical problems (e.g., type I situations—definable with fixes 
available) and adaptive problems (e.g., type II and III situations—definable but no clear 
cut fixes available and no clear cut problem definitions or fixes available). Furthermore, 
he declares that in type II situations, the "patient has to recognize his own problem 
enough to provoke adaptive change. The responsibility for meeting the problem has to be 
shared" (p. 75). In short, Heifetz' type II and type III situations seem to be analogous to 
those conditions requiring real and intended changes in organizational settings as 
envisioned by Burns and Rost in their paradigms of leadership. 
While further definitions and conceptualizations could be cited here, this literature 
review is already lengthy. Furthermore, the discussions of the major theorist's notions 
introduced here capture most contemporary thinking about leadership and, to a lesser 
degree, thinking about the construct of organizational change that has been chronicled in 
the literature over the past 30 years. 
Concepts in Effectively Leading Organizational Change and Leadership Skills and 
Characteristics in Implementing Change 
In this second subsection, I will discuss the process of leading organizational 
change with particular attention being given to the leadership skills required to implement 
change effectively. This subsection will be divided into two parts. The first will examine 
various organizational theorists' general views on leadership in relation to leading and 
managing organizational change (Rosen, 1986; Bennis, 1989 & 2003; Bergquist, 1993). 
The second part will explore what some organizational change theorists/consultants say 
are the necessary skills and characteristics that leaders must have in order to effectively 
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implement change initiatives (Kouzes & Posner, 1995; Kotter, 1996; Bennis, 1999; 
Conger & Benjamin, 1999; Kanter, 1999). 
General views on leading and managing organizational change 
Three theorists, Rosen, Bennis and Bergquist, who provide broad and insightful 
views on leadership and its relationship to leading and managing change will be 
discussed here. Specifically, I will discuss Rosen's healthy companies' principles and 
practices of managing environmental and organizational changes, Bennis' view of change 
as an opportunity rather than an obstacle, and Bergquist's notion of postmodern 
organizations and leaders. 
Rosen's view on leading and managing organizational change. As discussed in the 
background section of Chapter 1, considerable attention has been given in recent years to 
focusing on organizational downsizing, restructuring and revitalization as a means for 
understanding organizations undergoing major transformation and organizational change. 
Not long after Greenleaf and Burns articulated their views on leadership and change, 
Rosen (1986), in his monograph entitled Healthy Companies: A Human Resources 
Approach described several general principles that distinguished "healthy corporations" 
from other organization types; in particular, he focused on how so-called healthy 
corporations managed environmental and organizational changes differently. In his 
synthesis of fifty years of research on a broad array of issues associated with health and 
human resources in the workplace, Rosen directed attention to several change-related 
principles that are embraced by healthy companies; these included: flexibility and 
openness to change; avoidance of single-purpose and short term solutions and taking a 
long-term perspective on employees; running the company through both top-down and 
bottom-up approaches; and implementing broad environmental and organizational 
changes like positive policies regarding mistakes/risk taking and flexible work scheduling 
(pp. 29-31). In particular, Rosen argued that "leadership, commitment, and investment 
from top management are critical, but bottom-up approaches are necessary to create 
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feelings of ownership and family" (pp. 30-31). 
On the other hand, Rosen also maintained that "constant change can be a 
disruptive form of organizational stress and a potential hazard for employees" (p. 82). He 
supported that claim by pointing to "increased insecurity for workers who fear their jobs 
may be phased out by new technologies" or "because of factors such as automation, 
stricter attendance policies, job reclassifications, or cutbacks" (p. 82). For Rosen, poorly 
managed organizational changes are often doomed to failure as a result of workers 
developing "debilitating stress symptoms or responding] by sabotaging the change 
process" (p. 83). He cited other examples of stress associated with technological 
developments and the change process which included fear of information processing 
systems, inadequate retraining, fear of layoffs, organizational restructuring (especially 
through mergers and acquisitions) and unexplained changes (p. 83). He contended that 
research showed that poorly managed changes had direct health and job productivity 
consequences (e.g., heart disease, anxiety, and decreased job performance). 
Reflecting on the stressful effects of technology and organizational change, Rosen 
countered those negative descriptions with the details of a number of successful programs 
designed to protect workers from experiencing those effects at organizations like Deere & 
Company, Sperry Corporation, General Motors, Nissan USA, Motorola, Hallmark Cards, 
Advanced Micro Devices and Hewlett Packard. In short, Rosen associated the principles 
and practices found in healthy organizations' environmental and organizational changes 
efforts with effective leadership and positive organizational performance and growth. 
Bennis' view on leading and managing organizational change. Bennis, also explores the 
notions of leadership, in general, and leading organizational change, in particular. In his 
decades-long study of and writing on leaders, Bennis, in his influential book On 
Becoming A Leader (1989 & 2003), for instance, reasons insightfully that 
leaders are, by definition, innovators. They do things other people haven't done or 
don't do. They do things in advance of other people. They make new things. They 
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make old things new. Having learned from the past, they live in the present, with 
one eye on the future. And each leader puts it all together in a different way 
(p. 133). 
In addition, he extends this reasoning to the realities of leading organizational 
change and contends that "learning to lead is, on one level, learning to manage change." 
Like Rosen, Bennis asserts that "unless the leader continues to evolve, to adapt and adjust 
to external change, the organization will sooner or later stall" (p. 135). Moreover, he 
suggests that leaders should view change as an opportunity rather than an obstacle and 
accept it rather than resist it (p. 161). In another published article, Bennis (1999) builds 
upon these ideas and states the following: 
Rather than just downsizing, leaders must deploy the creativity of the workforce 
to recreate the company. How do we redeploy our workforce to create new 
opportunities and jobs for people? Leaders will have to learn how to create an 
environment that embraces change.. .The challenge for leaders is how to release 
the brainpower of their people. As we experience increasingly rapid change, many 
organizations will become unhinged. They will be confusing, chaotic places to 
work in. And yet leaders and managers will have to create ways to generate 
intellectual capital (p. 2). 
In sum, like Burns, Rost, Heifetz, and Rosen, Bennis describes a remarkable, twenty-first 
century world of leaders who are not merely managing organizational change. Rather, 
they are leading and guiding it and their organizations and institutions towards a better 
future state. 
Bergquist's view on leading and managing organizational change. Bergquist, another 
prominent organizational theorist, provides a unique account of his own view of 
leadership in his highly regarded book, The Postmodern Organization: Mastering the Art 
of Irreversible Change (1993). In outlining the parameters of his paradigm of leadership, 
Bergquist states: 
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As we look back to these earlier eras, we find that leaders in the premodern era 
tended to be "great men," who were selected for their character and 
education.. .They tended to exert authority through paternalistic concern for the 
welfare and proper education of those who depended on them.. .the more 
democratic modern era tends to emphasize structures, processes, and procedures 
that ensure the appropriate expression of leadership and influence... Those who 
head modern organizations typically define themselves as managers rather than 
leaders. Modern authority is expressed through rules, regulations, roles, and 
organizational structures (p.94). 
This view of modern leadership has much in common with Burns' notion of transactional 
leadership and Rost's concept of management. 
In contrast, in delineating the other features of his framework of leadership from, 
what he calls, the postmodern era, he says: 
The postmodern leader is neither inherently great nor merely a product of a 
system or bureaucracy. Individual leadership can be effective and influential if 
applied at the right time, in the right place, in the right manner, and with regard to 
the right problem or goal.. .It also requires a tolerance for ambiguity, a 
recognition of the need for one to learn from his or her mistakes, and a clear sense 
of personal mission and purpose. It is ultimately spiritual rather than secular in 
nature (p. 94, emphasis added). 
Although no references are made to Burns' concept of transformational leadership nor 
Heifetz' notions of leadership and adaptive challenges, Bergquist appears to be operating 
from a very similar perspective when he extols the virtues of postmodern leadership. In 
like manner, he reveals Greenleaf s influence on him, when he refers to leaders as 
"sources of integration in postmodern organizations" who "perform this integrative role 
through the creation and sustenance of community and through acting in the role of 
servant to those with whom they work" (p. 13). 
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Another important aspect of Bergquist's work is his distinct perspective of the 
postmodern leaders' role in responding to and coping with organizational change and 
transformation. He proposes that the "process of change in organizations often operates 
like fire" and uses the analogy of a real-life situation in which a change in structure is 
considered, but the word gets out and soon the organization is stuck with the change 
whether they like it or not; in essence, it becomes irreversible (p. 5). He also offers the 
pendulum as a metaphor for understanding how organizations, as systems, remain in 
equilibrium and operation due to their predictability, adherence to the laws of gravity and 
entropy, and reversibility (swinging back and forth repeatedly). 
Utilizing Bateson's (1979, p. 43 & 158) change ideas, Bergquist also puts forth 
his ideas on first- order change which he says occurs "when people in an organization do 
more of something that they are already doing or less of something that they are already 
doing as a way of returning to some desired state of being (homeostasis)" (p. 7). 
Bergquist then discusses second-order change which, in his view, happens "when we 
decide to (or are forced to) do something different from what we have done before, rather 
than just doing more or less of what we have already been doing" (p. 7). He ties all of 
these ideas together into the following coherent conceptual framework (much akin to the 
earlier mentioned Burke-Litwin change model and Burns' and Rost's notions of the 
relationship of transactional and transformational leadership to the achievement of real 
and intended changes): 
Those organizational change processes that are reversible involve the restoration 
of balance or style. They typically are first order in nature and resemble the 
dynamics of a pendulum. Other organizational change processes are irreversible. 
They bring about transformation and parallel the combustive processes of fire, 
rather than the mechanical processes of the pendulum. Second-order change is 
typically associated with these irreversible processes of combustion (p. 8). 
Finally, Bergquist conveys his belief that we, in the collective sense, and 
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postmodern leaders, in an implied sense, can cope with the turbulence in organizations 
and adapt to the "sense of edginess" that accompany first and second-order changes by 
adopting premodern and modern remedies, as well as some newly emerging strategies (p. 
249). Among those remedies and strategies, he indicates that "we must be able to draw 
together or synthesize that which seems diverse or ambiguous in hybrid 
organizations.. .to be able to love and build a sense of community among men and 
women who live with the complexities of cyclical and intersect organizations... [and] to 
find personal sanctuary in a world of organizational turbulence" (p. 254). In short, like 
Burns, Rost and Heifetz, Bergquist suggests that leaders adept at bringing about change 
in postmodern organizations must be able to synthesize ideas and people, establish strong 
commitments and partnerships among workers, and find safe places for reflection and 
renewal within or outside their respective organizations (pp. 252-253). 
Leadership Skills and Characteristics Necessary for Effectively Implementing 
Organizational Change Initiatives 
Next, I discuss the contributions of several theorists that provide their views on 
the necessary skills and characteristics that leaders must have or develop in order to 
effectively implement organizational change initiatives. In particular, I will discuss 
Kouzes and Posner's (1995) leader characteristics or qualities, Kotter's (1996) leadership 
capacities and habits, Conger and Benjamin's (1999) leadership and workplace 
competencies and Kanter's (1999) classic skills for leaders. 
Kouzes and Posner 's Leader Characteristics and Qualities. In their influential book, The 
Leadership Challenge: How to Keep Getting Extraordinary Things Done in 
Organizations, Kouzes and Posner (1995) discuss their own multi-faceted research 
efforts which were comprised of a series of quantitative studies begun in the early 1980s 
(e.g., administered questionnaires) and were subsequently expanded in the 1990s to 
include various qualitative research methods (e.g., over 400 written case studies, 
numerous focus groups, and forty in-depth interviews). Their quantitative research efforts 
80 
in the 1980s, which initially involved several thousand business and government 
executives and was later expanded to over 20,000 people on four continents, included 
various questionnaires that were refined over time. Through their quantitative research, in 
particular, Kouzes and Posner sought to identify the ideal qualities or characteristics of 
admired leaders from the perspective of research participants from around the world (the 
majority, however, were from the United States). The results from Kouzes and Posner's 
quantitative studies (which span nearly fifteen years) reveal a list of 20 characteristics 
that the participants selected as those that they "most look for and admire in a leader, 
someone whose direction they would follow" (p. 20). Kouzes and Posner focused 
particularly on four of the most frequently selected leadership qualities; being honest, 
forward-looking, inspiring, and competent. 
According to Kouzes and Posner, "nearly 90% of constituents want their leaders 
to be honest above all else" which means they want to know if the person is worthy of 
their trust and is being truthful, ethical, and principled" (p. 22). They report that 75% of 
their respondents expect their leaders to be forward-looking and "have a sense of 
direction," a concern for the future of the organization, and an ability to envision the 
future; they also "must know where they are going if they expect others to willingly join 
them on the journey" (p. 23). The authors also cited the expectation that leaders be 
inspiring, enthusiastic, and positive about the future; in particular, followers believe that 
leaders "must inspire our confidence in the validity of the goal" (p. 24). Kouzes and 
Posner also state that leaders must be seen as being competent (i.e., takes time to learn 
the business and the operation and possesses value-added competence), as well as 
capable and effective. 
Kotter's leadership capacities and habits. In his widely read and applied book, Leading 
Change, Kotter (1996) examines, among many other things, the relationship of lifelong 
learning to remarkable leaders' competitive capacity and their mental habits (i.e., 
Japanese industrialist Konosuke Matsushita). Kotter references his 20 year study of 115 
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students from the Harvard Business School class of 1974 which found that most of the 
subjects were doing well in their careers due to competitive drive and lifelong learning, 
factors that "seemed to give people an edge by creating an unusually strong competitive 
capacity" (p, 178). He asserts that, for those research subjects, "competitive drive helped 
create lifelong learning, which kept increasing skill and knowledge levels, especially 
leadership skills, which in turn produced a prodigious ability to deal with an increasingly 
difficult and fast-moving global economy" (p. 178). 
For Kotter, leaders that "learn, change and constantly reinvent themselves in the 
twenty-first century" will be those that develop several important mental habits that 
support lifelong learning (p. 182). He holds that "lifelong learners take risks" and "push 
themselves out of their comfort zones and try new ideas" (p. 182). He maintains that 
lifelong learners engage in humble self reflection through honest assessment of successes 
and failures (pp. 182-183). He explains that lifelong learners "actively solicit opinions and 
ideas from others... [and] they can learn from anyone under almost any circumstance" (p. 
182). He contends that lifelong learners "also listen carefully, and they do so with an 
open mind" knowing that it "will help give them accurate feedback on the effect of their 
actions" (p. 182). In conclusion, Kotter argues that the very best lifelong learners and 
leaders he has known seem to have high standards, ambitious goals, and a real sense of 
mission in their lives (p. 183). 
Conger and Benjamin's leadership and workplace competencies. Conger and Benjamin 
(1999) also discuss the necessary leadership skills, characteristics and competencies for 
the new century. In their book, Building Leaders: How Successful Companies Develop 
the Next Generation (1999), they argue that the competitive pressures from global 
competition and other market forces (i.e., rivals' actions) have forced organizations to 
engender changes (e.g., flattening their hierarchies and decentralizing decision making) 
that will have significant implications for future leaders (p. 240). As a result, they 
indicate that in order to lead effectively in this increasingly complex and highly 
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competitive world, future leaders will need to develop new leadership competencies (p. 
242). Conger and Benjamin point to the following competencies which future leaders will 
need to develop or become: creative and comprehensive in their search for new markets 
and partnerships/alliances (e.g., strategic opportunists), able to envision alternative global 
scenarios that will put their organization at greatest advantage (e.g., globally adept), able 
to improve products or services and extend existing markets (e.g., capable of leading 
across organizational boundaries with alliance parties), able to shift their attention to new 
data points as customers change the rules of success in the marketplace (e.g., keen data 
analysts), and able to instill a learning mind-set into their organizations (e.g., learning 
evangelists) (pp. 241-242). 
Conger and Benjamin also offered an impressive array of demographic and 
employment related data to graphically illustrate the dramatic shifts and trends that have 
shaped and influenced the workplace, in general, and organizations, as a whole. Mindful 
of these emergent data, they express the concern that "tomorrow's leaders will have to 
manage an increasingly diverse set of demands, equity issues, and development 
requirements" (p. 247). Hence, they propose that "workplace-sawy" leaders will need to 
develop the following "workplace competencies" if they are to succeed in the new 
century: be able to leverage the differences of their employees and provide appropriate 
learning experiences (e.g., sensitive to issues of diversity), be far more sensitive to the 
needs and rights of their employees (e.g., interpersonally competent), be exceedingly 
competent in the art of persuasion, communicating and mediating disputes (e.g., skillful 
communicators and motivators), be able to build a sense of community among employees 
who are less connected to the organization and each other (e.g., community builders), 
have a global and systemic understanding of the organization and able to align key 
systems (e.g., capable of building well-aligned organizational architectures), and be 
committed to developing leaders at all levels (e.g., developers of leaders) (pp. 247-251). 
For Conger and Benjamin, the development and acquisition of all of the above cited 
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leadership and workplace competencies will be essential and critical to leaders seeking to 
"succeed in creating long-term competitive advantage and a bright future for their 
organizations" (p, 250). 
Kanter 's classic skills for leaders. Finally, Kanter, in her article entitled "The Enduring 
Skills of Change Leaders" (1999), presents seven classic skills for leaders that can be 
used to take charge of change and, equally important, can be useful to leaders who "want 
to move an idea forward" (p. 53). Derived from her 20 years of working and consulting 
with leaders, and influenced by her extensive writings on the topics of leadership and 
management, she provides the following comprehensive list of skills for leaders to 
consider and act upon: (1) tuning in to the environment- actively collect information 
suggesting new approaches, form partnerships, pay special attention to customer 
complaints, etc.; (2) challenging the prevailing organizational wisdom- question current 
assumptions about the organization and the marketplace, go outside the industry and 
return with fresh ideas; (3) communicating a compelling aspiration- not just a picture of 
what could be but an appeal to our better selves; (4) building coalitions- involve people 
who have the resources, knowledge and political clout to make things happen; (5) 
transferring ownership to a working team- enlist others in implementation but remain 
involved and support the team; (6) learning to persevere- stay with it through the initial 
hurdles of the change process, don't "launch them and leave them"; and (7) making 
everyone a hero- remember to recognize, reward and celebrate accomplishments (pp. 53-
56). For Kanter, these classic skills not only serve to facilitate managing change inside 
organizations, specifically, but they are also key to creating effective partnerships and 
sustaining high performance within organizations, in general. 
Studies that Illuminate Leaders' Involvement with Implementing Organizational Change 
In this final part of the literature review, I will specifically look at three empirical 
studies that addressed various aspects of the role of leaders in implementing small and 
large-scale change interventions in the private and public sectors. First, I will review 
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Applebaum, Leblanc, and Shapiro's (1998) "The Aftermath of Downsizing: A Case 
Study of Disengagment, Disidentification, Disenfranchisement and Disenchantment," 
which is an analysis of the corporate reorganization of a Canadian firm that was reduced 
from 350 to 200 employees beginning in 1993. Second, I will look at Borins' (2002) 
"Leadership and Innovation in the Public Sector," which is a study of organizational 
turnarounds in the United States and United Kingdom Commonwealth's public sectors. 
Finally, I will review Higgs and Rowland's (2005) "All Changes Great and Small: 
Exploring Approaches to Change and its Leadership," a multi-case study of private and 
public sector organizations in the United Kingdom which investigated effective 
leadership behaviors in change situations. 
The studies listed in the previous paragraph and discussed in detail below were 
selected for a number of reasons. The decision to select the four studies was based on five 
criteria: (a) whether the study was especially relevant to the topic of this dissertation; (b) 
whether it was a study that examined a major reorganization or change initiative having 
broad impact within a single case or across multiple case sites; (c) whether it was 
conducted at a site or sites having some national or international significance within the 
public and/or private sectors; (d) whether it was recently published in a reputable 
scholarly journal; and (e) whether it utilized mixed qualitative and quantitative research 
methods in collection and analysis of data. 
Applebaum et al.'s (1998) influential study provided insight into some of the 
significant leadership aspects of organizational change and corporate reorganization that 
have emerged in North America in the past decade. In this study, the researchers analyzed 
the major corporate reorganization of a Canadian firm, Dominion Travelogics Unlimited 
(DTU) that was reduced from 350 to 200 employees from 1993 through 1995. The 
researchers used a single "hybrid case and field study" approach which utilized 
interviews, questionnaires and observations to collect data on "downsizing practices, 
improvement of earnings, [and employee] satisfaction and morale" (p. 406). Based on the 
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survey data, interviews and observations, the researchers concluded that leaders involved 
in successful major reorganization and downsizing must: find ways to get employees to 
accept the changes and become part of the new organizational culture, communicate 
openly about their intentions, collaborate in decision making, role model expected 
behaviors, understand and communicate cultural changes, generate trust by their own 
sense of integrity and demonstrating trustworthiness (p. 411 -415). 
It is important to note here (particularly in this discussion of the role of leaders in 
implementing change interventions) that in discussing their research findings and 
describing the leadership behaviors that are critical in organizational change programs, 
the researchers noted that "management's leadership in the change effort seems to be the 
key determinant of whether that change will succeed" (p. 413). With this in mind, the 
researchers recommended a type of leadership "that does more than just create and 
articulate a new vision for the organization... [but also exemplifies leadership that is] 
open and collaborative" (p. 413). 
In his article in the Leadership & Organization Development Journal, Borins 
provides an account of his study of organizational turnarounds led by newly-appointed 
agency heads and bottom-up innovations by public servants and middle managers in the 
U.S. and the U.K. Commonwealth. Borins uses case studies (i.e., DOL and FEMA during 
the Clinton Administration, New York Police Department, City of Seattle Recycling 
Program, Environment Canada Ultraviolet Index Program, and Canada's Export 
Development Corporation) and quantitative analysis of data collected from 440 
applications to three prestigious public sector innovation awards programs (from 1990 to 
1998). The researcher describes bottom-up innovations as those that: require advocates, 
are introduced as pilot programs, lead to new structures within an organization, 
frequently involve inter-organizational collaboration, and occur on the front lines or in 
middle management (pp. 469-470). 
Borins also defines a turnaround (e.g., reengineering the basic processes of the 
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organization) as "a response to a public sector organization that is simply not meeting 
normal expectations for service delivery" and is "found to be failing to meet minimum 
standards" (p. 473). Given those parameters and the qualitative and quantitative data 
mentioned above, the researcher found: (1) bottom-up innovation occurs much more 
frequently than known previously; (2) effective political leadership in a crisis requires 
broad-based decision-making, information gathering, and consultation; (3) successful 
leadership of a turnaround requires an agency head to regain political confidence, reach 
out to stakeholders and clients, and convince dispirited staff that change is possible and 
their efforts will be supported; and (4) successful bottom-up innovations require political 
leaders and agency heads to create a supportive climate by consulting staff, instituting 
awards and recognition for innovators, protecting innovators' central agencies and 
publicly championing of proven innovations (p. 467). As will be discussed later in the 
methodology section, the relevance of these findings are enhanced since some of the cited 
cases bear similarities to circumstances at the sites designated for this dissertation study. 
Higgs and Rowland (2005) qualitatively and quantitatively examine the influence 
of leadership behavior in change management processes. In their Journal of Change 
Management article, the researchers studied seven private and public sector organizations 
using a collaborative research model, with informants interactively telling stories about 
changes they had experienced, and employing narratives and case studies derived from 
70 discrete change stories and interviews of 40 informants involved in leading their 
organizations' change initiatives. Through data analysis, the researchers uncover several 
qualitative findings: (1) leader-centric approaches (i.e., those driven by the leaders' 
personal involvement and influence) do not appear to be related to success in any of the 
contexts; (2) success appears to be related to facilitative and enabling leadership 
behaviors; and (3) success also appears to be related to the leader building the capability 
to change in others (p. 133). Based on a combined review of the qualitative and 
quantitative findings, the researchers conclude that leadership behaviors grouped into 
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framing change (i.e., establishing starting points, communicating guiding principles) and 
building capacity (i.e., creating individual and organizational capabilities, communicating 
and creating connections) are more successful than those grouped as shaping behavior 
(i.e., what leaders say and do, making others accountable). The researchers also 
determine that shaping behavior appears to inhibit the success of change initiatives in all 
of the contexts. In conclusion, the researchers deduce that "an approach informed by 
complexity theory (i.e., emergent change) appears to be effective" and, ultimately, the 
most successful (p. 146). 
Summary 
This last section reviewed some of the seminal ideas in the literature on the role of 
leadership in changing and revitalizing organizations that are relevant to this dissertation. 
Several influential leadership theorists- Greenleaf, Burns, Rost and Heifetz- were 
discussed. Additionally, a review of the literature on effectively leading change and 
leadership skills and characteristics was divided into two parts: (a) general views on 
leadership in relation to leading and managing change (i.e., Rosen, Bennis, and 
Bergquist); and (b) leadership skills and characteristics necessary for effectively 
implementing change initiatives (i.e., Kouzes & Posner, Kotter, Conger & Benjamin, and 
Kanter). Furthermore, this last section reviewed some of the recent studies that have 
examined leaders' involvement with implementing organizational change efforts in the 
private and public sectors (i.e., Applebaum, Leblanc & Shapiro, Borins, and Higgs & 
Rowland). These theorists' and researchers' views provided conceptual foundations, 
practical examples, and models and frameworks that are helpful for understanding the 
process of leading and managing organizational change. Although there are obvious 
similarities and overlap among some of the theorists' views, some fundamental 
differences were noted. 
Conclusion 
This review presented some of the seminal ideas in the literature in the areas of 
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organizational change, downsizing, motivating workers (in general and in downsized 
organizations), and leadership that are relevant to this dissertation. The theories and 
studies discussed comprise some of the classic theories and graphic studies about each of 
the relevant topics to my study. Also, the literature presented in this review informed my 
study about leaders' influence in organizational change and downsizing throughout the 
research process. In general, the literature provides evidence that there is a growing body 
of knowledge pertaining to organizational change, downsizing, motivating workers, and 
the relevancy of my study. 
Furthermore, the literature conveys that more research needs to be conducted into the 
financial performance of downsizing organizations and the approaches of government 
entities (particularly local government) in implementing organizational change, 
restructuring and downsizing. Moreover, the literature also suggests that no studies 
appear to have been conducted in this specific area (organizational downsizing, and 
motivating workers and survivors in local government), as well as leaders' perceptions of 
the efficacy of their efforts to motivate their surviving subordinates. Therefore, an 
overview of the relevant literature appears to support the rationale for my study about 
organizational change, downsizing and the role of leadership in changing and revitalizing 
organizations. While this chapter examined previous research that is of particular 




STUDY DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a detailed overview of the research 
design and methodology for the study being reported here. Information is presented about 
the sites and respondents, the procedures used to gain access to the organizations that 
were studied, the researcher's role in the study, data collection and analysis procedures, 
and the procedures that were used to ensure trustworthiness. 
Site and Participant Selection 
As initially approved by the Institutional Review Board (February 1, 2006), the 
study was to utilize qualitative interviews and written surveys with selected management 
and non-management employees of three major contractors within the American 
aerospace industry. Because of convenience, the selected organizations were located 
primarily in the Southern California region. The anticipated sites selected for this study 
were the aerospace divisions of the Raytheon Company, the Boeing Corporation and the 
Northrop Grumman Corporation. I selected these sites for this study for several reasons. 
All three sites had undergone significant downsizing in recent years. In fact, the 
aerospace industry, in general, underwent major infrastructure transformation and 
restructuring over a period of about sixteen years (approximately 1988 to 2004); these 
transformations involved company mergers, acquisitions and divestitures that frequently 
led to major downsizing including massive reductions in force. Additionally, the 
aerospace industry, in general, and the three companies, in particular, continues to be 
formidable contributors to the economic stability of the Southern California region in 
spite of the aforementioned infrastructural transformations. It was also anticipated, for all 
of the reasons stated above, that the selected sites for this study would provide settings 
rich in opportunity to tease-out and examine effective leadership practices that enhance 
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the efforts to revitalize and motivate employees affected by major transformations and 
restructurings. 
Unfortunately, after several months and numerous unsuccessful attempts to gain 
access at those proposed aerospace sites, a decision was made to abandon those efforts 
and to focus on gaining access to other organizations in Southern California that had 
undergone or were about to undergo major infrastructure transformation involving 
downsizing and restructuring. It should be noted here that, according to anonymous, 
inside sources within the three aerospace companies, the reluctance to allow access 
appeared to be the result of a generalized retrenchment within the industry and an 
underlying concern of top leadership that the companies' interests were best served by 
"putting the restructuring and downsizing episodes behind them and to focus their efforts 
on a brighter future." Despite these set backs, subsequent efforts to secure other 
organizational settings (possessing characteristics similar to those described above) led 
successfully to the acquisition of two local government organizations in the Southern 
California region that had just begun some restructuring and/or downsizing and expected 
to expand those types of major organizational change initiatives. 
In terms of similar, desirable research characteristics, these local governmental 
entities (herein referred to by the pseudonyms, City of Brightwood and the City of Playa 
Vista) play an important role in the socio-economic vitality and well-being of the cities 
and region in which they operate. However, like many other small, medium and large 
sized local government organizations across the region and the nation, these two entities 
were and are experiencing serious current and future fiscal deficits that are being driven 
by local economic conditions (i.e., fluctuating tax base levels), rising employee medical 
costs and pension obligations, and increasing critical infrastructural demands (i.e., street 
pot hole repairs, major water pipe line repairs and replacements, aging facilities 
replacements such as libraries, fire departments, etc.). As result of these complex and 
vexing conditions, these government entities- the City of Brightwood (a medium sized 
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city) and the City of Playa Vista (a very large city)- are being carefully studied by local 
government practitioners and observers around the region and the nation. Equally 
important, the executive leadership of these entities welcomed this research and saw real 
value in the potential outcomes of this research investigation. 
Furthermore, as was anticipated with the proposed aerospace companies, these 
sites also provided rich settings that are, indeed, conducive to teasing-out and analyzing 
effective leadership practices in revitalizing and motivating employees affected by major 
transformations and restructurings. Likewise, because the hierarchical structures of these 
governmental entities are comparable to those of the originally proposed aerospace 
companies, the utilization of qualitative interviews and written surveys with selected 
management and non-management employees at these two sites was deemed to be 
equally appropriate and effective methods of data collection. Consequently, on July 14, 
2006, the Institutional Review Board approved a research project modification to include 
the required research venue change (see Appendix A), as well as other modest 
modifications to the research proposal (i.e., the research title, interview guide and 
interview participant criteria). 
Interview participants were selected purposefully using "criterion" and "snowball 
sampling" techniques (Patton, 1990). Patton asserts that the logic and purpose of criterion 
sampling is to "review and study all cases that meet some predetermined criterion of 
importance" (pg.176). Because my primary focus was on the perceptions of leaders who 
experienced organizational change, restructuring and downsizing, I sought an initial 
sample consisting of approximately 10 to 12 interview participants at each site using the 
following criterion: respondents would be mid and upper level managers on the 
leadership teams at the two sites; respondents would directly or indirectly supervise at 
least 5 employees and would have had comparable responsibilities for at least two years 
previously when major organizational change, restructuring or downsizing occurred; and 
respondents would hold positions with titles such as Police and Fire Chief, City 
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Librarian, and Director/Deputy Director/Superintendent/Manager (e.g., Human 
Resources, Planning, Park & Recreation, General Services, Community Services, 
Engineering & Capital Projects, Water Customer Service, Environmental Services, 
Metropolitan Wastewater, etc.). Utilizing the above criterion, I initially identified 12 
interview participants at both research sites with the assistance of the Human Resources 
Directors at each of those organizations. Additionally, during the course of identifying 
potential interview participants, the top staff executive at the City of Playa Vista (the 
Chief Operating Officer) volunteered to be interviewed. Shortly after that fortuitous 
development, the top staff executive at the City of Brightwood (the City Manager) 
accepted my invitation to be interviewed. 
Moreover, I also utilized a version of the snowball sampling strategy (Patton, 
1990) by asking the company personnel I encountered in the interviews to assist me in 
identifying additional interview participants who were likely to have a different 
perspective about the downsizing and restructuring experience. Utilizing that snowball 
sampling technique, I identified only one additional interviewee at each site due to the 
fact that several participants identified other potential participants that had already been 
interviewed or had retired or had left city government for other employment. However, 
the use of the aforementioned criterion and the snowball sampling method ultimately led 
to the interviews of 12 participants at the City of Playa Vista and 10 participants at the 
City of Brightwood. In fact, of the 6 other interview participants that were initially 
identified but not interviewed: 2 potential participants (one at each site) verbally declined 
to be interviewed; and 3 potential participants at the City of Brightwood and 1 potential 
at the City of Playa Vista never responded to my letters of invitation to participate and 
my follow-up phone calls. In any event, the top staff executive at each of the sites- the 
Chief Operating Officer and the City Manager- were among the total 22 respondents 
interviewed. Furthermore, the other 20 interviewees held the following titles: Police 
Chief; Fire Chief; Director, Acting Director, Deputy Director, and Superintendent, Park 
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and Recreation Department; Director, Human Resources Department; Director, Director, 
General Services Department; Director, Customer Services Department; Director, 
Planning Department; Director, Environmental Services Department; Acting Director, 
Public Works Department; Director, Community Services Department; Director, Family 
Justice Center; Director, Customer Services Department; Assistant Director, Metropolitan 
Wastewater Department; Deputy Director, Water Department; Lieutenant, Police 
Department; and Senior Accountant, Finance Department. 
Research Design 
In view of the fact that the study focused on two local government organizations 
in the Southern California region, the research purpose was best accomplished by using 
an interpretive case study/cross-case analysis design. The interpretive case study strategy 
was appropriate for this investigation because this approach enabled me to gather 
information in context with the intent of utilizing contextual factors in analyzing, 
interpreting, and theorizing about the phenomenon (Merriam, 1988 & 1998). Likewise, 
the use of interpretive methods provided a rich description of the phenomenon and 
allowed for further abstraction and conceptualization. 
Moreover, since I intended to shed new light upon and generate new ways of 
thinking about organizational downsizing, restructuring and revitalization, the case study 
(as described by Merriam) was well-suited for this research. In describing the bounded 
system features of the case study, Creswell (1998) emphasized the contextual richness of 
the detailed, in-depth process associated with the case study approach. Indeed, case study 
research normally employs multiple sources of information and, often, multiple cases (pg. 
61). Hence, I followed Creswell's notion of a collective, multi-sited case study and cross-
case analysis to describe "each case and themes within the case.. .followed by a thematic 
analysis across the cases" (pg. 61). 
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Access 
As mentioned earlier, I initially selected three aerospace organizations located in 
Southern California as the research sites for this study. As such, I had planned to make 
use of professional relationships I had established (during my tenure as a former human 
resources executive at Hughes Aircraft Company in Los Angeles) with colleagues at 
Raytheon, Boeing and Northrop Grumman. Although I was unable to gain access to those 
proposed sites in spite of numerous attempts, I was ultimately able to gain access to the 
two local government sites researched herein with the assistance of the City Manager at 
one of these sites and a Deputy Chief Operating Officer at the other site. I had previously 
worked with and provided organizational development consulting and facilitation 
services to the City Council, City Manager and his department heads. Likewise, the 
Deputy Chief Operating Officer had previously participated (as a member of the board of 
directors) in an organizational retreat which I had facilitated as an independent 
consultant. With these colleagues' assistance, I established contact with the appropriate 
"gatekeepers" (Glesne, 1999) and executive leadership (i.e., Chief Operating Officer, and 
Human Resources Directors), submitted my written proposal (see Appendices B and C) 
and secured written consent before entering these research settings. 
Upon acceptance of my proposal, I next sent a letter of invitation to participate 
(Appendix D) and spoke individually with all prospective respondents and explained my 
study and sought their participation in the study. However, as discussed earlier, not all 
prospective respondents accepted my invitation and/or responded to my follow-up phone 
calls. Upon agreeing to participate, each willing participant signed an informed consent 
form in order to participate (see Appendix E). The form noted that I would diligently 
endeavor to provide confidentiality, though I clearly emphasized that confidentiality 
could not be completely guaranteed. Because some of the departments within these 
research settings were relatively small, it may be difficult to fully safeguard participant 
confidentiality. Therefore, I took other appropriate steps to address participant's 
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confidentiality concerns (i.e., offering to meet/interview participant's at preferred off site 
locations, keeping all interview tape recordings, notes and transcriptions in a locked file 
cabinet and destroying them five years after completion of this research). 
Once consent was given, I individually interviewed all persons who agreed to be 
part of this research study. Upon completion of interviews, I allowed each respondent to 
review his or her individual transcript and afforded each an opportunity to change, add, or 
delete his or her statements. This final step enabled respondents to clarify their statements 
and, hopefully, increased their prospects of confidentiality. 
Researcher's Role 
I was the primary data collection instrument in the research process. As Patton 
(1990) suggests, I assumed the role of participant interviewer and document analyzer. As 
interviewer, I focused on the selected managers and, as researcher, I investigated 
subordinates' perceptions regarding their managers' efficacy in revitalizing & motivating 
surviving subordinates. Likewise, as interviewer, I sought to access the perceptions and 
the perspectives of the interviewees utilizing an interview guide approach (Patton, 1990). 
Furthermore, I examined available government documents, websites, newsletters, 
organizational charts, and local newspaper articles for purposes of triangulation and 
corroborating findings from the interviews. Moreover, as Glesne (1999) suggests, I 
assumed the role of "researcher as learner," thereby approaching interviews as "a curious 
student who comes to learn from and with the research participants" (pg. 41) rather than 
an expert on the topic. Hence, my approach with participants was that of a curious 
student who is learning about their lived, contextual experiences of organizational 
downsizing and restructuring. Lastly, I was sensitive to the participants and to the 
information gathered and "aware of any personal biases and how they might influence the 
research" (Merriam, 1998, pg. 21). 
96 
Data Collection Procedures 
A variety of data collection methods and procedures were employed in the study; 
these included an interview guide approach, some pertinent document review and 
analysis, and thematic coding of transcribed interviews. The study also utilized an 
anonymous grounded survey of subordinate employees that was pretested to help ensure 
the validity and reliability of the instrument. These various approaches and procedures 
will be discussed, in the order that they are listed above, in the following sections. 
Interview Procedures 
The study relied upon individual interviews as the primary data collection tool. 
Interviews of selected respondents utilized an interview guide approach (Patton, 1990 & 
2002), an approach that Merriam (1988 & 1998) calls a "semi-structured interview 
format." The "semi-structured interview format" allowed me to prepare a topical outline 
with corresponding questions in advance and to respond flexibly to the unfolding 
situation (Merriam, 1998, pg. 74). I used study research questions to develop and 
organize the interview guide. With this approach, I outlined questions and topics to be 
covered, in advance, but did not decide the exact order of the questions until the 
interview unfolded (Patton, 1990, pg. 283). Furthermore, using Dillman's (2000, pp. 140-
142) cognitive interviewing technique for pretesting questionnaires, I obtained some 
useful feedback from five "knowledgeable colleagues"- the earlier mentioned Deputy 
Chief Administrative Officer at the City of Playa Vista, the Human Resources Directors 
at both cities, and two private sector human resources professionals who worked with me 
at Hughes Aircraft Company in the late 1990s during that organization's major 
downsizing and restructuring initiatives. As a result of their critiques, I made a couple of 
revisions based on their thoughtful suggestions. After the interview guide pretesting, I 
proceeded on to the participant interview process. 
Prior to interviewing, permission to record interviews was sought from the 
prospective respondents. There were no cases where consent to record the interview was 
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declined. However, as a safeguard against problems in electronically recording the 
interviews and to eliminate respondent discomfort and allay anxieties, all respondents 
were advised that notes would be taken and that electronically recorded interviews were 
not compulsory. Recorded interviews were transcribed by professional transcribers 
following each interview and I thematically coded them as part of the subsequent data 
analysis procedures. Likewise, informed consent was obtained from all respondents. As 
mentioned earlier, the informed consent form appears in Appendix E. Furthermore, the 
note taking safeguard proved to be a tremendous benefit when four of the recorded 
interviews were lost in the U.S. mail en route to an out-of-state professional transcriber 
and two other recorded interviews were attenuated due to recording device 
malfunctioning. Unfortunately, the notes from one of the four lost recorded interviews 
were somewhat sketchy and cryptic, unlike the other three, and was, therefore, deemed 
unreliable and eliminated from the data coding and subsequent data analysis procedure. 
Interview questions were open-ended to allow respondents to share perspectives 
and insights but gave structure to the interviews and minimized variance between 
participants. Interview questions began with the general and moved to more specific 
topics (i.e., I asked participants to describe their experience in motivating layoff 
survivors, their perceptions of the role they played, and later, asked specific questions 
focused on respondent's strategies for revitalizing their organizations). By using the 
interview guide/semi-structured format approach with open-ended questions, I was able 
to explore questions and topics with the participants in a manner similar to a natural 
conversation while ensuring that the conversations did not deviate too far from the 
research topic and that key questions got answered. The Interview Guide (see Appendix 
F) included follow-up probes and follow-up questions, as needed, to maximize the 
richness of the data being obtained (Patton, 1990). These follow-up probes, when needed, 
also encouraged interviewees to expand on sketchy, overly generalized responses. A 
slightly modified Interview Guide was developed for the two top executives in order to 
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ensure relevance and enhance sense-making (see Appendix G). Though each interview 
was anticipated to last approximately one hour, I secured from the interviewees the 
option of a follow-up session to allow for completing the interview (i.e., in the case of 
lengthier or interrupted interviews), or pursuing possible follow-up questions, 
clarifications and researcher omissions. Follow-up sessions were conducted on-site and 
follow-up questions were conducted via email or telephone. 
To supplement the Interview Guides, I used two tools. The first tool, the Personal 
Demographics Questionnaire, represented the participant's total work experience at the 
City. A blank questionnaire was emailed to the participants prior to the interview so as to 
afford them the opportunity to fill it out in advance, thereby saving valuable time during 
the interview. Specifically, the Personal Demographics Questionnaire asked for more 
information about the person's background, including their prior leadership experiences. 
This additional information enabled me to assess the different perspectives I heard in 
context and, consequently, to construct a richer understanding of each case. 
The second tool, the Milestone Chart- Significant Organizational Change and 
Restructuring Events, offered an instrument for participants to reflect on events and 
dates/timelines that stood out about the City's change and restructuring initiatives over 
the previous three years. As the case with the first tool, participants were emailed the 
blank chart in advance of the interview with instructions to notate significant change or 
restructuring events that have occurred in their organizations up to this point. The 
Milestone Chart included three separate blank timelines arranged in chronological order 
beginning with the current timeline (fiscal year 2005/2006) placed at the top of the chart 
and the preceding timelines (fiscal year 2004/2005 and fiscal year 2003/2004) placed in 
the middle and at the bottom, respectively. Space was provided above and below each of 
the three timelines for notating the key organizational change and restructuring events 
that readily came to the participants' minds. Here again, the participants were given a 
99 
chance to freely reflect, to furnish background and insight into particular events that 
occurred at their City, and to contribute to a richer understanding of each case. 
Collection of Documents 
For purposes of data triangulation, it was my initial intent to review and analyze 
all available documents pertaining to and describing organizational revitalization and 
motivation initiatives at each site. However, because organizational change, restructuring 
and downsizing had been recently undertaken and were still underway at these research 
sites, I quickly discovered that very little internal documentation existed about those 
efforts. Moreover, executive leaders at both sites acknowledged that no types of 
revitalization or motivation initiatives had formally begun yet nor were there any 
immediate plans to introduce such measures. In fact, I was also informed that other than 
informal group meetings, discussions, announcements, and published organizational 
charts, there were little or no formal management directives, memoranda, internal policy, 
procedural manuals, newsletters or other records describing or documenting the 
organizational change, restructuring and downsizing measures recently undertaken or 
under consideration at both sites. There was, however, an abundance of articles in the 
local print and on-line press that documented most of the cost-cutting, staff reduction and 
pension issues that had been and were being undertaken by the administrations at both of 
these research sites. Those articles were collected and later reviewed as part of the data 
triangulation effort and a secondary data analysis process that I will talk more about 
below. Likewise, several on-line articles retrieved from the city's website describing a 
number of employee generated cost-saving proposals that were implemented at the City 
of Brightwood were also reviewed and analyzed. Furthermore, several official reports 
(i.e. annual budget proposals, updates on efficiency and productivity of city operations, 
business process engineering, etc.). 
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Grounded Survey Procedures 
After conducting and transcribing the managers' and executive leaders' 
interviews, I developed grounded surveys for subordinate employees. Survey respondents 
were to be comprised of all subordinate employees reporting directly or indirectly to the 
interview respondents during organizational change, restructuring or downsizing episodes 
over the past three years. Furthermore, I developed these anonymous surveys for 
purposes of triangulation and as a secondary data collection method. Hence, I developed 
two grounded surveys: (1) a survey for the subordinate employees reporting to the 20 
interviewed managers, the department heads and assistant/deputy department heads); and 
(2) a survey for the subordinate department heads reporting to the 2 executive leaders, the 
city manager and the chief operating officer. 
Employee survey respondents were identified at both sites with the support of 
human resources personnel and with the full assistance and cooperation of their 
managers. Department head survey respondents were identified with the assistance of 
human resources personnel at the City of Brightwood. However, in spite of initial 
organizational approval of such a survey, the executive leadership at the City of Playa 
Vista declined to participate in the department head survey. Citing concerns about recent 
negative publicity resulting from a city-wide employee survey that raised concerns about 
city managers' questionable handling of ethical issues and complaints, the City of Playa 
Vista's executive leadership team withdrew its support of the department head survey. In 
spite of assurance that the details of the department head survey would not be made 
available to the local media and assertions that the use of organizational pseudonyms in 
this dissertation would, over time, reduce the possibility of the City's exposure to further 
negative publicity, the City's leadership maintained its position to withdraw its 
endorsement of the department head survey. Notwithstanding this unfortunate setback to 
one significant aspect of the proposed cross-case analysis, the employee survey was 
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approved and successfully administered at the City of Playa Vista during the earlier phase 
of the grounded survey effort. 
The employee and departmental leader grounded surveys consisted of 20 
questions that included a combination of seven 5 point likert scale statements, three 
closed-ended questions, three yes/no response type questions, and seven contingency 
questions. The questions were developed after the first review and analysis of the 
transcribed interviews and with the intention of assessing the degree of alignment 
between the perceptions of the interview participants and their subordinate employees. 
Essentially, the question development effort involved underlining key ideas, making 
marginal notes, assigning categorical labels to those ideas or data segments, chunking or 
clustering those data and then developing relevant questions. Moreover, for purposes of 
supplemental data collection, analysis and comparison, five demographic questions were 
included at the end of the survey as suggested by Dillman (2000, p. 94). 
The use of Likert scale statements, open and closed-ended questions and other 
types of questions provided me with more flexibility in designing items and made the 
questionnaire more interesting (Babbie, 1990, pg. 127). An email letter of invitation to 
participate was sent to the subordinate employees explaining the nature of the research, as 
well as the purpose and duration of the survey, and providing access to the internet 
survey via an electronic link to the internet service provider (SurveyMonkey). 
Additionally, alternative access to secure, on-site computers was provided for prospective 
survey respondents among a small group of blue-collar workers at the City of 
Brightwood who did not have computer access at their work site. Furthermore, survey 
respondents interested in the final outcomes of the survey were advised of the anticipated 
time frame for completion of the data analysis and given contact information for 
requesting copies of the survey findings. 
Through the use of the on-line survey, respondent anonymity was guaranteed by 
my selection and application of SurveyMonkey's design features that enabled the 
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collection and collation of responses to be folly anonymous. In other words, since the 
survey did not require respondent names, there was no possibility of identifying 
participating respondents or accessing individuals' responses to the survey questions. 
Equally important, for purposes of subsequent preliminary data analysis, I was only 
provided online summary and detail reports of the survey's collated data. In addition, for 
purposes of further data analysis, I was provided access to each of the surveys' raw data 
bases for possible downloading into Excel spreadsheets. As a result of the use and 
application of these data analysis tools, the anonymity of the individual respondents was 
not compromised during any aspect of the analytical process. 
Additionally, pre-testing of the research instrument was conducted for the purpose 
of testing the content, validity and reliability of the survey tool (Babbie, 1990). The 
research instrument was pretested in the manner and form that was used during the real 
study. The selection of subjects for pre-testing the research instrument was varied so as to 
include reasonably appropriate respondents for the questions under consideration. 
Essentially, I again used the cognitive interviewing technique in testing the first draft of 
the survey instrument with six knowledgeable colleagues who, as Dillman says, "can 
identify with respondents and determine how likely it is that each of the questions can or 
will be answered (Dillman, 2000, pg. 141-142)." Four of these colleagues had previously 
participated in the previous pretesting of the interview guide- the two private sector 
human resources professionals, the Human Resources Director at the City of Brighwood, 
and the Deputy Chief Administrative Officer at the City of Playa Vista. The other two 
pre-testing participants were department heads at each of the two study sites. 
The cognitive interviewing technique enabled me to determine whether 
respondents could comprehend and answer the instrument questions accurately and as 
intended. Next, after obtaining feedback from the six pretesting participants, I 
incorporated that feedback into the creation of a second draft of the survey instrument. I 
then reviewed the second draft of the instrument with Dr. Robert Donmoyer, the Chair of 
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my dissertation committee, and Dr. Fred Galloway, a member of my dissertation 
committee and a quantitative research specialist. As a result of the last review, I made a 
few technical revisions, created the final draft of the instrument and proceeded with the 
grounded survey process and administration of the survey. 
Data Analysis Methods 
Extensive data in the form of notes and transcripts from interviews were analyzed 
and studied in order to identify emerging themes, patterns and relationships (Creswell, 
1998; Spradley, 1979 & 1980; van Manen, 1990) within each case or site. I coded the 
data from each interview in order to establish informational categories and to identify 
factors that related to the primary questions that guided this study. As a result, I 
developed a list of fifteen initial codes. I then clustered those codes within the following 
three major categories: methods and approaches used by subjects; perspectives held by 
subjects; and descriptions given by subjects. I then analyzed the coded data again from 
each interview from both sites to identify overall patterns and themes in the data. 
However, this process did not lend itself to the identification of patterns and 
themes that made sense to me as I had anticipated. Therefore, I re-analyzed the 
information from the notes and transcripts and a final list of twenty-one refined codes 
emerged and was used to re-code the notes and transcripts. As a result of this intensive 
process however, I felt somewhat unfulfilled with the preliminary themes that had 
emerged; particularly, since I now felt that these two rich and unique case studies had 
much more to tell us than those emergent themes. After consulting with my committee 
chair, I decided to employ the "narrative analysis" and "analysis of narrative" strategies. 
Hence, I first used the process of data analysis referred to by Polkinghome (1995) 
as "narrative analysis" to organize and present the data from the abundant newspaper 
articles and the other gathered information in a storied form. Polkinghome contends that 
narrative refers to 'texts that are thematically organized by plots" and he explains that 
researchers can use the process of "narrative configuration" to bring "together diverse 
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events, happenings, and actions of human lives into thematically unified goal-directed 
processes." (p. 5). Thus, what emerges from this approach is referred to as the plot and 
the "plot's integrating operation is called emplotment" (p. 5). As a consequence of 
configuring or emplotting happenings and events, Polkinghorne concludes that narrative 
meaning is the outcome. So, utilizing Sykes' (1998) steps (based on Polkinghorne's 
thinking) to create "emplotted narratives" presented in Chapters IV and V. 
Next, I used the technique of "analysis of narrative" to make sense of the 
interview responses and experiences described by the interview participants. 
Polkinghorne (1995) describes this technique in the following way: 
[In] analysis of narratives, researchers collect stories as data and analyze them 
with paradigmatic processes. The paradigmatic analysis results in descriptions of 
themes that hold across stories in or taxonomies of types of stories, characters, or 
settings... Thus, analysis of narrative moves from stories to common elements, (p. 
12) 
In essence, this analysis approach allowed me to enrich the stories being told, as 
well as to return to the coded data mentioned above and proceed with the identification of 
patterns and themes which were used in answering the research questions in Chapter VI. 
Case-ordered matrices (Miles & Huberman, 1984 &1994) were used during this phase of 
the analysis to develop coherent descriptions across the cases which, ultimately, 
enhanced the generalizability of the study's findings. 
I analyzed the quantitative data derived from the survey tool with guidance from 
Dr. Fred Galloway, a dissertation committee member and expert in quantitative methods. 
Data analysis initially consisted of reviewing and examining the earlier mentioned online 
summary and detail reports provided by SurveyMonkey. As a result of that analysis, it 
was determined that several of the survey questions and the summary and details were 
extracted and are presented and discussed in Chapter VI. The presentation of the data was 
done in order to show the degree of alignment or agreement between interview 
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respondent and survey respondent information. Data analysis was conducted as an 
activity simultaneously with data interpretation and narrative report writing so as to 
ensure focus and, as such, engaged my sustained attention to this study. 
As mentioned earlier in the data collection procedures, I gathered and analyzed 
various local press and online website articles documenting some of the cost-cutting and 
staff reduction measures for the purposes of data triangulation. By analyzing these 
documents, I sought to verify and validate responses and other pertinent information 
provided by the interview respondents. This analysis also enabled me to provide 
supplemental descriptions of respondent information and, ultimately, better 
understandings and confirmation of the emergent findings. 
Products 
I produced a rich, narrative description of a multi-sited case study. The first part 
of the analysis is a description of each case and emergent qualitative and quantitative 
themes within the case. The second part of the analysis analyzes and describes qualitative 
themes across the cases. I anticipate that this study will serve as a framework for 
developing information on best practices and guiding future research in the effective 
revitalization and motivation of surviving workforces in downsized organizations. 
Significance of the Study 
Understanding how organizations undergoing major transformation resulting from 
downsizing or restructuring rebuild diminished capacities is beneficial if we are to grasp 
fully how organizations can revitalize their surviving workforce. Such understanding 
serves to improve an organization's knowledge, efficiency and overall sense of well 
being during similar transformations, downsizing or restructuring. These understandings 
also serve to better inform organizational leadership of the value of human assets and to 
reinforce the need to preserve human resources along with the need to protect capital 
resources. It is expected that this study will provide deeper understanding of the strategies 
that leaders employ to revitalize, reinvigorate and motivate survivors of downsizing and 
106 
restructuring. For those leaders engaged in such efforts, the research should help identify 
reasonable and realistic strategies and expectations. Likewise, it is crucial that leaders 
fully understand the many consequences of and responses to organizational change, 
downsizing and restructuring, as well as the myriad challenges attendant to organizational 
revitalization and reinvigoration efforts. Lastly, it is my intent that this study may provide 
a rich source of information on best practices which organizations facing organizational 
change, downsizing or restructuring may draw upon. 
Limitations of the Study 
The results of this study may be limited in terms of generalizability. The intent 
was to present a study that is rich and thick in its endeavors to depict major 
organizational change within a formidable public sector. Thus, although the results of this 
qualitative study may have limited generalizability, the findings, on the other hand, 
should be transferable to other similar organizational settings. Likewise, this study may 
prompt other studies within different organizational and industrial contexts that could 
lead to an increasingly more sophisticated grounded theory. Therefore, even though this 
study may be of limited generalizability, it can, nevertheless, make a meaningful 
contribution to the growing body of knowledge and inquiry into the phenomena of 
organizational change, downsizing and restructuring. 
As a former human resource executive in the aerospace industry, my description 
and discussion of this phenomenon was influenced, in part, by my own direct experience. 
However, my former position within industry could be viewed positively when 
considering my theoretical and practical understanding of the studied phenomena and 
negatively if concerns were to arise that I was incapable of objective inquiry and analysis. 
As such, I was aware of my own biases and managed and monitored my subjectivity so 
that I produced a reliable analysis and inquiry into the studied phenomenon (Glesne, 1999 
& Peshkin, 1988). Lastly, the following factors posed further limitations on this study: 
the results and outcomes of this study were dependent on the truthfulness and timeliness 
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of the informants' responses; the data collected was limited to those gathered in the 
interview process and the administration of the survey tools; and only present employees 
of the studied companies were selected as informants in this study. 
Summary 
This chapter provided a detailed overview of the research design and 
methodology that guided my study. I presented information the local government sites 
that I ultimately chose to conduct the study and the twenty-one leaders with formal 
positional authority who participated in the study. In addition, I discussed the procedures 
that I used to obtain access at the research sites and my subsequent role in the study as 
researcher and interviewer. I also reviewed the interviewing process as the principle data 
collection method employed in the study. Moreover, I discussed how I utilized grounded 
survey procedures and Polkinghome's (1995) narrative analysis and analysis of narratives 
strategies for data analysis and reporting. I also presented reviews of the products, 
significance of the study, and limitations of the study. Finally, I presented the following 
definitions and key term. While this chapter detailed the methodology that guided my 
study, the following two chapters presents the findings from the two case sites. 
Definitions and Key Terms 
The use of the term downsizing of organizations, in both the non-profit and for-
profit business contexts, is a relatively recent phenomenon. Some researchers of 
organizational change trace the emergence of downsizing, as an American business 
practice, to the 1970s and 1980s when successive surges of "corporate cutbacks" and 
"restructuring" responded to global competition, "diffusion of technology" and declining 
market economies (Capelli, 1999; Johansen & Swigart, 1994; Tomasko, 1990 & 1993; 
Wolman & Colamosca, 1997). Simple dictionary definitions describe it as the act of 
terminating the employment of (a worker) when reducing a workforce. Cascio (1998, p. 
55) tersely described it as "the planned elimination of positions or jobs." Capelli (1999, p. 
115) presents a broader concept of downsizing by describing it as "dismissing workers 
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for reasons other than poor performance" and suggest that it "has come to mean cutting 
workers to reduce costs and improve financial performance, not necessarily to respond to 
declines in business." The term downsizing as described by Cascio (1998) and Capelli 
(1999) will serve as the combined operative definition for this study. 
In this study reference is made to laid-off coworkers and the lay-off process. 
Huczynski (1987, p. 339) describes the term layoffs as "a means of adjusting the existing 
supply and the new demand for labour." Capelli (1999, p. 115) defines the term layoffs as 
a traditional reference to "cutting workers in a business downturn (typically with the 
intention of hiring them back when business returned)." In slight contrast, Noer (1993, p. 
12) generically describes the term layoff as "all involuntary employee reductions for 
causes other than performance" and "does not imply that the employee may be recalled 
when business improves." Notwithstanding such minor differences in interpretation 
among researchers relative to employer intent, the term layoff in this study refers to both 
voluntary and involuntary employee reductions arising from strategies and decisions 
designed to reduce costs and improve business profitability, productivity and 
competitiveness. Furthermore, the term layoff survivors, as employed in this study, 
embraces Noer's definition which indicates that layoff survivors are "those people who 
remain in organizational systems after involuntary employee reductions" (1993, p. 13). 
The use of the term restructuring to characterize an intervention or change 
technique is also a contemporary phenomenon. Huczynski (1987, p. 294) provides a 
rather expansive concept of restructuring as "altering the number of levels in the 
hierarchy, expanding or contracting the number of units or departments, changing the 
composition of teams, altering responsibilities and authority levels and communication 
lines." For purposes of this study, Huczynski's conceptual description of restructuring 
will be used as the operative definition for this study. 
Reference is also made in this study to the concept of post-traumatic stress. Cohen 
& Cohen (1993, pp. 115-116) saw post-traumatic stress syndrome as "a relatively recent 
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name for a phenomenon that psychologists have recognized for some time: the serious 
emotional disturbance that follows a traumatic experience, sometimes quite a bit after the 
event." Further expanding on this view, Cohen & Cohen (p. 116) stated that 
"organizations, too, suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder" and "although the results 
are rarely characterized by violence, they can be extremely destructive to the 
organization's well-being." For purposes of this study, the term post-traumatic stress, as 
defined by Cohen & Cohen, applies to individual or organizational contexts. 
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CHAPTER IV 
FINDINGS, CASE I: THE CITY OF BRIGHTWOOD 
The Story of Organizational Change and Major Restructuring and Downsizing in 
the City of Brightwood 
Brightwood City borders two large cities in Southern California. It is the second 
oldest city in the county (incorporated in 1887) with a population of approximately 
60,000 people who are distributed throughout a 9.2 square mile area. It is a suburban area 
with a Latino population of approximately 60 percent which is comparable to the large 
neighboring city on its southern border and somewhat typical of communities in this 
south bay region which have seen their ethnic composition shift from largely Caucasian 
to Latino over the last thirty years. In fact, while the city features considerable diversity 
with 75 percent of its residents from minority groups, it is also plagued by some of the 
most entrenched social ills in the county. It is a working class community with a 
population with a median age of 28.7 years and a median household income of 
approximately $27,000 (the lowest level in the county). In 2002, 20 percent of the city's 
families lived below the poverty level (defined as $18,000 per year for a family of four), 
and the city's crime rate in 2005 ranked second highest in the county. 
Brightwood City is a 'General-Law' city run under the 'Council-Manager' form of 
government which is typical of most California cities in that it has an elected executive 
and policy-making branch (consisting of a mayor and city council members) and a city 
government bureaucracy run by a city manager. Hence, the mayor and city council 
establish goals and priorities and set the policy direction for the city, the city manager and 
the city government bureaucracy. As a result, the city manager, as the organization's chief 
executive, is accountable to the city council and is responsible for and oversees the 
various city departments charged with providing essential services and programs to the 
local citizens (i.e., finance, police and fire, libraries, parks and recreation, planning, 
public works and engineering, redevelopment, etc.). Additionally, the City Manager of 
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Brightwood has appointed and delegated some of his authority to an Assistant City 
Manager who oversees most of the aforementioned city departments. Finally, at the 
bottom of this organizational hierarchy, the various department heads are charged with 
managing and supervising the daily operations, services, and programs of their respective 
city departments and subdivisions. 
Life Before the Financial Crisis: Leadership Changes and New Fiscal Constraints 
This first section, "Life Before the Financial Crisis: Leadership Changes and New 
Fiscal Constraints," provides an overview of the changes in leadership, new policy 
direction, formation of the new government leadership team, and the implementation of 
initial interventions to enhance efficiencies and avoid cuts. 
Changes in Leadership and a New Policy Direction 
In November 2002, the voters elected two-year Councilman Nat Iniquez to 
replace sixteen-year incumbent Glen Ward as Mayor. Two new councilmen also were 
elected to fill seats vacated by one retiring member of the council, and one member of the 
council who was defeated in the election. 
During his mayoral campaign, Iniquez promoted what he called a "very direct 
agenda and that meant change." The local newspaper described the results of the election 
as the council's "most significant shift in 30 years with the incumbents' departures" and 
noted that the turnover amounted to a combined loss of 45 years of experience as elected 
officials. Indeed, the election turned out to be a precursor of other significant changes in 
leadership and the future direction that the new leadership would take the city. For 
example, immediately following the election, Mayor Iniquez appointed another new 
councilman, a Filipino-American, to fill his own vacant council position through the end 
of his elected term. Likewise, during the following year (January through November 
2003), the city manager, police chief, fire chief and five department heads retired, in 
some cases by taking advantage of an early retirement option. Essentially, with the 
election of two new council members, the appointment of another new council member, 
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and the hiring of replacements for the departed department heads, the ethnic composition 
of the city's leadership was dramatically changed within a two year period. 
Undaunted by these and other anticipated leadership changes, the new mayor and 
council embarked resolutely upon an ambitious course of urban renewal that would, 
indeed, change the city's physical and political landscape for years to come. Thus, within 
his first year in office, Mayor Iniquez began fulfilling his mayoral campaign promise by 
leading an organized drive to change the city's long-standing reputation as a poverty, 
crime and gang-ridden community and replace it with a vision of urban revitalization. 
According to a local newspaper account, that vision included a "vast array of commercial 
and residential developments, ethnic commercial districts, an educational complex, a new 
hotel, a boat marina, and an aquatic center, along with a new city library, arts center and 
fire station." 
Despite the many successes and remarkable progress that was made on these 
diverse (but also costly) projects, the revitalization campaign soon began to experience 
political and financial challenges. On the political front, Mayor Iniquez began to receive 
questions and criticism from his council colleagues for going too fast with so many 
projects and not involving the council in some of these ambitious yet important 
development efforts. On the financial side, though many of the ongoing projects were 
already funded by the time the criticism occurred, some projects (e.g., the library, fire 
station, arts and aquatic centers, a proposed Filipino commercial village and Mexican 
restaurant district) pushed by the mayor were either unfunded or still required millions of 
additional dollars to be fully completed. Adding to the council's growing financial 
concerns, the mayor and council, in June 2003, reduced various departments' operations 
and maintenance spending by 16 percent in order to balance the 2003-04 budget and 
avoid cuts in personnel. Moreover, though the new council had inherited substantial cash 
reserves due to the fiscal conservatism of previous councils, the new council would 
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again, in the 2004-05 budget deliberations in July of the following year, face another 
fiscal challenge that will be described in more detail later. 
Formation of a New Leadership Team: New Actors in City Government 
As mentioned above, the 2002 election took the city into an era of unprecedented 
leadership changes and a significantly new direction. As one interview participant put it, 
for nearly twenty years prior to the 2002 election, the city was a place where "things were 
pretty steady, very, very little change, and everyday was similar to the last." But with the 
entrance of a new mayor and council and a new policy direction, things began to change 
rapidly among the ranks of the city's bureaucratic leadership. In February 2003, when 
discussing the possibility of the current city manager's retirement (as well as other high 
level retirements that might follow) with the local newspaper, Mayor Iniquez described 
such possible leadership changes as "a tremendous opportunity" in which he hoped "to 
replace those executives with employees who better reflect the [city's] makeup" and 
"folks that understand what direction we want to go in as a city who have worked in that 
environment before." Similarly, some council members were reported in the local 
newspaper as saying that "the anticipated departures are an opportunity to fill the slots 
with leaders who better reflect the city's diversity" while sharing the belief that "a new 
city manager should be in place before the other slots come open, so that the individual 
could have input in assembling a new team." As it turned out, the city manager retired 
abruptly the next month while he was vacationing. With that sudden departure, the city 
immediately named Assistant City Manager Patrick Martin as interim city manager to 
temporarily replace the city manager who had held that position for 24 years.. 
Once the city manager retired—for reasons that neither the media or interviewees 
could explain—other key leadership retirements followed through the end of 2003. These 
included the retirements of the Police Chief, Fire Chief, Community Development 
Commission Executive Director, City Engineer & Public Works Director, Human 
Resources Director, Finance Director and Redevelopment Director. Though these 
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departures could be seen as common occurrences during a change of administration, 
interviewees made sense of this spate of retirements in different ways. One interview 
participant, for instance, mused that the departed leaders 
were good people, but they were operating in one paradigm and it had been that 
way for 20, 25 or 30 years. I think city leadership recognized that we were not 
going to get where we wanted to be with these same individuals in place. 
Another interview participant stated that 
the old city manager went on vacation and didn't come back. That left question 
marks in the minds of many people, especially those department heads who were 
at-will employees. And [because of that] there was a common question as to will 
anybody else have a similar fate? That question went through my mind 
personally. 
Not surprisingly, with perceptions like these floating around at different levels 
within the organization, a slow but steady exodus of rank-and-file employees began to 
occur and continued over the course of the next two and a half years. There will be more 
on this exodus later. 
While the exodus of key leaders and rank-and-file workers continued, Mayor 
Iniquez and the City Council moved forward with its politically popular vision of urban 
revitalization. As noted earlier, that vision involved a number of major construction 
projects that required not only large infusions of funding but also considerable 
administrative support. Soon, the largesse of the new vision and the volume of the 
accompanying work load began to place considerable pressure on the responsible city 
departments (e.g., redevelopment, planning and building & safety) already impacted by 
the growing loss of personnel. At the same time, the city began to face mounting 
constraints on its general fund requiring reductions in departmental operations and 
maintenance spending and a hiring freeze in order to avoid cuts in staffing levels. For this 
reason, in his preliminary budget message to the City Council in June 2003, Interim City 
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Manager Martin said, "We are all in for a rough and long-lasting roller coaster ride over 
the next 12 to 24 months" as he discussed the necessity of a 16 percent reduction in 
departmental spending and a hiring freeze. As will be discussed later, Martin's comments 
would, indeed, become a prophetic forewarning of serious fiscal challenges to come. 
Even though the city's fiscal condition was beginning to show signs of instability, 
the mayor remained optimistic about the city's promising future. Thus, over the next six 
to nine months, he continued to play a leadership role in the effort to overhaul the city's 
persistently negative image. Essentially, he became the "face" of the Brightwood — A 
City on the Move campaign. However, the mayor's involvement in this image campaign 
and his "frenetic pace and ambitious plans" (which, at times, excluded the involvement of 
council members) began to raise some criticism among some of the members of the city 
council. This criticism of the mayor, however, did not cause the council to abandon the 
urban revitalization effort nor did it dissuade them from joining the mayor in an 
increasingly important nation-wide search to permanently fill the City Manager position. 
Indeed, with the ongoing staffing issues and the emerging financial challenges facing the 
organization, it became even more important for the council to hire a highly creative, 
experienced and collaborative individual to assist them in sustaining their vision of 
renewal and growth. 
Responding to the pressing need to fill the city manager position, the mayor and 
council culminated their nation-wide search at the end of January 2004 with the 
appointment of Carlos Zepeda, a deputy city manager at a large city in a nearby state, as 
Brightwood's new city manager. Describing Zepeda as a 20-year public servant with 
considerable involvement in "efforts to build stadiums for the National Football 
League.. .and the National Hockey League," the local newspaper reported that he had 
"been tapped to transform city government in this working-class port town of 60,000." 
This insightful characterization was supported in that newspaper account with very 
favorable comments from the mayor and three of the four council members such as: his 
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"experience on stadiums stood out;" his "work on stadiums showed [me] he could 
shepherd large redevelopment projects;" he "seemed flexible in terms of work with the 
individual projects, styles and goals of different council members;" and "he's got the 
history, the education, the background to come to our city and make a difference." In 
addition, the newspaper quoted a former colleague who, when discussing his 
management style, praised Zepeda by predicting that "city staff could expect someone 
with an open door policy, a hands-on manager who wants to see staff expand skills and 
services for the public." 
Because of the singularly important role that the new city manager played in this 
rich story of organizational change and restructuring, it would be useful here to examine 
some of the leadership qualities and attributes that he actually brought to the city in terms 
of his ability to transform the city, as well as his approaches to developing staff, 
supporting his top leaders and communicating with employees. For instance, when 
discussing the influence that the new city council and the new city manager had on the 
positive changes that had taken place during the recent major restructuring in his 
department, one of the interview participants remarked: 
So now we've got a council that's kind of changed direction. We have a city 
manager who is much more progressive, has some fresh ideas that we haven't 
seen in the city for a long period of time. And now we have got a great leader in 
the department. So a lot of these ingredients fell together at the same time.. .[but] 
you can have the most progressive, most outstanding [department] leader in a lot 
of regards, but unless he is supported, you know with 360 [degree] support, he 
would not be nearly as effective. So we've had some real good support in the city 
[from the council and, in particular, the city manager] as well. 
Another interview participant commended Zepeda for his creativity as evidenced 
in his "thinking outside of the box that even brought even more dynamic thinking to .. .an 
already ever-changing organization [since the election of the new mayor and city 
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council]." Additionally, on the theme of Zepeda's commitment to developing staff while 
implementing changes in the organization, that same interviewee cited herself as an 
example and recalled Zepeda had recognized that she had been under-utilized for years 
and, as a result, promoted her into a department head position shortly after his arrival. 
The interviewee also pointed out that "just having a boss that took a real personal interest 
in you and your development, you know, truly becoming a mentor, [that was] something 
that I had not had before in my career.. .so that was like a huge change for me." In fact, 
the interviewee also spoke of the influence that the city manager had on her own 
approach to developing staff during departmental restructuring efforts by recounting that, 
in her recent experience as a new department head, 
there was a part-time secretary who was doing work out of class. I re-classed her, 
with the departure of the senior services coordinator.. .to become the senior 
services coordinator. And she is just thrilled and has just blossomed in the job. 
But that was a hard change for people, because they always saw her doing 
administrative work and suddenly she's out running a recreation center for 
seniors...I just took a tool from [Carlos] and [I] thought outside the box and 
said.. .1 can't hire new people and so [I] just created new job titles for people, re-
classed them, got them pay raises which worked out to help them. 
Adding to the theme of the city manager's utilization of staff development as a 
useful tool in organizational development, in general, and facilitating departmental 
restructuring initiatives, in particular, another interviewee described the revitalizing effect 
of the city manager's commitment to developing employees (himself, in particular) by 
revealing that 
the concept of the present management to look within when an opportunity arises, 
whether it be promotional, or not promotional.. .or any type of opportunity is 
exciting. The fact is that they do look from within, rather than starting at the 
outside and if not being able to find the proper employee on the outside.. .okay, 
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well maybe we can have somebody here do it. With this most recent job I have 
been given.. .1 was very complimented that they have the faith in me to look at me 
first to do this. It extremely motivated me, revitalized me, my [sense of] self, my 
mind. [It] makes me wake up early in the morning and [I] can't wait to get to 
work.. .it's just a wonderful experience.. .it's just a matter of the way .. .that 
they've changed their thinking.. .and I know that with talking with the other 
employees, it has also revitalized them. 
Moreover, on the theme of communicating with employees throughout the 
organization and, specifically, the methods he used in communicating how organizational 
changes are decided upon, the same interview participant praised the city manager for 
creating an environment that encouraged open communication by stating: 
We had the city manager, assistant city manager inviting us to their department 
head meetings.. .anybody, any employee in the city could go. So we knew 
right.. .from the top to the bottom what they were thinking, how the decision was 
made, when the decision was made, and where to go with the decision. So there 
was this full line of communication.. .which was very helpful. And up until this 
point, we had never seen [this kind of transparency] in [Brightwood City]. 
Lastly, Zepeda's accounts of his own qualities and attributes and, specifically, his 
approaches to staff and organizational development consistently matched up with the 
descriptions of the above quoted participants. In terms of his ability to transform the city, 
when interviewed as part of this research project, he described the importance of ensuring 
that: the management team he was building was "aligned with what the council's vision 
was"; and he was getting "the right people with the right skill sets.. .some very talented 
diverse individuals" that would be able to fulfill the needs of "a very aggressive 
community under its mayor and council." As for his approach to identifying existing staff 
for promotional opportunities created during departmental restructuring and 
reorganization, he related, in general terms, that "it was a great opportunity to come in 
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here.. .to take what was there, enhance it with new people, or motivate people and bring 
them up from within and create this whole dynamic of a culture of an organization that 
embraced change, was competitive." Citing his proudest achievements in providing staff 
advancement opportunities, he specifically recalled the examples of Lynn Davis 
(Community Services Director) and Sam Kirkland (City Engineer). 
In the case of Ms. Davis (one of the earlier quoted participants), Zepeda noted that 
promoting her was "extremely positive" for the organization and "very gratifying" for 
him because she had: two masters degrees; experienced "no upward mobility" for 
seventeen years; and "not only talent, but more importantly, commitment." In the 
instance of Mr. Kirkland's promotion, the city manager proudly recounted his "being able 
to take someone like a [Sam Kirkland] who was apprehensive, and say [Sam], you know, 
I believe in you, [and] you are the kind of person that I want on my team, [and so] 
however I can help you, I will help you." Equally important, he touched upon how 
important the city manager's support is to a department head's independent, departmental 
change initiative (i.e., Police Chief Garcia and the City Librarian). For example, he 
asserted that by allowing them to "assess what the priorities of the council and 
community are.. .they will start their own igniting of.. .what it is they feel is necessary 
[for their department] to get done...[and] as they start to work on those things, they can do 
that independent of the manager but with full support of the manager and the council." 
Finally, in discussing how the change/restructuring process was introduced to the 
organization, he disclosed a multi-level approach to communicating with employees and 
stakeholders that entailed 
just doing more outreach within neighborhood groups, doing more 
communication with our different organizational groups.. .whether it's staff 
meetings,.. .mechanisms that allow for more communication like an employee 
newsletter, an expanded intranet, a community newsletter, and updating our web 
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page.. .all of those contributed to what I consider to be essential to organizational 
change- which is communication. 
Considering all of the above mentioned accounts of the city manager's diverse 
qualities and attributes (including his own comments), it appears that Carlos Zepeda was 
well-cast for the lead role in the unfolding story of the formation of a new leadership 
team dedicated to the implementation of a new vision and direction for the City of 
Brightwood. Therefore, it came as no surprise that, immediately upon his arrival in 
February 2004, Zepeda would begin to systematically fill all six of the previously 
mentioned department head vacancies, as well as the Parks and Recreation Director 
vacancy created in 2002 by the retirement of the former director. Hence, from February 
through November 2004, through aggressive external recruitment, the new city manager 
hired a Human Resources Director (Southern California hire), a Fire Chief (out-of-state 
hire), a Police Chief (Southern California hire), and a Public Works Director (Southern 
California hire). 
Also, through thoughtful internal searches, Zepeda promoted several talented 
internal candidates to the other leadership vacancies which included the permanent heads 
of the Redevelopment Agency, the City Engineering Department, the new Community 
Services Department, as well as the acting directors of the Parks & Recreation 
Department, and the Finance Department. Concluding this leadership hiring campaign in 
November 2004, Zepeda hired a new Assistant City Manager, Lois Ward (another 
Southern California hire) to assume supervision of the majority of the city departments so 
as to enable him to devote personal attention and oversight to the growing needs of the 
mayor and city council, important special projects (i.e., possible construction of an NFL 
football stadium) and the merger of the City Finance Department and the Community 
Development Commission's Finance Department. In summary, with these talented and 
experienced leaders in place to assist him and the backing of the mayor and city council, 
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Zepeda was apparently ready to initiate an organizational transformation that would 
support the mayor and city council's new vision and policy direction. 
Implementing Initial Intervention Strategies: Enhancing Efficiencies, Avoiding Layoffs 
and Service Reductions 
As the new city manager began the campaign to fill the leadership vacancies in 
the organization, he was confronted with an equally difficult and unavoidable challenge. 
The month after starting his new job, he learned that, in spite of the earlier mentioned 
operations and spending reductions enacted the previous year, the city would soon face 
additional financial difficulties or as he put it "a significant event." As he described that 
event, he claimed that due to "the downturn in the economy... [and the] decrease in 
interest rates [that negatively affected the city's retirement fund investments].. .our 
retirement costs were going to jump from one million a year to four million a year." 
Zepeda then went on to add, "so the mixing and melding of numbers from other sources-
stagnant revenue streams, cost of business insurance plans' liability going up- created a 
projected four million dollar deficit." Thus, as the formation of the new leadership team 
was beginning to take shape, the stage was also being set for a continuing, in-depth 
examination of the city's financial obligations and expenditures, as well as its 
departmental structures and processes in order to address the city's worsening financial 
situation. 
Soon thereafter, the city manager began to share his ideas, at various meetings for 
improving organizational efficiencies through various change interventions including 
potential organizational realignments and mergers. These efficiency improvement 
discussions were part of Zepeda's initial response to the convergence of the vexing issues 
of increasing workload demands, staffing shortages and financial challenges. Essentially, 
the ideas and organizational restructuring scenarios that Zepeda shared during these 
discussions were based, in part, on his prior experience, as well as data gathered from his 
early organizational assessments, and many informal conversations with staff. In 
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particular, Zepeda obtained valuable information for his early assessments from the city 
council and his department heads at the first City Council and Staff Retreat in March 
2004. For example, during a facilitated exercise at the retreat (which I conducted as the 
city's independent retreat facilitator), the city manager garnered worthwhile input 
regarding the council's priorities for existing and proposed projects and services. 
Other examples of valuable information gathered by the city manager at the 
retreat were specific programmatic and service level data presented by the executive staff 
in each of their reviews of their own department's SWOT (Strengths, Weaknesses, 
Opportunities and Threats) analyses. In fact, one interview participant confirmed the 
significance of the March retreat upon the city manager's data gathering efforts by 
explaining that the SWOT analysis review process 
was critical in his decision making on, at least for this department, doing what he 
did. I think he looked at that and saw some opportunities for some change and 
acted on that. I don't know for the other departments if that was a critical 
document in how he proceeded in reorganizing different departments, but I think 
specifically for this department that SWOT analysis was a pretty critical 
document for him. 
As a result of the above mentioned information and data gathering efforts 
(especially the March 2004 retreat), the city manager began to form a clearer 
understanding of the growing complexity of the city's current and future fiscal, 
programmatic and service delivery outlook. Additionally, Zepeda's understanding of the 
city's future fiscal outlook was further informed in July 2004 by new 2004-05 budget 
projections revealing (according to the local newspaper) that the city anticipated "$5 
million in increased costs.. .largely for salary and retirement increases for police and fire 
officials... [and an expected] $1 million reduction in revenue from the state, which is in a 
severe budget crisis." This critical situation was quickly resolved by the council's 
decision to balance the 2004-05 budget by taking unused monies from city reserves and 
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capital projects, and increasing developer fees, thereby avoiding staff layoffs. 
Nevertheless, the latest fiscal challenge only served to heighten Zepeda's awareness of 
the need to institute various organizational interventions that would aid the city in 
addressing its ongoing fiscal problems while still avoiding layoffs. 
So, in the months following the March 2004 retreat and the July 2004 budget 
deliberations, Zepeda began to initiate a transparent change effort that would involve 
implementing various types of organizational interventions within city government. 
Indeed, in addition to assisting the city in resolving its fiscal challenges, another 
underlying intent of this change effort was to engage most staff, in one way or another, in 
a comprehensive approach to improve the programmatic and service delivery functions of 
the organization. The first type of intervention involved the immediate restructuring and 
realignment of various departments in order to improve organizational efficiency and 
facilitate appropriate assignment of shrinking staff. The second type of change included 
implementation of a broad-based process improvement effort to reduce spending and 
increase revenue. Lastly, the third type of change intervention entailed directing 
reductions in most departments' budgets as a cost savings measure (as had been done 
following the 2003-04 budget deliberations in June 2003), and other drastic measures. 
The restructuring of several departments and creation of a new department. 
Basically, the first type of intervention took place from September through November 
2004 and involved the city manager's restructuring of the Parks & Recreation, Public 
Works, and Engineering Departments and the creation of a new Community Services 
Department. This initial organizational intervention was accomplished through a 
combination of realignment, consolidation and interdepartmental transfer of various 
functions, services, and staff. Moreover, as part of this major restructuring, Zepeda 
promoted internal candidates into the vacant City Engineer position and the new 
Community Services Director job. Furthermore, he transferred the Acting Parks & 
Recreation Director/Park Superintendent and his staff over to the newly restructured 
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Public Works Department where they formed a new division under the authority of that 
department's director. 
The multi-level restructuring of the Police Department. Meanwhile, as the 
restructuring and realignment of those departments was unfolding, another similar type of 
organizational change intervention, a multi-level restructuring of the Police Department, 
was also underway. However, unlike the multi-level/multi-departmental restructuring 
mentioned above, this single department restructuring was neither conceptualized nor 
driven by the city manager. Despite this, the city manager fully supported this change 
initiative without any question or reservation. This was primarily due to the fact that the 
Police Chief was, indeed, hired with a clear expectation that he would bring change to a 
heretofore insulated police department well-known for its poor public image. 
Essentially, during the five month period after his arrival, Police Chief Garcia 
conducted a thorough assessment of his entire department with a keen eye toward: (1) 
achieving his goals of making Brightwood the "safest city in the county" and the "best 
police department in the country"; and (2) creating a "better aligned organization" that 
could do a better job of "position planning" and providing "quality service" to the 
community. And though City Manager Zepeda was not the driver of this particular 
intervention, many of the methods he employed in his restructuring and organizational 
development efforts were, interestingly enough, quite similar to the approaches used by 
Police Chief Garcia in his departmental change effort. For instance, like the city manager, 
Chief Garcia's early organizational assessment involved gathering broad-based input 
from his departmental staff, as well as stakeholders within city government and the 
community at large. Also, as part of his early assessment, the chief used the departmental 
SWOT analysis developed for the March 2004 retreat and "modified that to include a 5 
year strategic plan with input from officers from different levels within the organization." 
Other examples of similarities found in the methods and approaches that were 
utilized by Chief Garcia and City Manager Zepeda in these change interventions are the: 
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(1) alignment of staff assignments by function "instead of assigning a position based on 
individuals" (e.g., Records, Information Technology, Patrol, etc.); (2) assignment, and in 
some cases, reassignment of mid-level leaders (e.g., four lieutenants and thirteen 
sergeants) on the basis of skills and organizational needs; (3) hiring of top-level leaders 
"from the outside to [help] lead the organization" (e.g., two captains from other Southern 
California police departments); and (4) reassignment of an existing staff person (e.g., one 
experienced and well-respected sergeant) to a newly created mid-level leadership position 
titled Special Assistant to the Chief. As a result of his implementation of these and other 
methods and approaches, by the end of January 2005, Chief Garcia concluded his 
comprehensive departmental restructuring. 
Consequently, the newly restructured police department and its re-constituted 
executive leadership team was now poised to provide higher quality service and better 
prepared to make Brightwood the safest city in the county. However, at about the same 
time that these much focused tactical moves were being executed, the police department 
was also being dealt a serious set back. As will be discussed later, the narrow failure in 
November 2004 of Proposition S—a public safety initiative that "would raise property 
taxes to pay for a new police and fire station.. .and more streetlights in high-crime areas, 
[etc.]"—would soon put a damper on the new leadership's ability to implement its 
strategic goals. 
Implementing a broad-based process improvement effort. The second type of 
intervention, a process improvement initiative, was launched at the end of January 2005 
when Zepeda established the Efficiency, Cost Reduction and Revenue Enhancement 
Committee (CARE Committee). According to the February 2005 CARE Newsletter, the 
CARE Committee was charged with "collecting as many ideas as possible that could 
reduce cost, improve efficiency or increase revenues." After 12 "mini-brainstorming" 
sessions, the committee collected an incredible 446 ideas and presented them to the city 
manager who, in turn, highlighted them at the City Council Retreat in late February 2005. 
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Equally important, the committee, in conjunction with the department heads and city 
manager, was subsequently successful in implementing a large number of those ideas 
which ultimately resulted in substantial savings. 
In the months following the establishment of the CARE Committee, the city 
manager expanded this second type of change intervention by forming two additional yet 
equally important committees, the Position Review and Purchasing Review Committees. 
Basically, the Position Review Committee was charged with ensuring that position 
requests were carefully evaluated and, as the city manager suggested, in that process, 
department heads were required to "make the business case for the position" before it was 
permitted to be filled. Likewise, the Purchasing Review Committee, according to the 
October 2006 CARE Newsletter, was assigned the responsibility of finding "ways to do 
things differently, more cost effectively, easier and/or quicker and [to] share those 
thoughts" throughout the organization and within the city's processes for purchasing 
goods and services. 
Despite the fact that these three committees and all of the aforementioned 
departmental restructuring would soon be recognized as successful, ongoing endeavors, 
Zepeda understood intuitively that these changes, in toto, may not be sufficient to reverse 
the fiscal trends that were negatively affecting the city. Therefore, in order to ensure the 
city's sustainability and avoid the inevitability of a major financial crisis, he would 
possibly need to introduce the third type of intervention strategies (e.g., cuts in 
department budgets, layoffs, etc.). 
Summary of the Pre-financial Crisis Period and the Initial Intervention Strategies 
This section of the case focused on the situation in Brightwood prior to the 
financial crisis. Though the crisis had not yet occurred, the pre-crisis environment was 
hardly drama-free. Indeed, one can conceptualize the pre-crisis period as an unfolding 
drama. Act one of this drama—which I have titled "life before the financial crisis"— 
began the day after the municipal elections of November 2002. Scene one of act one finds 
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the City of Brightwood undergoing significant changes of historical proportions in the 
city's leadership and policy direction amidst emerging fiscal constraints. More 
specifically, scene one told the story of departures and replacements of an aging, 
entrenched city leadership—a mayor, two members of the city council, and a city 
manager. The scene also recounted the subsequent departure of a majority of the long-
standing city department heads that was followed by a steady exodus of workers at all 
levels of the organization. Additionally, scene one presented the account of the mid 2003 
budgetary deliberations wherein the newly elected council found itself dealing with its 
first warning of a potentially large budgetary shortfall. 
In scene two, in spite of those leadership departures (and, arguably, in part, 
because of the arrival of new leaders on the bureaucratic scene), the mayor and city 
council continued to press forward with the mayor's ambitious plan of urban renewal by 
pushing the implementation of a number of ongoing redevelopment projects. In 
particular, scene two revealed the tale of the council's hiring of a talented, new city 
manager (the story's protagonist) to play a lead role in the implementation of their new 
vision and policy direction. Having come to the city with a mandate from the council to 
bring about change, the new city manager quickly orchestrated a City Council and Staff 
Retreat in March 2004 (wherein the council established their priorities for existing and 
proposed projects and services) and undertook the formation of a new bureaucratic 
leadership team. As scene two closed, the new city manager hired a number of highly 
talented and diverse individuals to replace the recently departed/retired top leadership. 
In scene three, the city manager and city council received yet another warning of 
further financial problems facing the city. With this latest budgetary warning in mind, the 
city manager proceeded to implement some initial change interventions which included: 
major restructuring and reorganization of several departments; creation of a new 
department; and a broad-based process improvement effort. Simultaneously, the new 
police chief led a similar departmental reorganization effort that included realignment of 
128 
functions, reassignment of personnel, and overhaul of the leadership team. As a result, he 
transformed his organization from an insulated, remote police department to one focused 
on higher quality service to the community. Months later, while discussing a newly 
projected multi-million dollar budgetary shortfall, the city manager was quoted in the 
newspaper as saying that "to plug that big of a gap, you can't do it with efficiency 
measures, you have to do that with new money." Thus, act two would entail more 
scrutiny of the city's finances and implementing further intervention strategies. 
Life During the Financial Crisis: 
Sounding the Alarm and Facing the Oncoming "Train Wrecks " 
The second part of the chapter, which I have titled "Life During the Financial 
Crisis: Sounding the Alarm and Facing the Oncoming Train Wrecks," explores how the 
city was warned of the crisis, how the leadership responded to the situation and the 
outcomes of the city leadership's unwavering efforts. 
Identifying the Looming Financial Crisis and Issuing Dire Warnings 
In the days and weeks following the implementation of the initial change 
interventions noted above, the city manager began to realize that the end of the city's 
problems was nowhere in sight. As he recalled the situation at that time, he stated: 
In 2005, [Brightwood] City and [other local cities] and the State of California 
were in the midst of a development boom.. .housing, retail.. .and so [Brightwood] 
City had extraordinary pressure in terms of development ideas. And so what we 
saw was a workload that was expanding exponentially against a city that had 
challenges anyway.. .And so we went to the council and said these are the things 
that we need to do. We need facilities and we need some policy direction on 
whether you want to increase services or decrease services, because if you want to 
increase services your revenue stream is inadequate. So if we're going to decrease 
services, then we need to know that and we could start curtailing back what it is 
that you asked us to do. 
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In a similarly direct manner, Zepeda presented, at the City Council Retreat in 
February 2005, a somber warning of a looming financial crisis that would dwarf previous 
unfavorable financial forecasts. At that retreat, among the important informational pieces 
presented to the council by the city manager and his executive staff, was a gloomy 
assessment of the city's current and future fiscal situation. In a review of current and 5-
year projections of the city's expenditures and revenues (including payments into 
employee retirement funds), the city manager and assistant city manager warned the 
council of possible recurring budgetary shortfalls in the range of approximately $7 to $8 
million per year through fiscal year 2009-10. In reflecting upon the city's fiscal condition 
in 2005, Zepeda later described the potentially disastrous situation as a 
train wreck scenario with two trains wrecking.. .one was the work train which was 
going to be a great deal of work [for city departments and workers], and one was 
the money train which [was insufficient to sustain the increased workload or other 
additional services because there] was no resources. 
In some ways, that particular council retreat (where I again served as an 
independent facilitator), was a turning point for Zepeda and members of his executive 
leadership team who were in attendance. In other words, unlike the retreat the year 
before, this gathering resulted in a change of course for the city manager. In particular, it 
enabled him to present a very candid picture of the city's unhealthy fiscal condition. 
Equally important, it also afforded him the opportunity, as discussed earlier, to announce 
an incredibly large number of cost-saving ideas collected from staff at all levels of the 
organization. Without a doubt, that impressive display of active employee engagement in 
this collaborative problem-solving effort caught the attention of the council and the many 
members of the public in attendance at the retreat (as legally required under the Brown 
Act). 
Later, in early June 2005, the city manager and assistant city manager reiterated 
their concerns about the city's fiscal sustainability during a preliminary fiscal year 2005-
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06 budget discussion with the council and in interviews, at that time, with the local 
media. Specifically, they repeated their earlier warning with an updated and equally 
gloomy forecast that the council would need to close a gap, which was now estimated at 
approximately $6.7 million for the coming fiscal year. Moreover, during that discussion, 
Zepeda and Ward explained the causes of the anticipated multi-million dollar deficit and 
discussed short and long-term actions needed to 'fix' the problem. For instance, the city 
manager explained to the council that the substantial gap was due to a rise in overall costs 
including the earlier-mentioned increases in retirement fund costs, personnel salaries, 
and, as reported in the local newspaper, "changes in retirement investments and a 
decrease in the city's general portfolio." Additionally, Assistant City Manager Ward 
warned that though the "city will close that gap for 2005-06.. .without extra revenue, the 
city may not be able to do the same thing in 2006-07."As she explained to the council 
and, later, the local newspaper, the budget would be balanced by taking unused funds 
totaling $3.1 million for "vehicle replacement, office equipment and facility 
maintenance" and applying another "$3.6 million in a carry-forward balance." 
Leaders' First Response to the Continuing Financial Problems 
Immediately after issuing those dire warnings, Zepeda used that budget discussion 
to formally propose that the council adopt a long-term solution to the recurring budget 
deficit problem. As such, the city manager urged the council to place an initiative on the 
November special election ballot to increase the city's sales tax by one cent. Essentially, 
the city manager predicted that the measure, if passed, could generate enough money 
annually for the city to meet its ongoing obligations and help fund much-needed city 
services and facilities, and other urban renewal projects. According to the local 
newspaper, the proposed ballot measure, if passed by the voters, "could add $7 million to 
$8 million annually to the general fund." In further describing the complex situation, 
Zepeda later told the local newspaper that the mayor and council did not want to cut 
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costs; yet they also wanted to fund various projects including expanded police and fire 
services. The city manager stated to the media: 
If we're going to provide more services in [Brightwood] City, we can't just ask 
the general citizenry to bear that burden.. .We're asking more people to bear their 
fair share...Basically, what I'm saying to the council is we're limited. A penny 
tax generates the most money with the least amount of pain." 
Basically, in his reference to more people bearing a fair share, the city manager 
was referring to those nearly 40,000 people who come into the city during the daytime to 
work or conduct business and "who make up more than half the people buying 
merchandise." The disclosure of these compelling statistics seemed to provide the city 
council with yet another good reason to support the city manager's proposal to increase 
revenue through a sales tax increase. In addition to Zepeda's fundamental arguments for 
the sales tax increase, Assistant City Manager Ward warned the council that "if the 
proposed tax measure fails with voters in November, the city would have to cut all 
department budgets by 20 percent the next fiscal year." Thus, by the end of that council 
session in early June 2005, the council unanimously approved Zepeda's recommendation 
and directed city officials to put the sales tax measure on the November ballot. 
Mounting a Controversial Sales Tax Initiative and Failure of Proposition B 
Soon after receiving the green light from the council, the proposed sales tax 
measure was officially placed on the special election ballot as Proposition B. However, in 
spite of community polls suggesting the initiative might pass, as well as support from 
many businesses and the employee unions, the initiative faced some formidable 
obstacles. For example, one of the obstacles that the proponents of the measure faced was 
the residual effect or 'bad baggage' remaining after the failure of Proposition S (the 
earlier mentioned property tax initiative designed to pay for a new police and fire 
station). Even though that measure was narrowly defeated in November of the previous 
year with an approval rate of 65.29 percent (slightly missing the required two-thirds 
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approval rate), that election outcome set the stage for another classical confrontation 
between the proponents and opponents of ballot measures seeking tax increases to fund 
city government services and projects. Another obstruction to the measure's passage, that 
was later reported in the local newspaper, was a 
small-scale, last-minute campaign to mislead voters. A group of residents 
distributed fliers and signs saying the sales tax initiative was in fact a ballot 
measure regarding eminent domain. 
As a result of these and other obstacles, the measure failed with only a 43 percent 
approval rate in November 2005. In its routine coverage of news-worthy developments 
within Brightwood City, the local newspaper interviewed the city manager about his 
perspective on the failed initiative and it subsequently reported that Zepeda 
cited a number of factors in the measure's defeat: a convoluted ballot with a slew 
of state propositions, intense public mistrust of government because of the [Playa 
Vista?] City Hall fiasco and a general reluctance to increase taxes. 'It created the 
perfect storm, and therefore you saw the outcome,' [Zepeda said]. 
Zepeda's assessment of the complex conditions that influenced that election outcome 
was, undeniably, politically astute and very much on point. Nonetheless, a few civic 
leaders and members of the bureaucratic leadership team felt that, notwithstanding the 
more obvious factors that Zepeda highlighted, their was also an apparent lack of an 
organized and visible campaign effort to secure passage of the sales tax proposition. 
In particular, there was a well-founded perception that the mayor and city council, 
despite their unanimous approval of placing the measure on the ballot, were noticeably 
missing during the few community meetings convened to discuss the proposition. One 
interview participant, who was also one of the new leaders recruited to accelerate much-
needed growth and modernization in his department, was among those who noticed the 
lack of an organized campaign and, specifically, the council's lack of involvement in 
promoting the measure. In an ex post facto assessment of his own reactions to the failures 
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of Propositions S and B, as well as the roles that the city's leaders played in promoting 
those efforts, that interviewee stated: 
That Public Safety Initiative, really for lack of a better term, took the wind out of 
my sails, because I was under the impression that we were coming into an 
organization that was ready to grow. That [Brightwood] city is on the move, and 
that was part of the definition of being on the move.. .The Proposition B, I was 
very impressed with the fact the city council, the elected officials here decided 
that it would go right back to the citizens and make an effort to get an initiative 
passed to make up for the structural deficit that we had. And they're very 
committed. However, I didn't see that commitment during the actual campaign. 
They weren't out front. And I think that resulted in the failure of the initiative. 
There was really no organized effort to pass that initiative, Proposition B. 
In essence, the outcome of the vote on Proposition B was a major disappointment 
to the many supporters of the initiative that were among the ranks of the city's elected 
officials, government workforce and citizens at large. Clearly, this was another serious 
blow to the city leaders' efforts to generate additional revenues to fund much-needed 
capital projects, expanded services and, ultimately, the sustainability of the city 
government. In short, the primary question before the city leaders, at this juncture, was 
simply: 'what do we do now?' 
Implementing Secondary Intervention Strategies: Aftermath of Proposition B 
With the failure of Proposition B in November 2005 and the imminent budgetary 
crisis looming on the horizon, the city manager was compelled, now more than ever, to 
respond to the dire situation in ways that he had hoped could be avoided. Examining all 
of the options available to him at that point, City Manager Zepeda looked at the earlier 
mentioned type three intervention strategies that he had considered implementing during 
the initial phase of the transparent change effort that he had launched in the last quarter of 
2004. However, having previous experience with organizational change initiatives and 
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having broadened his familiarity with the change literature after that experience, Zepeda 
decided, at that time, to delay implementing the third type of organizational interventions. 
He understood that, in the public sector, type three intervention strategies are often used 
after other interventions have been implemented and, in particular, if those other 
interventions have failed to remedy an organization's overall dilemma. Furthermore, he 
knew that, during this secondary phase of the change process, he must focus critically on 
further reining in spending by downsizing the organization vis-a-vis type three 
interventions including reductions in department budgets, staffing levels, public services, 
etc. 
Therefore, acting with a heightened sense of urgency, influenced in large part by 
the failure of Proposition B, Zepeda swiftly launched the second phase of the transparent 
change effort in early November 2005. To this end, he immediately proposed: (1) 20 
percent reductions in all department budgets; (2) a city-wide hiring freeze that affected 
approximately 40 position vacancies (an estimated $1.5 million savings); (3) a wage 
freeze affecting all city employees; and (4) cuts in spending on recruiting, purchasing, 
training, travel and capital projects. At the same time, in a personal display of leadership, 
City Manager Zepeda voluntarily took a 10 percent pay cut in his $165,000 annual salary. 
Later, after nearly two months of lively discussion and public comment at council 
meetings and budget workshops, the council reluctantly approved the implementation of 
a number of drastic cost-cutting actions. To sum up, on December 20, 2005, the council 
took public comments and approved the following actions: (1) reductions in hours of 
service at the library; (2) postponement of the opening of the rebuilt municipal pool 
which would result in approximately 30 intermittent swimming pool employees not being 
rehired; (3) a severe reduction in swimming pool operations throughout the year; and (4) 
the city manager's hiring and wage freeze orders. 
During the discussion concerning those drastic cost-cutting measures at that 
council meeting, the city manager disclosed that nearly $4 million more in cuts must be 
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made by June 30, 2006 in order to close the almost $7 million deficit. So, in addition to 
coming to grips with the bleak realities of the newly initiated cuts, Zepeda and the 
council now faced the dilemma of identifying and implementing even deeper cuts. Hence, 
the city manager and council began the arduous task of informing the city residents about 
the growing severity of the situation. 
Thus, beginning in mid January 2006, the city manager increased his efforts to 
direct residents' attention towards the city's continuing fiscal deterioration and the need 
for action. In an informal but accelerated public information campaign, Zepeda focused 
his public comments on: clearly and repeatedly communicating the causes of the fiscal 
crisis; the unavoidability of the onerous cuts mentioned above; and the likelihood of 
further drastic measures (including further service reductions and the possibility of 
layoffs) if the projected budgetary deficits were not remedied forthwith. Soon, Zepeda's 
amplified public information effort became increasingly evident in his presentations and 
public comments at subsequent council meetings, budget workshops and other 
community forums. In fact, his frequent communication on the city's budgetary dilemma 
quickly began to gain the attention of keenly interested community leaders and residents. 
Meanwhile, during a budget discussion at a council meeting in late January 2006, 
Zepeda joined the council in engaging residents in a candid discussion about why and 
where additional cuts should be made. During this meeting, the council approved 
additional regressive cuts discussed in the previous month's council session which, 
ultimately, would include layoffs of 19 part-time library employees. Equally important, 
during this council session, the city manager urged the council to consider placing 
another one cent sales tax measure on the next election ballot. 
In describing the city manager's viewpoint on the importance of the sales tax 
increase to the city's fiscal viability, the local newspaper quoted him as saying, at that 
meeting, that: 
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Without it [a one cent sales tax measure], the city can't accommodate its projected 
growth.. .Through my discussions with focus groups throughout the city, people 
are saying they didn't understand the measure [Proposition B] and they do not 
like the cuts.. .What you see now will only be worse.. .Will there be another 
proposition? There better be. If something doesn't happen soon, our departments 
will have to see more cuts. 
In the same news article, the local newspaper also reported that, in response to City 
Manager Zepeda's somber predictions, the "council members agreed that the $7 million 
in cuts they have to make between now and June [2006] is crippling services." Further, 
the article specifically quoted long-time councilman Roy Manning who, concerned about 
the severe cuts and the need for some kind of action, said tersely: "We can't accept this. 
We're going to have to do something about it." 
Over the next few weeks, the public discourse on the drastic cost-cutting actions 
and a second sales tax proposal continued to attract attention and concern at city hall, in 
'town hall-style meetings' and the local media. Consequently, the one cent sales tax 
proposal was put on the February 7, 2006 council agenda for open discussion and 
possible action. In short, the mayor and council responded to the many calls for action on 
their part and, as such, voted unanimously, at that council meeting, to place another sales 
tax initiative before the voters in the June 2006 election. Thereafter, the initiative was 
placed on the election ballot as Proposition D. 
Merger of the Community Development Commission and the Redevelopment 
Agency. As the roll-out of the above described cost-cutting actions and the revived sales 
tax measure were gaining momentum, another type-one change intervention 
(departmental restructuring and realignment) was also gaining the support of the mayor 
and council. This intervention entailed a significant departure from the way the city had 
conducted community development and redevelopment business over the previous thirty 
years. In addition, unlike the other change interventions that were implemented earlier, 
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this major change intervention was essentially conceived and crafted by the mayor and 
council. In brief, this intervention was launched when the city manager was directed by 
the council, around mid February 2006, to implement the merger of the Community 
Development Commission and the Redevelopment Agency. 
Basically, this merger involved moving the formerly independent operational 
functions and responsibilities of the Community Development Commission (CDC) and 
consolidating them within the existing structure of the city government's Redevelopment 
Agency, and then re-naming the merged, reconstituted agency the Community 
Development Department (CDD). As a result, three program divisions were created 
within the department (i.e., the redevelopment, neighborhood services and housing and 
grants divisions) for operational and service delivery purposes. Essentially, the placement 
of the operations of the CDC, within the city government structure under the reporting 
authority of the city manager, was done in order to enable the Community Development 
Commission (which is comprised of the mayor and the members of the city council) to 
improve: coordination and streamlining of development services; cost-effective 
management of resources (i.e., staffing and funding) and efficient service delivery; and 
integration of existing departmental strategic plans with the city's long-range planning, 
and Capital Improvement Program. 
Likewise, the merger would also bolster this agency which had continuously 
struggled, in recent years, to manage its constantly growing list of disparate and 
competing projects; and was viewed by the mayor and council as critical to their 
aggressive urban revitalization plans. In particular, the merger aligned the work of the 
new CDD with the city council's goal of fiscal sustainability and, eventually, the city's 5-
year strategic plan. In summary, the merger was completed in March 2006 and comprised 
yet another type one change intervention utilized in the transparent change effort at the 
City of Brightwood. 
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On the other hand, not everybody in the city government's leadership viewed the 
merger in the same light. Specifically, two interview participants expressed reservations 
about the CDC merger when asked if they felt the restructuring process was successful. 
One of the interviewees felt that the "jury was still out" on the merger and that it was 
"probably not effective" insofar as the anticipated benefits and achievements had yet to 
be realized. The other interviewee said: "I think it's still in the process.. .1 don't think its 
completely successful right now because I think they're still ironing out a lot of things." 
Public outcry over the cuts in programs and public services. While the merger of 
the Community Development Department was in progress, the reality of the draconian 
cuts began to set in at city hall and among the city's residents. Even though the city 
manager and assistant city manager had painstakingly warned that drastic measures 
would be taken if the fiscal crisis was not abated, there was, nevertheless, a public outcry 
over these actions. In fact, an outpouring of public discontent over the resultant cuts in 
programs and public services was expressed at several council meetings, city budget 
workshops and other community forums in the months immediately following the 
implementation of the cost-cutting measures. The outcries, however, were, essentially, 
expressions of concern from community members over the negative effects that the cost-
cutting actions were having, or would have, on the quality of their lives (e.g., reduced 
access to the library and swimming pool, cuts in senior and disabled programs and 
services, slower emergency responses by police and fire fighters, etc.). For example, in an 
appeal to the council concerning the life-threatening consequences resulting from 
firefighter response times going beyond their four-minute target, a cardiologist at the 
local hospital told the council: "If we do anymore cuts, our survival rate is going to be 
even worse. We need to figure out a way to solve this." " 
In the meantime, several of the members of the executive leadership team (e.g., 
the city librarian, police and fire chiefs, etc.) had joined the city manager in his escalating 
communication efforts and shared their perspectives and concerns about the cost-cutting 
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measures at some of those public venues, as well as in interviews with the local 
newspaper. The department heads' comments, at that time, were generally focused on the 
unintended, negative consequences of those drastic actions on their respective 
departments (e.g., reduced services and programs, facility closures, staff attrition, etc.). 
For instance, the local newspaper disclosed City Librarian Amy Carson's sentiments 
concerning the closure of the new library an additional two days a week, and the 
corresponding negative effects on the community with the following: 
In this working-class city, where about 36 percent of the population - the highest 
rate in the county - is illiterate and more than 40 percent didn't finish high school, 
the library is vital.. .It's sad for the community. They won't have access to the 
information and tools they need to have a better life. 
In like manner, Chief Garcia, reflecting on the effects of possible layoffs in his 
department, was quoted by the media as telling the council: "My biggest fear is that there 
will be an increase in crime. The city won't be safe, and people won't want to come to 
[Brightwood] City." Similarly, Chief Randall Jefferson, expressing an equally 
unequivocal reaction to the gloomy prospect of layoffs and closure of one fire station, 
appealed to the council by asserting: "It's a recipe for disaster." Also, a newspaper article 
in late April 2006 described the discouraging effects of the past and existing hiring 
freezes, as well as the dismal expectations that would result from layoffs in under-staffed 
city departments. Specifically, the directors of the Building and Safety and Planning 
Departments talked about the "escalating struggle" resulting from the impacts of: the 
hiring freezes on "shrinking staffs" (e.g., 40 city staff departures in the past two years 
including 20 "in the past five months alone"); increasing workloads "fueled" by the city's 
"building frenzy"; and the anticipation of further delays in processing times for permits 
and development plans. To sum up, the article concluded that "city officials want voters 
to know a lot is riding on Proposition D, which [Brightwood] City voters will decide on 
June 6." 
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Government leaders' views of the fallout from the failure of Proposition B. In 
their subsequent interviews with me, most of the participants went beyond merely 
discussing the objective, organizational types of concerns that they each had, at the time 
those critical cost-cutting actions were being implemented. Accordingly, most of the 
participants also expressed some of their subjective types of sentiments about the above 
cited negative consequences. In particular, Police Chief Garcia described the negative 
effect of the hiring freeze upon his department (e.g., the immediate exodus of staff and 
police officers), as well as the impact of the failure of Proposition B on him, personally, 
in the following manner: 
When Prop B failed, there was a temporary freeze on hiring. We went from 87 
officers to about 70 officers to 60 some officers. We also lost professional staff. 
Then on top of that, we had officers that were injured. At the same time, that was 
a big budget hit on us because without the additional revenue that was anticipated 
from the one cent sales tax, we couldn't implement our strategic plan.. .It was the 
failure of Prop B that really brought a lot of consternation and we have had a lot 
of officers leaving. By that, I mean six or eight officers going to other 
departments, which is a lot for our department. We average about six or seven 
officers leaving a year, but not in a short period of time... They [Propositions S 
and B] affected me in that I came to [Brightwood] City from [Playa Vista?] PD to 
make some change, to bring about change. It affected me personally that I 
couldn't implement what was needed for the department and what was needed for 
the community...Our community has a median income of [$]35,000, [and we are] 
probably the most violent city in the County.. .and we have been for years. It 
affected me because I wanted to so badly reduce our crime. 
Another interview participant elaborated on the failure of Proposition B, the 
resultant 20 percent cut in department budgets, and the personal effects of both of these 
events, in the following way: 
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[In] November '05, Proposition B failed. That was a huge, huge blow to the city, 
to the department. It impacted my department greatly.. .a lot of our programs that 
were near and dear to me.. .All that went by the wayside...everything was put on 
hold.. .Everything we did had to go through a committee. And a lot of things 
weren't funded... With 20 percent cuts right off the bat for our departments.. .And 
[in] a small department like mine.. .that was a pretty hard pill to swallow. That 
significantly altered the way we did things. And in a department like ours, where 
we are out in the community.. .It's hard to not feel like you can't even carry out 
your core mission. 
Finally, more than half of the leaders interviewed, expressed their concerns about the 
adverse impacts that the Proposition B fiasco and some of the cost-cutting measures had 
upon the morale of the city workforce (e.g., staff and possible salary cuts, etc.). One of 
the participants distinctly echoed that recurring theme in this way, 
And after that failed [Proposition B], I think the entire city became, or the entire 
workforce demonstrated a decrease, a significant decrease in morale. There was 
some anger that citizens did not appreciate the contributions that city employees 
make. There was a sense of a loss of direction. That people were really feeling 
like, 'Do I want to be a part of this organization?' There were threats of layoffs, of 
salary reductions, increasing workloads. So it really.. .made an impact on the 
entire organization. 
Averting the Train Wrecks: Leaders' Last Response to the Oncoming Disaster 
By voting to place another sales tax initiative on the June 2006 election ballot 
shortly after the earlier failure of Proposition B, the council publicly acknowledged the 
serious need for a long-term 'fix' to the city's financial dilemma. In commenting on the 
city's ominous dilemma and the need for a speedy remedy, Councilman Manning was 
quoted by the local newspaper as saying: "If the sales tax does not pass, this is only going 
to continue.. .1 don't care who's in office - they're not going to be able to stop this." In 
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contrast to their languid efforts during the Proposition B initiative, however, this time the 
elected officials and other community leaders would step up to this ominous situation in a 
decisive and determined manner. 
In its ongoing coverage of the city's dilemma, the local newspaper described the 
scenario, at that time, in the following way: "After getting a dose of what is to come, 
proponents of the sales tax launched a much more prominent campaign to educate 
[Brightwood] City voters on the situation." As such, supporters of the measure joined the 
city manager, council and their political consultants in leading the effort to avert the 
oncoming "train wrecks" by promoting the passage of the renewed sales tax measure, 
Proposition D. 
Round two: forging another sales tax measure. It was sometime in April 2006 that 
members of the city council, several sympathetic civic leaders and other community 
supporters/volunteers (including a number of city workers) deployed the educational 
campaign aimed at making the case for a sales tax increase. In the same article cited 
above, the local newspaper also reported that the leaders and the many volunteers of the 
campaign began "fundraising, walking precincts, running phone banks and hosting town 
hall-style meetings to try to persuade voters to increase the city sales tax." For these 
reasons, the Save [Brightwood] City campaign (as the effort was named upon attaining 
political action committee status) served as an important rallying point around the sales 
tax measure. 
Moreover, the education campaign provided an opportunity for these dedicated 
volunteers to engage in civic leadership activities that would: (a) broaden the reach of the 
information exchanged during previously cited city council sessions and the city manager 
and executive staffs public information campaign and (b) contribute to a growing sense 
of community ownership of the city's financial problems and its future. An example of 
the latter type of active leadership involvement and capacity-building was exemplified by 
the city's representative on the regional Port Commission who planned and coordinated 
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weekend precinct walks for dozens of volunteers. Another example of committed civic 
leadership was the former chair of the local Filipino-American Chamber of Commerce 
and owner of a local phone business who provided committee volunteers with an office 
for an evening phone bank operation. 
Additionally, the precinct walks created a useful community feedback loop that, 
among other things, ultimately led to the mayor and council members volunteering to 
take pay cuts. In a commentary on the elected officials' agreeing to take pay cuts if the 
tax failed, the local newspaper recounted the following: 
The [Brighwood] City mayor and City Council agreed Tuesday night [May 2, 
2006] to take a 30 percent pay cut if the sales-tax hike on the June ballot doesn't 
pass. The idea came after Port Commissioner [Dougie Valencia] said he had 
encountered distrust of city officials and resistance to the sales tax while walking 
precincts two weekends in a row. Since the council will have to resort to layoffs if 
the tax doesn't pass and is asking voters to tax themselves, then council members 
should lead by example, he said. 'There's a big distrust of the government out 
there,' [Valencia] said. 'I look at the council as the leaders, and you need to set 
the example for the citizens of this community.' Applause erupted in council 
chambers after [Valencia] implored the council to take a pay cut. Officials swiftly 
acknowledged the suggestion by saying they would take the 30 percent pay cut if 
the 1-cent-on-the-dollar sales- tax proposal fails June 6... [Valencia] said several 
residents told him that city leaders should take a pay cut while he was 
campaigning to promote the sales tax.. .These gestures resonate with the 
community, [Valencia] said. As a business owner, he said he has had to do the 
same. 'You have to take the lead and say, T in right here fighting with you.' 
Not long after Commissioner Valencia's forceful plea, the local newspaper reported that 
Chiefs Garcia and Jefferson "agreed to take a pay cut if the tax failed." 
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In his announcement that he would, as reported in one article, "take a 10 percent 
pay cut if the increase is voted down," Chief Garcia echoed Commissioner Valencia's 
earlier words by saying: "I have to lead by example." In his subsequent interview with 
me, Chief Jefferson connected his thoughts on the roles that key members of the 
leadership team performed during the change/restructuring process, with his view on the 
voluntary pay cut issue and concluded that 
one of the most significant [roles] was the [city] manager stepped forward and 
said that he would take a 10 percent reduction in pay, setting the example. And 
the council followed suit.. .with a commitment for a reduction in pay if the sales 
tax did not pass, along with myself and the police chief. And really all the 
managers in the organization were pretty much committed too. I'd say 80 percent 
of them were committed to setting the example if it did not pass and take a 
reduction in pay or benefits. But the [city] manager actually stepped forward and 
took that reduction. 
All things considered, by his exemplary action, City Manager Zepeda 
demonstrated unequivocally his 'commitment to his beliefs' in the citizens and the city's 
workforce and to the council's "visions and dreams of what could be" by "modeling the 
way" for the other city leaders (Kouzes & Posner, 2002). At the same time, the executive 
leaders mentioned above were "enlisted" and inspired by Zepeda and the council to the 
extent that they 'accepted that vision as their own' because they believed that their 
"leaders understand their needs and have their interests at heart" (Kouzes & Posner, 
2002). Without a doubt, these demonstrations of committed and selfless leadership 
resonated with most, if not all, of the supporters of Proposition D and bolstered their 
determination to secure the passage of this vitally important sales tax proposal. As a 
result of the incredible resolve of the city council, city manager, various civic and 
government leaders and other concerned and committed individuals, Proposition D 
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successfully passed in June 2006. In a reversal of the results for Proposition B just seven 
months earlier, the second sales tax measure received a 58 percent approval rate. 
Summary of the Financial Crisis Period and the Leadership Response to Dire Financial 
Conditions 
This section of the case focused on Brightwood's fiscal crisis and the city leaders' 
response to the crisis from February 2005 to June 2006. The events recounted here, in 
other words, can be thought of as the second act in an unfolding drama. Act two of this 
drama, "life during the financial crisis," opens with a scene set in early February 2005 
(following the implementation of the aforementioned change interventions) in which the 
city manager presents a gloomy 5-year financial forecast and a number of staff generated 
cost-saving ideas at the first City Council Retreat. As scene one progresses to early June 
2005, the assistant city manager reveals that short-term, budgetary shifts and 'technical 
fixes' will not be available for balancing the 2006-07 budget's estimated $7 million 
shortfall. By meeting's end, Zepeda proposes a long-term solution to the recurring budget 
deficit problem—a controversial ballot initiative asking voters to approve a one cent 
increase to the city's sales tax. As scene one closes at the end of that crucial council 
session, the council unanimously approves placing the sales tax measure on the 
November 2005 ballot. 
In scene two, despite favorable community polls and support from business and 
labor groups, the tax measure, Proposition B, encounters stiff opposition from some 
residents who fundamentally object to tax increases and are, to varying degrees, 
suspicious of government officials. Contributing to the momentum going against the 
proposition, there is the lack of an organized campaign in support of the measure and the 
council's noticeable absence at a few public forums organized around this issue. As scene 
two fast-forwards to an election central television newscast in mid November 2005, the 
newsman briefly reports on the fairly decisive defeat of Proposition B. Scene two 
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concludes with office interviews being conducted by a 'local beat' journalist at the 
offices of three key actors in the Proposition B saga. 
Scene three opens a few days after the election in the halls of the city 
administration building where the city manager mulls over the immediate implementation 
of several onerous but necessary organizational changes (e.g., deep department budget 
reductions, hiring and wage freezes, and cuts in essential expenditures) and he realizes 
that these painful actions, and others to come, will have serious internal and external 
consequences. As 2005 comes to a close, the council approves several drastic cost-cutting 
measures affecting the library and municipal pool which includes not rehiring nearly 30 
intermittent pool employees, and severe cuts in library and pool operations. In mid 
January 2006, City Manager Zepeda activates an amplified public information campaign 
to communicate the severity of the fiscal crisis with the involvement in those efforts of 
several executive team members, and the growing attention of community leaders and 
residents. Also, at the council's late January 2006 meeting, the council approves closing 
the library two additional days per week, and laying off all of the part-time library 
employees. Furthermore, at the urging of the city manager and convinced that proposed 
across-the-board departmental budget cuts would have disastrous consequences on the 
city's public health and safety services, the council, in February 2006, approves asking 
voters again for a one cent sales tax increase. Scene three draws to a close in mid March 
2006 as the council brings an end to a thirty year tradition of conducting community 
development and redevelopment business in separate governmental silos and merges the 
Community Development Commission and the Redevelopment Agency. 
Finally, scene four rapidly runs through a series of mini vignettes that takes the 
audience through a flurry of events from mid March and culminating with the June 2006 
election. Included in that flurry of events are: (1) a series of probing newspaper articles 
exposing the city's development infrastructure and public safety systems' acute 
vulnerability to the dire effects of the draconian fiscal cuts; (2) a couple of emotion-filled 
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council meetings where some council members and city officials bemoan the harshness 
of the cuts, and a community leader successfully exhorts the council to accept a 
substantial pay cut if the sales tax measure fails; and (3) an "intense public awareness 
campaign" involving public forums and debates, phone banks, fundraising events and 
weekend precinct walks promoting the sales tax. As act two ends, the final vignette 
shows the voters passing Proposition D at the polls; thus, enabling the city to avert the 
fiscal "train wrecks." 
Life After the Financial Crisis: Going Forward in an Era of Fiscal Uncertainty 
In many cases, organizations undergoing change, restructuring and downsizing do 
not experience the kinds of timely or "final" outcomes that they had anticipated in their 
planning timelines. This is often the case with local government organizations that are 
subject to continuously changing financial and political conditions. Truly, this was the 
situation at the City of Brightwood during its major change, restructuring and downsizing 
effort. This final section, "Life After the Financial Crisis: Going Forward in an Era of 
Uncertainty," reviews how the leaders responded to the passage of the sales tax measure, 
leaders' perceptions of the restructuring and intervention efforts, and how the leaders 
planned to guide the organization towards long-term viability and growth. 
Passage of Proposition D: "We Stanched the Bleeding. " 
Proposition D's passage serves as one of a few high water marks in Brightwood 
City's local government history, especially in view of the City's leaders' resilience and 
determination in the face of a near fiscal collapse. Considering the fact that other local 
governments in California had, in the recent past, unsuccessfully attempted to generate 
revenues through one-half cent and one cent sales tax increase initiatives, this successful 
effort stands as a remarkable achievement. Furthermore, Brightwood City officials' 
reactions to the final passage of the sales tax measure were, indeed, swift, appreciative 
and deliberate. 
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As such, immediately after the election, Brightwood City officials' disclosed to 
the local newspaper that they would expeditiously 
eliminate the need to cut budgets 20 percent in all departments... [remove] a 
hiring and wage freeze [that] has been in place since November... [and] reopening 
the library to 6 days a week, restoring hours at the swimming pool, watering the 
grass at the park and keeping the lights on at the basketball courts. 
Furthermore, the local newspaper reported City Manager Zepeda's early reaction to the 
success of his recommended tax measure with the following quote: 
I feel a sense of gratitude for the community and for the employees a sense of 
relief.. .After losing 48 positions, we're hoping that our police officers and 
employees who were exploring other opportunities will consider [Brightwood] 
City a stable, long-term place of employment.. .Now that it has passed, 
[Brightwood] City's immediate future is not as bleak.. .We stanched the bleeding 
in [Brightwood] City. 
Also, all of the interview participants who shared their reactions to the successful 
passage of the tax measure expressed either amazement at its approval the 'second time 
around,' general relief in that no jobs would be lost, gratitude and appreciation for the 
hard work of the proponents and the approving voters, or a combination of those 
sentiments. A couple of the interviewees even stressed the significance of the "milestone" 
passage of a sales tax measure (resulting in the highest sales tax rate in the county) in this 
'poor' city (e.g., the lowest household income in the county and a very high incidence of 
poverty). One of those two participants also discussed, in particular, the significant 
impact of the negative consequences of the draconian cost-cutting measures with the 
following statement: 
yet it helped a great deal to have the community actually feel some pain, to have 
the reduced library hours, to have the pool closure, to have the positions not filled 
in all departments. The employees felt the pain but the residents also felt the pain. 
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It was clear this was not a false alarm. This was not a drill. This was not people 
blowing smoke. This was real. It was like a punch in the nose for the community 
and they got it. It was a real high risk approach, I think, but it was a successful 
approach. 
The other participant, who also emphasized the significance of the passage of the 
tax measure, reaffirmed the importance of the restoration of services "that were near and 
dear to us." This same participant also proudly highlighted her involvement in the "grass-
roots effort and literally walking out in the community every weekend" and underscored 
the sacrifice that she and many others made by "giving up your weekend to get this thing 
passed." Likewise, in the same newspaper article that recounted Zepeda's early reaction 
to Proposition D's passage, as cited above, Councilman Manning was also reported as 
saying: "Citizens stepped up to the plate. Now it's going to be up to the council to be 
proper stewards." 
Stabilizing the Workforce and Addressing Citizens' Aspirations 
City Manager Zepeda's above-cited remarks about city employees and the 
ongoing concerns about the steady exodus of police officers and other city staff 
demonstrated clearly that stabilizing the workforce would be among the top issues to be 
addressed in the immediate aftermath of the passage of the tax increase initiative. In 
addition, as he pondered the significant organizational change events he listed on the 
interview guide's milestone chart, the city manager recounted some of the critical staff 
changes that occurred from 2004 to the latter part of 2006 in the following way: 
Where we were in 2004 with all the executive hires and replacements, in 2006 
toward 2007, we're there again. Public Works Director, Building & Safety 
Director, Redevelopment Director, Deputy Director of Redevelopment, Deputy 
Director of HR, HR Director, Assistant City Manager, and Finance Director were 
all part and parcel to a merger [which has led to] uncertainty, [and] natural 
attrition. And so we're full circle. 
150 
With these challenging staffing issues in mind, the council approved, two weeks after the 
tax measure's passage, a $36 million budget for fiscal year 2006-07 which, according to 
the local newspaper, allowed for, among other things, "27 immediate hires" (the majority 
of which would be in the police and fire departments), and "other imminent hires [to] 
include a finance director, a risk manager, two city planners and a librarian." 
The newspaper further reported that, during that same council session, the 
"council members talked about what residents want to see in the city." Councilman Fred 
Pacheco, reflecting on the feedback that he and other council members had heard during 
the budget crisis, stated: "People want clean parks with green grass. People want to see a 
comprehensive traffic safety program and a livable and great city." Further, in building 
upon the council member's description of the residents' hopes and dreams for the city, 
the author of that same article accurately characterized the city leaders' fiscal aspirations 
by asserting that "the tax increase will last 10 years, after which officials hope to have 
enough revenue-generation business in the city to not have to ask voters to approve it 
again." Additionally, in a subsequent article, the same journalist, while commenting on 
the sales tax increase which went into effect on October 1, 2006, stated that "the higher 
rate is expected to produce $7 million to $9 million annually in extra revenue," and 
further noted that "since the tax begins in the midst of the city's fiscal year, officials are 
projecting about $5 million in revenue for this fiscal year." 
Despite those encouraging projections, the city manager and the council 
immediately began "working to attract new retail outlets to the city, which will produce 
tax revenue." The article went on to specifically disclose that "on the books are a Costco, 
a Target and the [Local] Shopping Center expansion. City officials are discussing 
building a football stadium in the city.. .and turning the city's municipal golf course into 
a retail outlet." Through these aggressive efforts, the city officials showed clearly that 
they were committed to 'growing new revenues' which, in the long term, would aid them 
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in fulfilling their vision of revitalization and addressing constituents' aspirations for their 
beloved city. 
Moving from Short-Term Sustainability to Long-Term Viability and Growth 
As mentioned earlier, the additional sales tax revenue would allow the city leaders 
to "dodge the bullet" by avoiding a short-term financial calamity. Thus, with the success 
of this brilliant but hard-fought political/fiscal maneuver, the city leadership had now 
created a sound framework for moving from short-term sustainability to long-term 
viability and growth. Indeed, City Manager Zepeda later recounted the implications of the 
newly approved sales tax upon the city's future sustainability and efficiency of its 
operations and services in the following manner: 
And the opportunities in front of us now are those of more efficiency, more 
integration because of the merger of the CDC and the City, and some 
sustainability in the short-term, which is a five to nine-year period with respect to 
the sales tax plugging temporarily that structural deficit. 
But, in a circumspect assessment of the future operational and service 
implications of the added tax revenue, Police Chief Garcia cautiously predicted that 
although it passed, the monies don't come in until October 1, so they start 
collecting the money and we won't know probably until about January [2007] 
how much is actually going to start coming in. The bigger picture will be a year 
later. We will have to see what it is really like. But this proposition since it 
passed, all of the services should be restored and, therefore, all of the positions 
should be filled. [But] that is not going to happen right away. 
At the same time, another interviewee affirmed the optimistic atmosphere at city hall 
following the measure's passing, as did a number of other interview participants, in his 
expression of happiness over their collective victory. Even though a "sense of relief" 
was still permeating the organization at the time of his interview, this same participant 
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suggested that city workers must be mindful of their duty "to give them [the citizens] 
what they are paying for." 
In other words, his comment was intended to forewarn city leaders and workers to 
avoid complacency because residents' expectations would be greater than before because 
of the additional sales tax burden they now shared. On the other hand, his comment may 
have also served as a cautionary reminder of the local newspaper's reporting in July 2006 
that a city resident had, in fact, "filed paperwork with the city clerk saying he intends to 
try to get the tax repealed through another vote." Without a doubt, in the minds of many 
dissatisfied city residents who opposed the measure, the sales tax issue was far from 
being resolved. 
Leaders' Views of the Efficacy of the Change/Restructuring Efforts 
Besides their various responses and reactions to the passage of Proposition D as 
discussed above, the city bureaucratic leaders also shared some insightful perceptions of 
the efficacy of the change/restructuring efforts. In fact, the executive management's 
perceptions of the efficacy of the restructuring process were somewhat mixed, though 
generally favorable. As shown in Table 1, the majority of the interview participants (seven 
of the ten) made comments (paraphrased in Table 1 for purposes of brevity) during their 
interviews that suggested they viewed the restructuring process as successful. Nonetheless, 
three of those seven participants qualified their comments with caveats suggesting that the 
restructuring work was essentially unfinished or incomplete. Specifically, those 
interviewees said such things as: it was "still too early to tell the success," the process was 
"a work in progress," and "the jury is still out." 
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Table 1. Leaders' perceptions of the change/restructuring process- City of Brightwood 
Part. P M N U Comments 
#1 X Successful but Department Understaffed 
Dedicated & Passionate Staff (Committed Groups) 
Majority of Staff Supportive 
More Getting Done & Better Programs Offered 
#2 X X Too Early to Tell the Success 
Successful in Employee Development 
Falling Short- Inadequate Staffing 
Successful in Employee Feedback 
#3 X Possible Fallout from Loss of Personnel 
Don't Know Yet- Jury is Still 
Out 
Effective in Keeping Staff Informed 
Successful if Adequate Resources Materialize 
Met Immediate Objective- Held the Line 
#4 X Successful for the Moment 
Objective Met- Stay Alive Financially 
Successful Milestone- Passage of Proposition D 
Fewer People- Loss of Institutional Knowledge 
Wait & See if Gaps are 
Filled 
#5 X X Process is Still Going On 
Streamlined Management & Management Processes 
Management Willing to Make Jobs Easier/Comfortable 
Assisted in Budgetary 
Shortfalls 
People Got Opportunities/Revitalized 
Successful in Keeping Everybody 
Informed 
#6 X X A Work in Progress & Continues to Be 
Needed to Take More Time Before Moving On to Other 
Projects 
Need More Feet on the Street- More Bodies 
Required Lots of Hard Work, Perseverance & Sacrifice 
Long Overdue- Reinvigorated 
Individuals 
Majority View- We're So Much Better 
Now 
#7 X Absolutely Successful 
People Bought Into It/Accepted the 
Vision 
People Not Used to Driving to Our New Location 
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#8 X X Not Successful Right Now-Still in Process 
They're Still Ironing Out a Lot of Technical Issues 
Not Well Thought Through 
#9 X X Jury is Still Out 
Probably Not Effective 
#10 X Successfully Confronted the Fiscal Crisis 
Business Community Supported Proposition D 
Community Supported the Solution 
Created Better Model for Redevelopment Agency 
Comm. Changed for the Better-Completed Numerous 
Projects 
Note: P Positive M Mixed 
N Negative U Unfinished 
Part. Participant 
Likewise, one half of all of the participants cited the severe shortage or loss of 
staff as a factor in their overall assessment of the efficacy of the restructuring efforts. 
Moreover, the three interview participants who refrained from stating that the 
restructuring process was successful also made comments suggesting that it was too early 
in the process to judge the efficacy of the restructuring efforts. Yet, despite their seeming 
ambivalence, two of those three participants did not view the restructuring process at the 
Redevelopment Agency as successful or effective, at that point in time. 
In contrast, City Manager Zepeda conveyed an unequivocally positive perception 
of the efficacy of the city-wide change/restructuring efforts. Essentially, during his 
interview with me, Zepeda provided the following description of a change initiative that 
someday may be viewed as an unparalleled turning point in the city's history: 
I think it has been successful for a couple of reasons.. .You have a blank canvas in 
terms of nine executive positions to fill and all of a sudden you are confronted 
with your fiscal crisis, and you confront that crisis head on. You're one of two 
cities in the State of California who are able to do that. None in the region 
attempted it, when we attempted it [the one cent sales tax]. And so I think those 
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changes were extremely positive and speak for themselves, I think. The idea that, 
you know, the mayor and council saw an opportunity to create a better model for 
development by integrating the Redevelopment Agency in the city after 35 years 
is an example of further success on the city's side.. .And I think from a project 
standpoint, the work done by people on the City's staff to finish a $20 million 
library, a $9 million fire station, $3 million worth of street improvements, you 
know, $4 million worth of [street] median landscaping.. .All those speak to a 
community that is changed for the better.. .So I think the changes that have 
occurred in [Brightwood] City or that we have undergone have been extremely 
positive and I say that humbly. 
In conclusion, considering all of the above cited participant responses, those 
leaders' perceptions, in the aggregate, seem to support the notion that the change and 
restructuring efforts were viewed as successful, notwithstanding the fact that about half 
of those leaders felt that a definitive judgment, at the time of the interviews, was 
somewhat premature. Incidentally, these qualitative findings of the leaders' views of the 
efficacy of the change/restructuring efforts were noticeably similar to the findings from 
both of the grounded surveys which were described earlier in Chapter 3. In brief, both 
groups of survey respondents (comprised of subordinate employees reporting directly or 
indirectly to the interview respondents) were almost evenly split on the question of 
whether or not they felt that the departmental merger or restructuring process was/will be 
successful. In Survey I (comprised of 25 subordinate employees of the interview 
participants- excluding the city manager), 48% (or 12) of the respondents rated the 
departmental merger or restructuring process successful, whereas 36% (or 9) responded 
that it was too early to say and 12% (or 3) indicated they were unsure. In Survey II 
(comprised of 5 subordinate employees of the city manager), 60% (or 3) rated the 
departmental merger or restructuring process successful, while 40% (or 2) indicated that 
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it was too early to say. More data from the written surveys, as well as the qualitative 
interviews will be examined in greater detail in Chapter 6. 
Reflecting on the Fiscal Crisis and the City's Future 
As the city ventures forward amidst the fiscal uncertainty that seems to dominate 
government affairs these days, it would be useful, in this final section, to share some of 
the government leaders' comments about the reorganization process' impact on the city 
workforce, and the community. In short, these leaders' comments reveal their unique 
perceptions of the city government's recent intervention efforts, as well as their hopes 
and expectations for the future. For example, some of City Manager Zepeda's interview 
comments provide an insightful 'macro' perspective of the city's recent fiscal challenges 
and its promising future. 
In particular, Zepeda summarized his view of the city's recent fiscal struggles in 
the following comments he made as part of his response to the question of what people 
are now saying about the change/restructuring process: 
I think there's a sense of relief that we fought the right fight in terms of fiscal 
sustainability; the city met it, the community bought into it, and ultimately, you 
know, it would become an example of a community that is resilient, an 
organization that's open.. .At this point, we bought ourselves some more time. We 
didn't solve the problem permanently, and you never do. But at least we were 
open enough to admit the problem. The council had enough courage to address 
the problem, and the community saw enough good or understood the problem 
enough to support the solution. 
Moreover, in responding to the question of what people are now seeing in the 
organization that they would not have seen before, Zepeda presented an optimistic and 
authentic outlook for the city's future with the following comments: 
.. .we're rebuilding the city. We're investing in the city. And that's evident 
through.. .our projects. And I think one of the best things that can be said about all 
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that, is that the mayor and council have done extremely well... So if we're gonna 
[sic] build a library, we're gonna [sic] build the best one we can. If we're gonna 
[sic] build a fire station, we're gonna [sic] build the best one we can. And we 
ought not [to] be concerned with doing things that are kind of a reach or 
mundane.. .So I think that is part and parcel to the new [Brightwood] City [in] that 
you bring on the best people, you have the best vision, and you try to do the best 
thing for the community. And whether you fail or succeed, what really matters is 
you're trying to do the best you can by the people you serve. 
Likewise, in their responses to the same two questions recounted above, several 
selected interview participants shared their own unique 'micro' or departmental 
perspectives of the change/restructuring process. For instance, when responding to the 
question of what people were now saying about the restructuring process, these 
participants' comments, like the city manager's, were also optimistic and upbeat. The 
first interviewee made the following comment: "Well, right now people are feeling high 
because it [Proposition D] passed. And I think people are saying, you know, the future's 
in front of us—there are a lot of positive things that are going on." The second interview 
participant commented that people were now saying: "That it was long overdue. It has 
reinvigorated and re-motivated individuals.. .1 think there are some things where we can 
continue to do better in. But I think the majority of people would say that this is better by 
far than where we were at, by far." 
A third interviewee responded to the same question by saying: 
I think those who have excelled would say it was the best thing since sliced bread. 
For those who have chosen not to get on the bandwagon, they would say that 
splitting the departments wasn't a good thing.. .1 would say overwhelmingly, 
people would be more in support of the reorganization. Because I believe that 
even those who were negative to it or resistant to it have come out better and have 
learned more. 
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Lastly, a fourth interview participant responded with the following remark: ".. .today 
people are excited...I think everybody was motivated. Being long-time employees, you 
don't see much movement here. You don't see opportunities for advancement. Well, all 
of a sudden they're seeing these opportunities on the horizon... They're seeing 
movement, possibilities of movement." 
When asked about what people would now see in the organization, those same 
interviewees responded with equally optimistic comments. For purposes of coherence, 
those participants' comments are presented as follows in the same chronological order as 
their earlier responses were cited above. Hence, in response to the second question, the 
first interview participant said: "I think you see a lot more—I'm not sure how to measure 
this, but I think people are happier. At least they see opportunity. They see a chance for 
continuing their career in [Brightwood] City, long term. They see a sense of stability." 
The second interviewee remarked: "We're doing a lot more now than we did in the past. I 
think they would say people have a fair and equal opportunity here to excel. I think they 
would say that there was a higher level of morale, that it was genuinely a good place to 
work." 
In like manner, the third participant answered the question by asserting: "A lot 
more things [are] getting done. A lot more pro-activeness rather than re-activeness; more 
programs, better programs.. .1 think a more caring group of people who now think outside 
of the box more than just this is the way we've always done it.. .1 think a lot more 
committed groups; a lot more passionate groups." Finally, the fourth participant 
conveyed the following response: 
So they see that they are now getting what they need to do their job and they're 
not going to be reprimanded or considered whiney if they come in and they say, 
you know, I'm hot, I'm tired, we need this, we need that. I mean, whatever the 
problem, they realize that they can come forward [with] these things, and we will 
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accommodate them with what they need to make their job move smoother for 
them. 
Summary of the Post-Financial Crisis Period and Leaders' Perceptions of the 
Change/Restructuring 
This final section of the case focused on the situation in Brightwood after the 
fiscal crisis and the city leaders' response to the final passage of the controversial sales 
tax measure. The closing act of this drama—which I have titled "life after the financial 
crisis," begins days after the June 2006 elections and the voters' approval of Proposition 
D. The final act opens with the drama's protagonist, City Manager Zepeda, being 
interviewed by a local reporter and expressing his sincere gratitude to the voters and his 
upbeat optimism over the future benefits of the new tax increase (including stable, long-
term employment). Next, Councilman Manning is shown talking to the same reporter and 
commending the voters' for accepting the increased tax burden and exhorting the council 
to be good stewards of the anticipated and much-needed tax revenues. Not long after 
those leaders' interviews, the city council immediately approves over thirty immediate 
hires to stabilize the workforce and teams up with the city manager in attracting new 
retail outlets, a shopping center expansion and other revenue-generating developments. 
Furthermore, the final act also showcases conversations with a number of the 
city's department heads, as recorded during their interviews in this research project. Like 
the city manager, those department heads elaborate on their deep appreciation and 
amazement over the passage of this historic tax initiative, as well as the positive aspects 
of the restoration of important services, and the avoidance of job losses. Likewise, those 
department heads take their respective turns talking candidly about their views of the 
passage of Proposition D, the efficacy of the change/restructuring efforts, as well as their 
reflections on the city's fiscal crisis and its future. 
Additionally, during their interviews, they each briefly delve into some of their 
authentic experiences with the restructuring and cost-cutting initiatives. They recall the 
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effects of those initiatives on themselves personally, their coworkers and the city 
workforce, as a whole, and the community, in general, as they struggled to maintain 
services. But, they also talk optimistically about their future hiring and service delivery 
plans, their work on exciting and inspirational revitalization projects, their ongoing 
efforts to attract new businesses and other revenue generating opportunities and, lastly, 
the greatly improved possibilities for employment stability for all city workers, and even 
professional growth and advancement for some of those workers. 
At the same time, a few of the department heads temper their enthusiasm, 
however, with conditional comments that reveal a sort of sobering, conditional optimism 
characteristic of "battle-tested" bureaucratic combatants who have experienced the 
disappointment and frustration of a nearly complete "melt-down" of their organization's 
financial system. Thus, in their closing remarks, those actors use qualifying phrases such 
as "the jury is still out" and "it's still too early to tell" when describing their ambivalent 
views of the change/restructuring efforts. Nevertheless, it is the city manager who, in his 
impassioned responses to the researchers' questions, eloquently frames the city's 
dramatic and, some times precarious, three year journey to fiscal sustainability and 
solvency. And, he not only captures the dreams and aspirations of the city's leaders, 
workforce and residents but he ends the dramatic story with his own elegant description 
of a city with unlimited potential for magnificent growth and unparalleled beauty. 
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CHAPTER V 
FINDINGS, CASE II: THE CITY OF PLAYA VISTA 
The Story of Organizational Change and Major Restructuring and Downsizing in the City 
of Playa Vista 
The city of Playa Vista is one of the oldest of the five largest cities in Southern 
California. It was incorporated in 1850 and has a population of over one million people 
who are distributed throughout an area of over 300 square miles. It is a metropolitan area 
with an ethnic composition of 48% White, 27% Hispanic, 15% Asian/Other, and 7% 
African-American which is comparable to the other four largest cities in Southern 
California. It is a predominantly urban community with a population with a median age 
of 34.3 years and a median household income of nearly $48,000 (recently ranked by 
Forbes Magazine as the fifth wealthiest in the United States). In 2000, 10.6 percent of the 
city's families lived below the poverty level and the city's crime rate in 2005 ranked firth 
in the county. 
From 1931 until January 2006, Playa Vista operated under the 'Council-Manager' 
or 'City Manager' form of government as described in Chapter 4. In short, Playa Vista, 
like Brightwood City, was governed by an elected executive and policy-making branch (a 
mayor and city council) and a government bureaucracy run by a city manager. As such, 
in this government schema, the mayor and council established policy and the city 
manager oversaw the city departments providing essential services and programs. 
However, in 2006, the city's form of government changed to a 'Strong Mayor' system as 
a result of a city-wide vote in November 2004. The enacting legislation, Proposition F, 
approved by a simple majority of 51.4% of the voters, provided for a trial period starting 
on January 1, 2006 and ending on December 31, 2010. 
Under this new form of government, the mayor is, in effect, the elected executive 
officer of the city, while the city council serves as its legislative body. Likewise, under 
this new structure with separate executive and legislative branches, the mayor is no 
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longer a member of the City Council and oversees the daily operations of the city 
including the power to hire and fire city personnel and prepare the city budget. In 
addition, this voter-mandated governance change created a council president post to 
preside over council meetings and an independent budget analyst position with support 
staff to review and advise the council on the mayor's proposed budgets. The switch to 
this new form of governance also conferred upon the council the ability to override 
mayoral vetoes with five votes from its eight members. In November 2010, the citizens 
will again vote on whether or not to retain the 'Strong Mayor' form of government. 
Life Before the Looming Budget Deficit, Corruption Trials and Pension Debacle 
This first section, "Life Before the Looming Budget Deficit, Political Corruption 
Trials, and Pension Debacle," provides an overview of: the growing budget deficit, 
implementation of interventions to reduce costs, changes in leadership amid scandal and 
the pension debacle, and voter approval of a strong mayor form of government. 
Implementing Initial Intervention Strategies to Reduce Costs: Anticipating 
Unprecedented Budget and Resource Pressure 
Other than warnings of possible layoffs, potential service cuts and new fees, and 
some actual reduced spending on maintenance (i.e., replacement of firefighting and 
police equipment resulting from cuts in state funding during the recession years of 1992 
and 1993), the City of Playa Vista had a long history of apparent fiscal stability. But, 
during 2003 and 2004, the city was again faced with threats to its fiscal stability (like 
most other California cities and counties) due to significant budget cuts proposed by the 
Governor resulting from an unprecedented state budget deficit amounting to nearly $24 
billion in 2002. Those continuing threats from proposed state funding cuts (ranging from 
$75 million over two years—2003 to 2004—and nearly $15 million in 2005), and a 
projected $24 million budget deficit in the city's 2004-2005 budget resulted in the 
following remedial actions by the city manager at that time, Martin Ungerman: (1) a 
hiring freeze in January 2003; (2) slashing $10.7 million in services in early 2004 (i.e., 
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park maintenance reductions and delayed library books and computer purchases); (3) 
laying off 3 department directors and 3 deputy directors and consolidating several 
departments in April 2004; and (4) cutting 176 positions through attrition and imposing a 
5% cut in departmental spending in June 2004. Unlike Brightwood City's incremental 
approach in Chapter 4, Playa Vista City's accelerated approach to initiating immediate 
change through type three change interventions (e.g., drastic cuts in departmental 
budgets, staffing levels, and public services) underscores the enormous magnitude of the 
city's projected deficits. 
As the first of those city manager-driven actions were taking place in 2003, the 
Chiefs of the Police and Fire Departments were simultaneously implementing 
departmental reorganizations (also referred to in Chapter IV as type one change 
intervention strategies). Essentially, these departmental reorganizations or restructurings 
were done, in general, to contribute to the city's overall efforts to reduce costs in 
anticipation of unprecedented budget and resource pressure and, specifically, to achieve 
greater efficiencies and cost savings. As a result, the Police Department completed its 
reorganization and staff redeployment by August 2003 and, shortly thereafter, the Fire 
Department finished its reorganization in December 2003. 
Furthermore, in late June 2004, after months of lengthy hearings on the city's 
ever-worsening financial outlook, the city council approved the new city manager's 
following budgetary recommendations: (1) cutting funds for social service programs 
serving youth, seniors and the disabled; (2) reducing hours at pools, libraries and 
recreation centers; (3) closing six community service centers; (4) cutting more than 100 
positions through attrition; and (5) imposing new fees totaling over $9 million in new 
revenue for use of swimming pools, fire prevention inspections, licensing bouncers at 
bars and a processing fee for all business licenses. In addition, the following month, the 
City Manager, Leroy Embers, mandated a new city-wide hiring freeze and directed that 
vacant positions be filled by employees displaced by recent closures and cuts. Despite 
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these initial type one and type three intervention strategies, the City of Playa Vista would 
be forced, as will soon be discussed, to implement other additional intervention strategies 
and further cost reductions in order to keep pace with the growing fiscal crisis. 
Changes in the City's Leadership: Councilmen Indicted, City Auditor Resigns, and City 
Manager Retires Unexpectedly 
In August 2003, three city councilmen—Raul Iniquez, Mark Zucker and Carver 
Lane—were indicted for their alleged involvement in a corruption scheme involving 
bribery in connection with various salacious activities. These serious allegations followed 
a lengthy FBI undercover investigation that included a previous raid of the three council 
offices by FBI agents and Playa Vista police and involved downloading computer files 
and seizing other undisclosed items. Law enforcement officials said, at that time, that the 
search was based on conversations intercepted from earlier surveillance involving wire 
taps and listening devices in the three city council offices. The local newspaper reported 
that authorities were "pursuing charges of wire fraud, bribery, extortion and racketeering 
under the statue known as RICO—or Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations." 
Several months later, around January 2004, as Playa Vista City Hall was still 
reeling from the council office raids and the council indictments, city officials disclosed 
to Wall Street a range of errors and omissions about its escalating, unfunded pension 
system debt and retiree health care benefits in its 2002 and 2003 audits. These serious 
violations of the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws in connection with the 
city's offer and sale of over $260 million in municipal bonds in 2002 and $2.3 billion in 
2003 were followed days later by the sudden resignation of the long-time City Auditor, 
Ernie Rauner. In the weeks that followed in February 2004, the FBI, Securities and 
Exchange Commission and the U.S. Attorney launched joint investigations into the city's 
finances. As the investigations gained momentum, they fueled the launching of what two 
years later would result in further criminal and civil proceedings against the five top city 
pension system officials who were believed to have engaged in a fraud scheme for 
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personal, professional and financial gain. Two months later in April 2004, City Manager 
Martin Ungerman retired amid the pension fund scandal and corruption indictments; he 
was replaced by his Assistant City Manager, Leroy Embers. Naturally, the erupting 
pension fund scandal and those sudden and unexpected leadership changes began to 
quickly stimulate mounting concerns over Playa Vista's growing leadership crisis which 
was approaching unprecedented historical proportions. 
Leaders' Views of the Initial Intervention Strategies and Leadership Changes 
As has been noted, the unusual convergence in 2003 and 2004 of the ominous 
budget deficit, the political corruption scandal, and the shocking pension debacle 
produced significant and transformative changes in the city's workforce and political 
landscape not experienced, heretofore, at the city. In particular, some significant 
structural changes in the workforce can be seen in the cases of the Fire and Police 
Department reorganizations (end of 2003) and the rerouting of collection services at the 
Environmental Services Department (mid 2004). For instance, one interview participant 
(the new Fire Chief and former Assistant Chief), when describing some of the important 
aspects of the department's restructuring in 2003, recalled that 
we restructured [Playa Vista] Fire and Rescue into two sections during that 
reorg[anization], and that's what created the support services half of the 
organization and operational portion of the organization.. .that's what came out of 
the reorg[anization] and restructuring and moving positions. We became a pretty 
efficient and lean organization under that process. And where we took uniforms 
out of say, the communications division, we reallocated them to where we thought 
we had a weak point which was our training division. Typically when budgets get 
tight, training is the first thing you cut. We're also going through a renewal with 
our organizational hiring—a lot of new people, promoting a lot of young people. 
And we felt training probably was the Achilles Heal, if you will, in our 
operations. So we shifted the uniform positions over into the training sections to 
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try and beef that area up; and that was a strong focus for the chief. 
In the same way, another interview participant (the Police Chief who was new to the city 
at the time of the department's 2003 reorganization) echoed a similar theme of significant 
change through substantive reallocation of resources, when he recounted the following 
perspective of his own departmental reorganization: 
In coming here, taking a look at the Police Department [and] how it runs [and] 
understanding the major issues—underfunded, under-staffed and under-equipped 
(and has been that way probably for 10 years). And then coming up with a 
strategic plan that you can sell to the council, you can sell to the officers—that 
replaces personnel, gives us modern equipment, and the training that we need in 
the organization—[because it] was important to be able to do [that]. And we've 
worked through that plan, showing the council how we can do it without 
additional revenues from the city.. .We've sold that, which was significant to the 
city. 
Similarly, when discussing the 2004 implementation of the major rerouting of collection 
of garbage and recycling services for the Environmental Services Department, a third 
interviewee (the department director with 19 years of city service) reported 
In a nut shell.. .we remapped the entire city.. .and changed all of the collection 
routes.. .we were able to reduce the number of trucks that were needed to provide 
trash collection services and the number of people that would [be] need[ed] to 
provide that service.. .we moved those freed up resources and we put them over in 
our recycling efforts.. .And so we represented the first year that we would 
save.. .to be exact, $680,000 in the general fund.. .as a result of these efficiencies 
that we would gain.. .and we were able to accomplish all that we represented... 
and it's because of the people. I mean they're the ones who did it.. .and now it's 
saving the general fund over a million dollars a year...So, I mean initially [from 
my] personal standpoint, I was worried. I didn't know how it was gonna work. It 
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definitely had a great impact on the organization.. .But this whole department 
came together to make it happen and make it successful and it's been successful! 
In addition to those important intervention strategies mentioned above, the 
disturbing events of 2003 and 2004 also directly influenced, as mentioned earlier, various 
transformative changes in the city's political landscape and leadership. Moreover, those 
changes had a profound effect on the views and personal sensibilities of many of the 
city's bureaucratic leaders. For example, in recalling his personal reactions to the 
scandals that rocked city hall, the Police Chief mused that 
about nine months into being here, they indicted three of the council people.. .the 
City Manager who hired me quit. They indicted six of the employees in the city 
government, the financial managers; [Ernie Rauner], one of the people, quit. And 
of course one of those people that got indicted works for me... [it] was a real 
shake-up in the organization.. .The people that I was used to working with and 
going to, the Mayor walking out and quitting really slowed everything down in 
the city; there was no continuity of management. We needed to work through that, 
and I think we were very lucky to have Mr. [Leroy Embers] step up to the plate, 
but that was only short-term for six months. [But] we worked through those 
issues. 
In contrast, another interview participant, a department director with 24 years of city 
service, related the following personal thoughts about the scandals' transformative effects 
on the city's bureaucracy and the perceptions, in general, about city workers: 
I can remember back to January of 2004, very clearly.. .the beginning of when 
things started to, to unravel. When they said that, you know, they had made errors 
and omissions in our disclosure statement and it, it's just a series of events that 
happened after that.. .1 had no involvement in any of them, but I knew a lot of 
people that did and I read about them, and you can't help but be impacted by it. 
You work in an organization as many years as I have, and it's been such a 
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positive experience, and then all of a sudden turned into where you didn't want to 
go places and tell people where you worked any more. You know it used to be— 
Oh, I work for the city! And now, well, you know.. .you're kind of hemming and 
hawing because you don't want to hear what people will have to say about your 
pension or your this, or your that. And so, that was such a huge difference for me! 
To sum up, the leaders' views above support the notion that the continuing budget 
deficits and the expanding pension debacle had profound impacts upon the city's 
workforce, its bureaucratic leadership and even its political leadership. In some ways, 
those disturbing events were seen by some of the bureaucratic leaders as transformative 
in a positive and constructive sense; and in other ways, those disruptive events were 
viewed as transformative in a negative and destructive sense. Nevertheless, as these 
unsettling events continued to unfold, as will be seen in the following sections, so would 
the progression of intervention strategies and leadership changes. 
Voters Express Desire for a Change: Majority Approves the Strong Mayor Form of 
Government 
In the midst of the growing financial problems, the corruption and pension 
scandals, and the public's increasing frustration and concern over those serious issues, 
several civic, business and academic leaders began to discuss alternatives for 
restructuring government. In a private meeting convened in his city hall office in mid 
March 2004 (on the eve of City Manager Ungerman's retirement), Mayor Don Morris 
joined several of those leaders in revisiting the notion of changing the city's governance 
structure to a strong mayor form of government. However, this was not the first time in 
the city's history that the strong mayor form of government had been promoted as a 
plausible alternative to the city manager form of government. In fact, the notion was 
unsuccessfully proposed to the city's voters for the first time in 1973 during a term of the 
city's legendary mayor, Paul Warren. The reform initiative surfaced again in the 1980s 
and 1990s when former mayors Madeleine O'Brien and Sandra Greene attempted 
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unsuccessfully to launch similar initiatives during their terms. Likewise, during his first 
mayoral campaign in 2000, Don Morris talked about presenting a strong mayor proposal 
to the City Council if he was elected; and though he won the election, the proposal did 
not materialize at that time. 
Though the political environment was not accepting of the strong mayor reform 
initiative during those earlier efforts and discussions, Mayor Morris and the other 
supporters of the movement believed that the time was finally right for its passage at the 
polls. Hence, buoyed by heightened public interest and growing demands upon the 
scandal-plagued City Council for accountability and solutions to the city's vexing 
financial crisis, the mayor announced his intention, at a press conference in late March 
2004, to put the strong mayor proposal on the November ballot. As a result, after 
successful passage through the council's Rules, Finance and Intergovernmental Relations 
Committee, the initiative was approved by the City Council in late June 2004 for 
placement on the November 2004 election ballot. Finally, in early November 2004, the 
strong mayor measure, Proposition F, was approved by a simple majority of 51.4% of the 
city's voters. In short, with the voters' approval of this significant reform initiative, this 
historical shift of power started on a five-year trial period on January 1, 2006 and would 
end on December 31, 2010 unless finally approved and affirmed by a second public vote 
in November 2010. 
Summary of the Budget Deficit, Corruption Scandal and Pension Debacle and the 
Leaders '/Citizens' Response 
This section of the case, covering the period from January 2003 through 
November 2004, focused on the situation in Playa Vista prior to and during the city's 
mounting budget deficit, corruption scandal, the unfolding pension fund debacle, and the 
voters' approval of the strong mayor form of government. The first part of this section 
told the story of the origins of the city's budget deficit and the government leaders' initial 
response to the growing fiscal crisis (i.e., hiring freezes, budgetary and service cuts, new 
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fees, departmental reorganizations, etc.). This initial part of the section also recounted: (a) 
the indictments of three city councilmen; (b) the launching of federal investigations into 
several city officials' alleged fraudulent actions connected to the city's unfunded pension 
system debt; and (c) the unexpected departures of the City Auditor and City Manager in 
the midst of highly publicized scandals. In addition, the first part of this section presented 
the views of several bureaucratic leaders regarding the serious impacts of those 
intervention strategies and resultant leadership changes upon the city's workforce. 
The first part of this section also recounted the story of the public's increasing 
concern over the serious issues confronting the city's fiscal and political stability and the 
timely resurgence of a reform initiative promoting the shift to a strong mayor form of 
government. Lastly, this part of this section also recited the details of the: (a) evolution of 
the notion of the strong mayor government structure; (b) successful marshalling of 
community support for the reform initiative; and (c) voters approval and passage of the 
measure at the polls. 
Life During the Fiscal Crisis, Corruption Convictions and the Expansion of the Pension 
Underfunding Proceedings 
The second part of the chapter, which I have titled "Life During the Fiscal Crisis, 
Corruption Convictions and Expansion of the Pension Underfunding Proceedings" 
examines the corruption convictions and elections of new political leaders, massive 
departures of top bureaucratic leaders, and dissolution of the city manager form of 
government. 
More Leadership Changes Amid Scandals and Dissolution of the City Manager Form of 
Government 
As the strong mayor reform initiative gained momentum in the final months 
leading up to the November 2004 election, so did the spate of sudden and unexpected 
leadership changes. In a shocking turn of events, Councilman Lane (one of the indicted 
councilmen accused of corruption) died suddenly and unexpectedly from internal 
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bleeding of the liver. That tragic event was followed, in January 2005, by the election of 
Councilman Lane's chief of staff, Teddy Yeoman, who replaced the deceased 
councilman in that vacated council seat. Moreover, the following month, the council 
appointed Jason Torgeson to replace departed City Auditor Rauner. And then, in one of 
the most surprising of all of the high profile leadership departures, Mayor Morris 
announced his resignation in April 2005 saying he "lacked the leadership to fix the city's 
problems." 
Further, in the midst of the escalating pension fund investigation, in May 2005, 
the former acting city auditor was placed on administrative leave and a deputy city 
manager, the city treasurer and the human resources director were all forced to resign. 
That same month, the District Attorney filed felony conflict-of-interest charges against 
those same city officials (with the exception of the deputy city manager) and two pension 
board members. Also, during the following month: (a) the City Attorney filed a lawsuit 
alleging "economic conflicts" against six current and former pension fund trustees for 
their involvement in the underfunding of the city's pension system; and (b) Councilmen 
Iniquez and Zucker were convicted and resigned for corruption in the political scandal 
mentioned earlier. Thereafter, the flow of leadership departures began to intensify at 
nearly all leadership levels within the political and bureaucratic structures. For instance, 
over the next six to seven months: (1) the long-time Community & Economic 
Development Director resigned citing concerns regarding city officials' continual 
whittling down of department funding and critical services; (2) a deputy city manager 
sued by the City Attorney for shaping plans to underfund the pension system retired after 
30 years of city service; (3) at least 130 management employees (including 40 assistant 
deputy directors) left city government by the end of 2005 due to the questionable viability 
of their management jobs; and (4) City Manager Embers resigned and departed from city 
government on the eve of the elimination of his position by the installation of the strong 
mayor form of government in January 2006. 
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On the other hand, with those significant leadership departures, there also came 
new leadership opportunities. For example, in November 2005, the citizens elected a new 
mayor, John Sampson and the city council elected Councilman Sam Paulson the first 
Council President to serve under the incoming strong mayor government. Additionally, 
the next month, in preparation for the inception of the strong mayor government, the 
council appointed: (a) Rhonda Fargo, retired Navy admiral and CEO of a major nonprofit 
organization, to serve as the transitional city manager until assuming the new Chief 
Operating Officer position (to which she was hand-picked by incoming Strong Mayor, 
John Sampson); and (b) Angela Thompson, deputy city manager at a large city in a 
nearby state, to fill the newly created Independent Budget Analyst post. With the massive 
departures of top leadership, the dissolution of the city manager form of government, and 
these appointments, the council appeared ready to usher in a new era of Strong Mayor 
governance in 2006. 
More Intervention Strategies and the Continued Erosion of the City's Finances 
While the seemingly ceaseless political and bureaucratic leadership turnover 
continued to unfold, it became increasingly apparent that additional change interventions 
would be needed to address the city's rapidly eroding financial situation. The first 
instance of this occurred in March 2005 when City Manager Embers revealed yet another 
very serious budget shortfall of $26.5 million and renewed his previous calls for 
continuing the city-wide hiring freeze, cutting departmental spending by 5%, and 
delaying park maintenance and repairs. Consequently, the City Council obliged him and 
approved his plan to balance the city's operating budget before the end of that fiscal year 
with those added type three interventions. Similarly, two months later in mid May 2005, 
after repeated threats of possible layoffs by the city manager, the City Council approved 
four union contracts that included significant concessions agreed to by the unions' 
leadership (e.g., a two year wage freeze and increased contributions to the deficit-ridden 
pension system). 
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In like manner, at the end of May 2005, Mayor Morris announced that the 
Environmental Services Department's rerouting of pick up routes for garbage and 
recycling trash saved the city's general fund over $671,000 since the change began a year 
earlier and would save an estimated $10 million during the next decade (as discussed 
earlier in this section). City officials also credited this system redesign or process 
improvement effort (also referred to in Chapter 4 as a type two change intervention 
strategy) with: (1) reducing harmful environmental impacts resulting from a cut in 
"collection truck miles traveled by 900 a day;" (2) adding 50,000 homes to its yard waste 
recycling program; and (3) avoiding staff layoffs by reassigning truck drivers to new 
routes. Then, at the end of June 2005 (after two months of bitter discussion and 
impassioned public debate), the City Council approved the city manager's proposed 
budget for fiscal year 2006. In essence, though the council weighed in with a few 
revisions of its own (i.e., reductions in proposed staff and service cuts, no layoffs, and fee 
increases), the austere budget called for significant cuts in library hours and workforce 
headcount (approximately 295 employees), as well as pool and community service center 
closures. 
Lastly, in an effort in October 2005 to encourage the council to proactively tamp 
the growing budget deficit and keep the city's budget balanced, City Manager Embers 
reported an immediate $10.1 million budget deficit and forecasted a $19 million deficit by 
the end of the fiscal year. In his final budgetary update (prior to terminating his service 
with the city just before the onset of the strong mayor government), Embers also asked 
most department heads to identify ways to cut 3% from their spending plans which would 
be given to the council for approval the following month. In many ways, despite the 
implementation of these additional type two and type three change interventions in 2005, 
the constantly changing and embattled city leadership continued to struggle in its efforts 
to reverse the continued erosion of the city's finances. In fact, the futility of their efforts 
seemed to be even more vexing when it was reported in the local newspaper that $7.6 
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million of the immediate $10.1 million deficit was from costs tied to the federal 
investigations into the city's finances. Indeed, with no quick end in sight to the federal 
investigations, nor the "continuing legal and accounting fees tied to the pension fund 
deficit," or the chronic shortages in the city's multi-million dollar general fund budget, 
there was little likelihood that the city's financial situation would soon improve. 
Leaders' Views of the Strong Mayor Government, Ongoing Interventions and Leadership 
Changes 
As mentioned earlier, the upheaval at city hall (e.g., adoption of the strong mayor 
government, escalating pension fund investigations, and councilmen convictions), and the 
continued erosion of the city's finances brought forth a series of unprecedented 
organizational interventions and leadership changes. Like the earlier interventions and 
leadership transformations of 2003 and 2004, the ongoing events in 2005 continued to 
affect the city's bureaucratic leadership in different yet similar ways. For instance, one 
interview participant (a deputy department director with 18 years of city service), when 
asked about his personal experience with some of those significant organizational and 
leadership changes, remarked that 
several of the leaders [in the] city manager's office, were either retiring or 
resigning or, you know, promoting to other positions in other organizations. So 
we had this huge turnover of very senior management staff. The city manager had 
already indicated that he was going to be leaving once the strong mayor form of 
government had begun and so there was a lot of turnover.. .there have been lots of 
changes, and a lot of them have been caused by just retirement, kind of natural 
attrition of some of the senior folks that have been around for a long time.. .And 
- so going from a city manager form of government to a strong mayor form of 
government, it left a lot of questions out there. There were a lot of unknowns. 
Another interview participant (a department director with more than 22 years of city 
service), while describing the shift to the strong mayor government as one of the 
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significant organizational changes at the city, simply said 
it's a shift because before you had the city manager form of government and you 
could take it before council and get things approved. Now you're going through 
the mayor. So it's changed, and so the government is totally different than what 
we had before. 
Another interviewee (a department director with 18 years service) was equally 
straight-forward about the organizational implications of the switch to the strong mayor 
form of government when he disclosed that 
it was in November [2005] that new upper management were then appointed and 
were taking over the day-to-day operations] of the city.. .that's really when it hit 
home.. .that we were really going to change the way we do business in the city— 
[and] the way we were structured. 
In contrast, another interview participant, when discussing the adoption of the strong 
mayor government and its potentially demoralizing effect on the workforce, candidly 
revealed that 
we knew it was coming. Because when the notion started and we started 
hearing.. .this business leader and that business leader is really advancing the 
thought of the strong mayor form of government, we thought, oh my gosh, the 
way the voters feel right now, they would vote on anything!...it was just like 
whatever it took to fix what's going on with the city, let's do that!...But luckily, 
they did put in a year transition period.. .But what happened is, because of the 
scandals and in the middle of the year, the mayor resigned, we were without a 
mayor... [it] ended up in reality being like a month to transition.. .And we were 
not ready. And so, you take all of the stress that was going on in general in this 
organization and you add to it the fact that we're still just now sorting out, in 
August, some of the things that we should have sorted out last year during this 
transition period.. .So it was to me an extremely impactful piece!...[because this 
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was] an organization that was already incredibly dysfunctional, because of all the 
loss of talent, because of all the loss of players, because of all the hammering in 
the press. And everybody is like—I want to stay below the radar screen because if 
you come up, you might be investigated for something. 
Likewise, another interviewee (a fairly new department director with 18 years of 
city service) also talked about some of the detrimental effects experienced in the 
workplace as a result of the anticipated implementation of the strong mayor government. 
She insightfully stated: 
Well that also brought change because people did not know what was going to 
happen. I think what we read in the paper and heard about is that there would be 
layoffs. There would be a 10% cut in the budget across the board. So for us, in 
particular, when we're already at bare bone minimum, to lose another 10% would 
essentially mean we would lose our receptionists.. .that would be a huge chunk! 
So that unknown and the uncertainty you know, causes a lot of stress for 
employees.. .trying to keep everybody focused on the vision and just hanging in 
there and working together as a team; and not worrying about what change will 
bring and sort of embracing it. 
On the whole, the bureaucratic leaders' perspectives above show that the city's 
evolving problems continued to trouble the beleaguered workforce. Additionally, those 
expressed views demonstrate that many of the city's bureaucratic leaders truly believed 
that the ongoing interventions and leadership changes in 2005 had undoubtedly impacted 
the morale of the remaining leaders and rank-and-file workers. Consequently, many 
serious organizational and leadership challenges lay ahead as the city's incoming political 
and bureaucratic leadership began to implement the strong mayor government in early 
January 2006. 
Summary of the Fiscal Crisis, Corruption Convictions and the Expanding Pension 
Underfunding Proceedings 
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This section of the case focused on Playa Vista's growing fiscal crisis, and the 
political and bureaucratic upheaval created by the expansion of the legal proceedings 
surrounding the corruption and pension system scandals. This second part of the section, 
traversing the period from January 2005 through December 2005, delved into the 
intensified flow of leadership departures due to various reasons including the death of a 
councilman, the convictions and resignations of two other councilmen, the resignations of 
a second-term mayor and a short-term city manager, and massive resignations and 
retirements of government managers. Beside those significant leadership departures, 
several important leadership replacements also transpired—the election of a new mayor, 
new councilman and the first Council President (to serve in the strong mayor 
government), as well as the appointment of a transitional city manager and the first 
Independent Budget Analyst (also to serve in the strong mayor government). 
Finally, the second part of this section related the account of the continued erosion 
of the city's financial position and the political and bureaucratic leaders' supplementary 
response which included more of the same types of change interventions as mentioned 
above. The secondary part of this section also delineated the candid views of several 
government leaders about the long-considered shift to a strong mayor form of 
government. Lastly, this part of the section also examined those and other leaders' views 
of the troubling impacts that the ongoing interventions and leadership changes had upon 
themselves and their workers. 
Life During the Extreme Government Make-Over, Financial Melt-Down and Deepening 
Pension System Quagmire 
The third part of the chapter entitled "Life During the Extreme Government 
Make-Over, Financial Melt Down and Deepening Pension System Quagmire" recounts 
the: inception of the strong mayor form of government, formation of a new organizational 
structure and leadership team, implementation of increasingly stringent intervention 
strategies, escalating pension fund troubles and legal proceedings, and the new mayor's 
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reform agenda and fiscal recovery plan. 
Inception of the Strong Mayor Form of Government: Forming New Organizational 
Structures and Leadership Team 
Essentially, besides the elimination of the city manager position and the 
bureaucratic apparatus that supported the city manager, the approval and subsequent 
implementation of the strong mayor system caused fundamental changes and 
significantly altered the city's governance and top leadership structure. Thus, along with 
the city manager position, thirteen other top leadership jobs were eliminated along with 
approximately twenty-seven other mid-level leadership jobs reporting directly into those 
top leadership positions. Equally important, those significant changes in the governance 
structure and top leadership compelled the newly-elected, incoming mayor to completely 
reorganize the departmental structure and form a new executive leadership team with new 
players to manage the new structure and ultimately support the strong mayor government. 
In other words, the new strong mayor (who was officially opposed to the strong mayor 
initiative during the mayoral campaign) was ironically forced to launch an extreme make-
over of the city government. 
With this in mind, from late November 2005 through early April 2006, new 
mayor, John Sampson, appointed ten individuals to fill most of the top leadership 
positions in his incoming administration. On the other hand, in January 2006, the mayor 
officially requested the resignations of over 200 management employees of which he 
later said he would accept one-third of those resignations. Furthermore, by early April 
2006 the major reorganization had slightly increased the city's organizational structure 
from a total of twenty-four departments to twenty five departments. However, the city 
manager's job and the other thirteen eliminated leadership positions had been replaced by 
the ten new top leadership appointees (who filled newly established positions such as 
Chief Operating Officer or COO, Assistant COO, Deputy COO and various director 
positions). With the implementation of these key structural changes and his top ten 
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leaders in place, the new strong mayor was now apparently positioned to deliver on his 
reported promises to fix the broken city government and get the city "back on track." 
At the same time that the new strong mayor was putting the above changes and 
new players into place, other very noticeable ebbs and flows were also occurring in the 
leadership ranks at city hall. First, two new city councilmen were selected in a special 
election in early January 2006 and were pushed to quickly assume their new duties on 
behalf of their district constituents. In fact, in filling those vacant council positions 
(resulting from the earlier mentioned convictions and resignations of Councilmen Iniquez 
and Zucker), the new councilmen had only five months left on their predecessors' 
remaining council terms before they had to face re-election in early June 2006. Basically, 
as the local newspaper put it, at that time, "the honeymoon for the new council members 
will be short." Despite their short honeymoons, both councilmen were re-elected and 
were allowed to continue their fledgling work with the new mayor and the rest of the 
council in addressing the plethora of serious issues confronting the city. 
Secondly, in the midst of the new mayor's leadership hires and the addition of the 
two new councilmen, the stream of government leaders' departures continued to intensify 
in an unabated manner. As a result, from January 2006 to October 2006, there were seven 
more departures of veteran government leaders in key positions including five directors, 
the Fire Chief and one recently appointed Deputy COO (formerly a Deputy City Manager 
in the previous city manager government). On the whole, with the exception of the Fire 
Chiefs retirement, those key leadership turnovers resulted primarily from resignations 
due to acceptance of comparable or higher level jobs at other municipal governments. 
Although, one of those departing directors acknowledged, in a local newspaper article 
covering the mass exodus of city managers in mid January 2006, that she was recruited 
by the City of Los Angeles and that other government agencies were "aware of the 
situation in [Playa Vista] and eager to snag workers tired of dealing with it [the turmoil at 
City Hall]." Similarly, in a newspaper article in early June 2006, the Fire Chief attributed 
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his retirement to certain factors including his ongoing concern over the city's dangerous 
lack of preparedness for major fire events due to the lack of critical resources and staffing 
(which he felt were not being addressed by the city's political leadership), and an 
uncertain future due to the city's financial problems. 
While the above cited leadership transitions took place, the evolving strong mayor 
form of government also began to undergo close examination and substantive 
clarification and change as a result of: (1) the new strong mayor's efforts to exercise 
some of the executive powers and authority vested in the strong mayor under the voter-
approved initiative; and (2) the city council's objections to some of the mayor's efforts 
and their questioning of the legal boundaries of the strong mayor's newly acquired 
executive powers. The first moderate example of the tension between the council and the 
mayor (under the strong mayor government) occurred in early June 2006 during the fiscal 
2007 budget approval process. Though the process was marked by some complaints 
about the substance of some aspects of the mayor's first proposed budget (especially the 
numerous adjustments to his proposed spending plan) and it required compromises on 
both sides, the council approved it as recommended by a vote of 6-1. Nonetheless, the 
very mildly contentious tenor of those budgetary discussions portended more tensions 
and power struggles yet to come as the mayor and council continued to test the legal 
boundaries of the strong mayor's authority. In any event, this first test of the strong 
mayor's authority led to the council's unanimous approval in mid July 2006 of Mayor 
Sampson's proposal to give him, as the local newspaper reported, "the authority to make 
limited budgetary and personnel changes without first seeking the council's approval." 
Basically, by this decision, the council agreed to give Sampson the "procedural 
change so he could effectively implement measures to save money and increase 
efficiency." In return, however, the council reserved its authority, as vested in the strong 
mayor measure, "to approve any budgetary changes while the mayor oversees the city's 
day-to-day operations." Nevertheless, the next test of the strong mayor's spending 
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authority came in mid October 2006 when a dispute arose over the mayor's cutting of a 
children's swimming program and shifting funds from a social service agency serving the 
homeless after the council had approved his original spending plan (which did not 
include those cuts). Unlike the above mentioned amicable resolution, this issue was not 
resolved and, remained unresolved as of the conclusion of this research project at the end 
of October 2006. 
New Mayor Addresses the Continuing Financial and Pension Troubles: Escalating 
Intervention Strategies and Legal Proceedings 
As the new mayor was implementing the wide-spread structural and staffing 
changes discussed above, he also set his sights on the city's continuing financial and 
pension-related troubles. Having run a campaign based on government reform and 
returning the city back to its former days of preeminence, he called for (in his first State 
of the City Address in January 2006) several things including: pension board member 
resignations, changes in the city's financial practices, 10% departmental staffing cuts, and 
voter approval of outsourcing of some city services. After several months, while those 
proposals were being mulled over at city hall and elsewhere, the mayor put forth a 
number of formal plans which he outlined in his fiscal recovery plan for the Fiscal Year 
2007 Annual Budget (April 2006). Included among those formalized proposals were: (a) 
paying down unfunded pension liabilities and retiree health care costs; (b) funding 
deferred maintenance projects, possible staffing cuts; (c) continuing a city-wide structural 
reorganization; (d) employing business process reengineering (to reduce costs and create 
managerial efficiency); and (e) three ballot measures (e.g., voter approval of future 
pension increases, $108 million infusion into the retirement system, and managed 
competition for city services). 
Two months later, the mayor closed two city warehouses, authorized a dramatic 
increase in the number of electronic purchases by the city, consolidated the city's 
purchasing and contracting functions into a new department, and cut 17 contracting jobs. 
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In taking these first steps to address the city's fiscal problems, the mayor predicted that 
these cuts and streamlining activities would save the city nearly $9 million through fiscal 
year 2007. However, it should be noted that the 17 affected employees were shifted to 
other positions in the city; thereby avoiding layoffs. 
Over the next four months, the mayor continued to step up his efforts to reduce 
costs and increase efficiencies by promoting two ballot propositions (Propositions B and 
C) that would amend the city charter to give voters a say over pension increases for city 
employees and open the possibility for privatization of some city work. He also proposed 
cutting 36 jobs (including one deputy director) and fleet reductions at the Environmental 
Services Department along with reorganizing that department from 6 to 3 divisions. As a 
result of these type one, two and three change interventions that he initiated during his 
first ten months in office, the mayor appeared to be on his way to addressing the city's 
financial crisis. Unfortunately, the coming months (in fact, the next year and beyond) 
would not be kind to the city's fiscal situation and, as a result, a financial melt-down 
would ensue. In fact, the chronic melt-down would lead to an escalation of intervention 
strategies that would continue into the coming months, years, and beyond. 
Ironically, at the same time as the fiscal melt-down progressed, the same kind of 
drawn-out, dismal outlook was emerging for the city's troubled pension system. 
Basically, during the same ten month period of his taking office, the mayor and, 
undoubtedly, most of the city bore witness to: (1) the U.S. Attorney charging five pension 
system administrators with 20 counts of wire and mail fraud; (2) an outside risk 
management firm issuing a critical report documenting misconduct and, in some cases, 
legal violations involving the former mayor, four current council members, two former 
council members, two former city managers, and a former city attorney; and (3) the 
release of a revised audit of the city's 2003 fiscal status revealing increases in the city's 
pension deficit to $1.7 billion and retiree health care liabilities to $1.3 billion, as well as 
individual errors causing a $456 million overstatement of city assets. Hence, it came as 
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no surprise when the mayor announced he would adopt the outside firm's 
recommendations addressing the systemic failures throughout the city's financial 
structure and estimated that it would cost $45 million and take 30 months to implement. 
Leaders' Views of the Efficacy of the Change/Restructuring Efforts 
In retrospect, as they reflected upon the major change and restructuring initiatives 
that the city had undergone over the past few years, the interview participants shared 
candid perspectives of the efficacy of those efforts. Indeed, these leaders' perceptions of 
the efficacy of the restructuring process were a mixed bag but generally favorable for 
reasons similar to those stated by the Brightwood leaders. As shown in Table 2, more 
than half of the interview participants (six of the eleven) made statements that suggested 
they viewed the restructuring process as successful. Yet, the majority of them (eight) 
conditioned their comments with characterizations indicating that the restructuring 
process was unfinished. Essentially, like the Brightwood leaders, the Playa Vista 
interviewees who felt the process was not finished said such things as: we are "in the 
midst of it," it is "still ongoing," let's "wait and see," it's "a work in progress" and "the 
jury is still out." 
Table 2. Leaders' perceptions of the chanqe/restructurinq process- City of Plava Vista 
Part. P M N U Comments 
#1 X In the midst of it-kind of hard to say 
It has the potential to be successful 
Went through this before-got hit in each budget cycle 
When restructured-who will be left to keep the doors open 
#2 X You just meet a natural resistance 
Not a quick change process-3rd year of 5 year process 
More efficient department 
More work with fewer people 
Providing more public safety services with fewer people 
#3 X Hoped for more participation-not involved in mtgs./decision-making 
Absolutely Successful-necessary 
#4 X X In the midst of it-haven't implemented the process yet 
Try to create the framework-giving us the opportunity to get ready 
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#5 X X Not giving us enough time to evaluate it 
Needed better explanation of the process 
Still ongoing 
Definitely successful-Can see the benefits now 
Should have included Directors in the process earlier 
#6 X X I think we're going to make it 
It's good that we're going through the process 
Have organizational fo previously lacking 
information previously 
lacking 
Include directors early on 
#7 X X Could have involved staff early on 
Not yet successful-l think it will be 
I'm very hopeful 
Brought some order to things-they have a direction 
#8 X Work in progress-going through it now 
Wait and see-jury is still out 
It can be done 
Not involved in thinking/creating it 
Withholding judgment 
#9 X Should have staff participate in the process earlier 
A lot of folks have a negative attitude out there towards it 
Haven't gone through it yet-begin BPR next month 
#10 X Haven't had a restructuring yet 
Jury is still out 
Lack of financial rewards 
Don't know if successful yet 
#11 X Didn't have time to do a major communications effort 
Could have done better communication effort 
Failure is not an option 
Note P Positive M Mixed 
N Negative U Unfinished 
Part. Participant 
Additionally, of the eight participants who felt that the restructuring was 
unfinished, there were four interviewees who declined to indicate, either way, if the 
restructuring was successful or unsuccessful. This noncommittal stance represents a 
difference from the more optimistic Brightwood storyline. Despite this, two of those 
leaders expressed some optimism about the restructuring process with comments like "it 
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has the potential to be successful" and "it can be done." On the other hand, the other two 
leaders, who offered neither a positive nor negative assessment of the success or failure 
of the restructuring, conveyed some criticism of the process with such observations as "a 
lot of folks have a negative attitude out there towards it" and assessments asserting that 
"a lack of financial rewards" might be needed to ensure success. 
In brief, considering all of the above cited/referenced commentary and 
characterizations, the leaders' perceptions suggest that the restructuring process, on the 
whole, was successful despite the widely-shared concerns that it was still a work in 
progress. Interestingly enough, these qualitative findings were somewhat similar (with 
some exceptions) to the findings from the subordinate employees' grounded surveys. In 
short, the survey respondents (subordinate employees reporting directly or indirectly to 
the interview respondents) were split on the question of whether or not they felt that the 
departmental restructuring process was/will be successful. In Survey III (comprised of 21 
subordinate employees of the interview participants- excluding the chief operating 
officer), 38% (or 8) of the respondents said that it was too early to tell, whereas 33% (or 
7) indicated the departmental restructuring process successful, and 19% (or 4) rated the 
process unsuccessful. Clearly, the latter negative rating reveals a small but somewhat 
meaningful deviation between the survey and interview respondents' perceptions of the 
efficacy of the restructuring process. More data from the written survey and the 
qualitative interviews will be reviewed in more detail in Chapter VI. 
Summary of the Extreme Make-Over of the City Government 
This final section of the case, covering the period from January 2006 through 
October 2006, focused on Playa Vista's rapid transition to the strong mayor form of 
government and the dynamics that accompanied the formation of the new organizational 
structure and leadership team. This third part of the section explored the significant 
changes brought about by the shift to a new governance structure and political paradigm 
that included the creation of a new government structure, the recruitment and placement 
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of a new executive leadership team, and election and arrival of two new councilmen. 
Along with those significant leadership changes, the stream of veteran government 
leadership departures intensified; thereby, increasing the concerns of city employees and 
managers about the uncertainty of their city government careers. 
Lastly, this final section of the case told the story of the new mayor's diligent, 
initial efforts to address the financial melt-down and the expanding pension troubles. The 
section delved into the decisive steps to implement type one, two and three change 
interventions in efforts to cut costs and balance the city's deficit-ridden budget. The 
section also recounted the mayor and his new administration's efforts to deal with the 
many financial problems and legal proceedings arising from the deepening pension 
system quagmire. Finally, this last section examined the leaders' and subordinate 
employees' views of the efficacy of the restructuring process which, ultimately, raises the 
question of how all of these initiatives will help, in the end, to improve upon the 
increasingly dismal future outlook for the city. 
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CHAPTER VI 
CROSS-CASE ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION OF THE FINDINGS 
This final chapter begins with a brief overview of the problem, purpose and 
methods of the study. Then the major findings will be summarized; the research questions 
articulated in Chapter I will be used to organize both a summary of the two cases and a 
look across the two cases. Next, the implications that the study has for theorizing about 
organizational change, restructuring and downsizing will be discussed and the 
methodology will be reflected upon and critiqued. Finally, recommendations for practice 
and further research will be identified. 
Brief Review of the Problem, Purpose and Methods of the Study 
As was discussed in Chapter I, over the past twenty-five years, corporate mergers, 
government consolidations, workforce downsizings and plant closures have increased 
dramatically; as a consequence, millions of workers around the nation have lost their 
jobs. As the quantitative and qualitative evidence concerning major organizational 
change efforts and the undesirable consequences of organizational downsizing and 
restructuring has steadily grown, so has the interest amongst scholars and organizational 
leaders to better understand the complexities of the studied phenomenon and the effective 
leadership and management of those efforts. The literature indicates that leaders can 
influence organizational change, downsizing and restructuring by attending to and 
modifying effective leadership strategies and approaches. Much of this literature, 
however, is theoretical and speculative, and the empirical work that does exist has 
focused mostly on business. 
Thus, the overarching purpose of this qualitative study was to understand how 
leaders in two local government organizations perceived their methods for revitalizing 
their organizations and motivating those who remained in the organization after major 
change, restructuring and/or downsizing had occurred during a recent four year period. 
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The study explored the intervention strategies, communication methods and leadership 
approaches employed by those leaders in formal and informal revitalization and 
motivation efforts. The goal was to develop insights and a possible framework for 
identifying approaches that were used in the study and might be used by other leaders 
attempting to revitalize their organizations and motivate their employees during and after 
implementing organizational change, restructuring and downsizing initiatives. 
Brief Review of the Research Methods 
This dissertation research used mostly qualitative methods to study leaders' 
perceptions of their efforts to revitalize and motivate their subordinates after major 
change and restructuring at two local government organizations that were part of the 
study. These sites were selected after numerous unsuccessful attempts were made to gain 
access to research sites in the private sector aerospace industry. An additional review 
revealed that the shift in type of site was in many ways fortuitous because of the dearth of 
studies of economically driven change initiatives in public sector organizations. The two 
public sector sites that were selected for study were experiencing and had experienced 
significant fiscally driven change efforts over the four year period covered by the study. 
Individual interviews were conducted with twenty-one participants; ten 
participants at one site and eleven participants at a second site. In addition to interviews, 
extensive analysis of government documents, websites, newsletters, newspaper accounts 
and grounded surveys of subordinate employees were utilized to corroborate and/or 
triangulate the interview data gathered from each site. 
Data analysis and the presentation of the findings involved the use of two 
analytical approaches which Polkinghorne (1995) refers to as narrative analysis and the 
analysis of narrative. The narrative analysis strategy was utilized in Chapter IV and 
Chapter V to analyze the data; this analysis approach involved reconfiguring the data into 
"emplotted narratives" to tell the stories of what occurred at the studied sites. The next 
section of this chapter employs the analysis of narratives strategy to bring forth answers 
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to the research questions. This strategy involves more traditional coding and 
categorization approaches that organize the information gathered into emergent themes 
that appeared across the cases. In essence, Chapters IV and V produced implicit answers 
to the research questions; the following section provides explicit answers to the research 
questions. 
Review of the Major Findings in Terms of the Research Questions 
The organization for this section is around the research questions that were 
articulated in Chapterl and answered implicitly in Chapters IV and V. Here, the implicit 
answers will be made explicit. 
Case I: The City of Brightwood 
Research question #/.This is the first research question: 
What are the strategies, methods and leadership approaches mid & upper level 
managers use to revitalize their organizations and motivate those who remain in 
the organization after major change, restructuring and/or downsizing and how do 
those managers describe those strategies and methods? 
In terms of research question one, most members of the City of Brightwood's 
government leadership team talked about using varied strategies, methods and leadership 
approaches to revitalize and motivate their remaining or surviving employees during the 
fiscal crisis and the organizational change interventions discussed in Chapter IV. A 
typology of the strategies and approaches was developed based on the recurring themes 
that emerged from the interviews in both cases. This typology for the Brightwood case 
can be found in Table 3. 
In terms of research question one, Table 3 reveals that four of the ten interviewed 
leaders in case number one indicated that they used all seven of the listed strategies or 
approaches in their motivational work with their subordinates. Likewise, five of the 
remaining six leaders also described their engagement in actions or affecting behaviors 




Table 3. Strategies, methods & approaches used to motivate employees durina restructurina 
Strategy, Method or Approach L1 L2 L3 L4 L5 L6 L7 L8 L9 Top 
Leader 
Articulating Positive Future Vision X X X X X X X 
Projecting Positive 
Attitude 
X X X X X X X X 
Keeping Employees Informed X X X X X X X X 
Soliciting Employee Input 
& Feedback 
X X X X X X X 
Provide Employees New Job/Career 
Opportunities 
X X X X X X X 
Creating Safe/Risk Taking X X X X X X X 
Environment 
Modeling Behavior/Leading by X X X X X X X 
Example 
An example of a comment that was coded under the "creating a vision to help 
direct the change effort" category (Kotter, 1996) is a comment by the Brightwood City 
Manager: 
You have to give them a sense of comfort that you know what you're doing, that 
you are a steady hand at the helm and... .to get out of this situation, we're going to 
do these things internally. We're going to have these plans, we're going to 
communicate this way, and then we're going to get the council to make X 
decision or have these decisions to consider.. .And what we try to do is create a 
confident organization, a purposeful organization that understood the problem, 
articulated it.. .we provide recommended solutions, and then ultimately get the 
elected officials to understand them and then... [get] the community to ultimately 
buy in and then solve the problem. And that builds trust in management, and that 
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buy in and then solve the problem. And that builds trust in management, and that 
builds trust in elected officials, and then ultimately, by performing, we build trust 
in the community. 
Another key change leader in Brightwood, the Police Chief, also articulated, in 
very simple terms, a visionary, departmental goal of having "the best department in the 
country" with all of the attendant characteristics befitting a top-ranked, award-winning 
police department. 
At times the positive vision that got articulated in Brightwood was of better times 
to come after the crisis has passed. One person, for example, told his subordinates: "This 
is not the way it is always going to be. When the sales tax passes, we will be able to fill 
some positions. So you guys aren't going to have to endure the hell you are going 
through right now indefinitely." 
Another strategy that was employed by most of the interviewed leaders was 
projecting a positive attitude. One person stated, 
They looked at my attitude and my appearance and they saw that I accepted it [the 
organizational change]. 'If he thinks it is great, well I think it is great 
too'.. .Leaders need to show leadership and that is one way—by accepting 
changes and explaining and going forward. 
In addition, the Fire Chief also talked about the importance of a positive attitude 
or, in his words, a "can do attitude" and linked this idea to another item on the Table 3 
list, creating a safe, risk-taking environment. He stated: 
We improved the morale. [We] deflated some of the anger. [We] provided some 
direction and a sense of a can-do attitude... it opened up the lines of 
communication. It created some debate. And I think it also allowed for some 
criticism of the current way of doing things and some creativity as it relates to 
new ways of doing things...I think it is important because [if] it creates an 
atmosphere or an environment where people can feel safe and feel that their 
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contributions.. .or their suggestions are heard and that they are awarded, or 
recognized for their contribution. 
The latter perspective is similar to the City Manager's reflections on the 
importance of creating a safe environment and risk taking. He recollected that 
I always believe that if people fear a manager, dread a manager, don't like a 
manager, they can't believe in the manager. And so what I try to do is make sure 
that the people feel safe with me, that they know they can come and tell me good 
things and bad things.. .my interests are trying to get to the right solution, try to 
make sure that people feel safe to take risk[s], make mistakes, and that nothing 
bad is gonna happen to them the first or second time. 
And the Police Chief also echoed an approach to creating a safe place that is very 
similar to the notions of the City Manager and his colleagues, the Fire Chief and the City 
Manager, when he claimed: 
I have an open door policy. They can come up here and visit anytime. They can 
speak freely without the fear of reprisal, which wasn't the case before. So I think 
it is not something that I did, or the change that I created. I just created the 
environment for that. 
Table 3 also indicates that all but two of the interviewees acknowledged the 
critical importance of information sharing. For example, the City Manager, as discussed 
in Chapter IV, recognized the importance of "creating communication mechanisms" (i.e. 
newsletters, frequent meetings, expanded intranet, updated web page, etc.). The Fire 
Chief asserted that an "unprecedented" meeting with his firefighters and their family 
members on a Saturday was a very effective approach that he would do again. Another 
veteran member of the executive leadership team similarly contended that "passing on 
information was critical" to "subordinate staff, most of [which] were thirsty for 
information" and "were stressed out about their own futures, their families' futures." 
Finally, several members of the leadership team reported on their role in leading 
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by example and modeling new behaviors. An example of modeling new and expected 
behaviors was made by one participant who stated that "I found myself conscientiously 
making sure that I was doing things that were consistent with where we wanted to go 
with this organization." Examples of leading by example were found in simple comments 
made by the Police and Fire Chiefs that contained such phrases as "lead by example" and 
"set the example." Moreover, an example of a hybrid leadership approach or orientation 
that combines the notions of leading by example and modeling expected behaviors was 
shared by the City Manager. He said that "I give people the benefit of the doubt—I treat 
them the way I wanna be treated. [And] that if there are changes that need to be made, 
that I'm pleasant, that I work through it and [I] am able to wake up in the morning and 
say I did the right thing." Lastly, as discussed in Chapter IV, very tangible examples of 
leading by example were evidenced in the City Manager's acceptance of a 10% pay cut 
and the commitments by the Police and Fire Chiefs to take the same pay cut if 
Proposition D did not pass. 
Other strategies and approaches (e.g., soliciting employee input and feedback and 
providing employees new job and career opportunities) were previously discussed in 
Chapter IV; the first topic also will be alluded to in the discussion of the second research 
question. 
Research question #2. The second research question reads as follows: 
What are the mid and upper level managers 'perceptions and ex post facto 
assessments about the efficacy of their approaches and what data and assessment 
mechanisms were used in these assessments? 
The Brightwood leaders' perceptions and ex post facto assessments about the 
efficacy of the restructuring process were discussed in detail in Chapter IV and 
enumerated in Table 1 at the end of the fourth chapter. Table 1 suggests that the leaders' 
perceptions of the efficacy of the restructuring process were somewhat mixed, though 
generally favorable. One problem was that definitive judgments, at that time, were 
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considered somewhat premature by many of the interviewed leaders given the recency of 
the actual implementation of the restructuring/change interventions at the time the 
interviews occurred. 
Even those who offered the too-soon-to-tell caveat, however, rated their efforts 
effective, or, in some cases, very effective. Indeed, as shown in Table 4, four of the 
participants (40%) indicated that they were effective in those efforts, while six (60%) said 
they were very effective. 
City of Brightwood 
Table 4. Leaders' perceptions of their efficacy in motivating/revitalizing 
Very i 
Effective Effective Ineffective 
Too Soon 
to Tell 
Leader 1 ! X 
Leader 2 j X 
Leader 3 X \ 
Leader 4 X 
Leader 5 X 
\ 
Leader 6 X 
Leader 7 X I : 
Leader 8 X 
\ 
Leader 9 X 
Top Leader x 
: ; 
The assessment strategies that were identified were largely informal. To be sure, 
Table 5 indicates that two of the Brightwood leaders mentioned various sort of surveys, 
but these surveys were generic and not focused on or explicitly motivated by an attempt 
to assess change efforts. In fact, three of the members of the leadership team noted that 
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no measurement tools were applied and one, in particular, stated "that's where we're 
lacking. I don't think that we really had an opportunity to.. .really evaluate what took 
place... and I think those kinds of things are important." 
Table 5. 
Citv of Briahtwood 
Assessments used to measure efficacy in motivatina/revitalizina 
Formal Informal 
Non-
Existent Types Used 
Leader 1 X X Employee Feedback, Dept. 
Surveys, Forums 
Leader 2 X 
Leader 3 X Dept. Heads Mtgs. (Discuss) 
Leader 4 X Dept. Heads Mtgs. (Discuss) 
Leader 5 X 
Leader 6 X Dept. Heads Mtgs. (Discuss) 
Leader 7 X X Employee Feedback and Survey 
Leader 8 X Meetings, Conversations 
Leader 9 X 
Top Leader X Dept. Heads Mtgs. (Discuss) 
Table 5 also indicates that most leaders indicated that assessments were informal 
rather than formal; five of the interviewees indicated that the informal assessments only 
occurred in department heads meetings where presumably the departmental leaders 
discussed many issues including their efforts to implement the various organizational 
interventions within their departments and the responses to these efforts. 
Research question #3. The third research question asked: 
Can the mid and upper level managers' descriptions of the strategies, methods 
and approaches be linked to one or more leadership approaches or orientations 
in the literature? 
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As mentioned in the discussion of research question #1, the various strategies, 
methods and approaches people used to revitalize and motivate their employees were 
consistent with the literature. Table 6 explicitly links this information with particular 
leadership theories and theorists. 
Table 6. 
Summary of the Literature 
Strategy, Method or Approach Related Literature 
Articulating Positive Future 
Vision 
Kotter (1996), D'Aprix (1996), Quinn (1996), Applebaum etal. 
(1997 & 1998), Kouzes and Posner (2002), Marks (2003) 
Projecting Positive Attitude Applebaum etal. (1997), Kouzes and Posner (2002), 
Marks (2003) 
Keeping Employees Informed Gore (1997), Applebaum etal. (1997 &1998), Jones (1998), Borins 
(2002), Marks (2003) 
Providing Employees New Job-
Career Opportunities 
Lippitt and Lippitt (1984), Buch and Aldridge (1990), Cameron 
etal. (1991), Brockner (1992), Mishra and Spreitzer (1998), 
Conger and Benjamin (1999), Armenakis et al. (1999), Lewin and 
Johnston (2000), Bennis (2003), Houkes etal. (2003), Woodward 
and Hendry (2004), Perry etal. (2006) 
Soliciting Employee Input and 
Feedback 
Kotter (1996), Applebaum etal. (1997 & 1998), Borins (2002), 
Noer (2002), Marks (2003) 
Creating Safe/Risk-Taking 
Environment 
Rosen (1986), Bergquist (1993), Quinn (1996), Kotter (1996), 
Kouzes & Posner (2002), Marks (2003) 
Modeling Behavior and Leading 
By Example 
Noer (1993), Carr etal. (1996), Applebaum etal. 
(1998), Alkhafaji (2001), Kouzes & Posner (2002), Marks (2003) 
Research question #4. This is the fourth research question: 
To what extent are the research participants 'perceptions congruent? Are 
managers' perceptions similar or different than those of their subordinates? 
As mentioned in the brief review of the research methods above and discussed in 
greater detail in Chapter III, grounded surveys of the participating leaders' subordinate 
employees were used in both cases to triangulate the interview data gathered at the 
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Brightwood case site. Five of the questions from the survey are useful in answering 
Research Question # 4. These questions and the data they generated are as follows: 
1. Did your boss make efforts to encourage and/or incentivize you to stay on with the 
organization during the merger or restructuring actions described earlier? 
Yes- 68% (17 Total Responses) 
No- 28% (7 Total Responses) 
Cannot Recall- 4% (1 Response) 
2. If you answered yes to #1 above, please check and/or fill-in all of the methods or 
approaches your boss used to motivate employees to stay on with the organization 
during the departmental merger or restructuring: 
Group Meetings/Forums/Discussions 63.2% (12 Responses) 
Email/Website Announcements & Communications 15.8% (3 Responses) 
Morale/Team Building Activities 15.8% (3 Responses) 
More Training or Cross-Training 15.8% (3 Responses) 
Reassurances/Positive Attitude/Future Vision 68.4% (13 Responses) 
Monetary Incentives & Alternative Schedules 36.8% (7 Responses) 
Other (please specify) 21.1% (4 Responses) 
3. Of the motivational methods or approaches identified in question #2 above, 
which do you personally feel were the most effective? 
Group Meetings 40.0% (6 Responses) 
Positive Attitude 13.3% (2 Responses) 
Retention Pay & Monetary Incentives 13.3% (2 Responses) 
Forums 6.7% (1 Response) 
Discussions 6.7% (1 Response) 
Reassurance 6.7% (1 Response) 
Future Vision 6.7% (1 Response) 
Morale/Team Building 6.7% (1 Response) 
4. Please rate your boss' overall efforts to motivate you and other employees (including 
his/her communication methods and motivational approaches) during the 
departmental merger or restructuring: 
No Methods Used 




12% (3 Responses) 
12% (3 Responses) 
24% (6 Responses) 
36% (9 Responses) 
16% (4 Responses) 
198 
5. Please rate your boss' effectiveness in leading the department during the 
departmental merger or restructuring (i.e. communicating the vision, seeking 
employee buy in, motivating and team building, modeling core values and behaviors, 
etc.): 
6. Do you feel that the departmental merger or restructuring process/will be successful? 
Yes- 48% (12 Responses) 
No- 4% (1 Response) 
Too Early To Say- 36% (9 Responses) 
Unsure-12% (3 Responses) 
On the whole, the employees' survey responses in all five questions above 
corroborated the interview data that was discussed in Chapter IV and research questions 
#1 and #2 above. In essence, the majority of the employee respondents acknowledged 
that: (1) most of the members of the leadership team made efforts to encourage and/or 
incentivize employees to stay during restructuring; (2) group meetings, 
reassurances/positive attitude/future vision, and monetary incentives and alternative 
schedules were the most frequently identified methods or approaches used to motivate 
employees by the interviewed leaders; (3) group meetings were identified as the most 
effective approach to motivate employees to stay; and (4) their boss' overall efforts to 
motivate employees during restructuring were either moderately or highly effective. 
The last rating was only barely a majority (i.e., 52 percent), and 12% of 
employees rated their boss' overall efforts to motivate employees during restructuring not 
very effective. In addition, 12% of subordinates said their boss used no motivation 
methods; nearly two thirds of them (64%) rated their boss' effectiveness in leading the 
department during the restructuring from moderately effective to highly effective; and 
8% of the respondent said their boss' effectiveness in leading the department during the 
restructuring was not effective. 





8% (2 Responses) 
24% (6 Responses) 
44%> (11 Responses) 
20% (5 Responses) 
4%> (1 Response) 
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To sum up, these data demonstrate a reasonably fair degree of congruence 
between the interview and survey participants when comparing the leaders' perceptions 
in Tables 1 and 4 with the survey findings. In essence, there seems to be general 
agreement that the leaders encouraged their employees to stay, and they were effective in 
motivating their employees and leading their departments during the restructuring. 
Case II: The City of Playa Vista 
Response to research question #1. The focus now turns to what the data from the 
second case say about the research questions. As has already been noted in the previous 
section, the first research question is: 
What are the strategies, methods and leadership approaches mid & upper level 
managers use to revitalize their organizations and motivate those who remain in 
the organization after major change, restructuring and/or downsizing and how do 
those managers describe those strategies and methods? 
As was the case with the Brightwood leadership team, most members of the City 
of Playa Vista's leadership team talked about using various strategies, methods and 
leadership approaches to revitalize and motivate their remaining employees. These were 
discussed in detail in Chapter V; the strategy data are summarized here in Table 7. 
Table 7 indicates that, although none of the eleven leaders interviewed for Case 1 
used all seven of the strategies identified by looking across the two cases and reviewing 
the literature, one used six, two used five and two others used four of the strategies. 
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City of Playa Vista 
Table 7. Strateqies, methods & approaches used to motivate employees during restructuring 
Strategy, Method or Approach L1 L2 L3 L4 L5 L6 L7 L8 L9 Top 
Leader 
Articulating Positive Future Vision X X X 
Projecting Positive Attitude X X X X X X X 
Keeping Employees Informed X X X X X X X X X X 
Soliciting Employee Input & 
Feedback 
X X X X X X X 
Provide Employees New Job/ X 
Career Opportunities 
Creating Safe/Risk-Taking X X 
Environment 
Modeling Behavior/Leading by X X X X X 
Example 
All of the interviewees indicated that the strategy of keeping employees 
informed was very important in their attempts to stabilize morale, employee engagement 
and participation in the change initiatives. For instance, one leadership member stated, "I 
think it's really that open communication line. I think that's been what's making us 
effective both in communicating our situation and hearing where we need to go." Another 
person recalled, "They just want to see you out there. They want to see you talking to 
them. They want to be able to ask questions. Even if you don't have the answers, they 
just want that opportunity to ask the questions." 
Additionally, most of the leadership team members acknowledged that the 
approach of projecting a positive attitude was also important in seeking and getting 
employees' buy-in and ensuring that employees remained calm during the major change 
process. For example, one person reflected on her role during the early stages of the 
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change initiative in her department. She stated, "So it's learning to go with the flow and 
be patient.. .embracing the change, learning to go with it. You have two choices. You can 
either interpret each and every action that is something negative or something positive. I 
chose to make it positive." Another leader reported that, "I kept all my meetings positive. 
We had themes and we had things that [were] celebrated and made people feel valued 
and made people feel comfortable and let them forget about some of the rigors of their 
work for a short period of time." 
Most of the leaders also noted that the method of soliciting employee input and 
feedback were vital, for a number of reasons, including the formulation of solutions and 
promoting a better understanding of the reasons for the change initiative. For instance, 
one participant recounted that, "We brought the very best minds of the department.. .Sat 
them down in the room and all agreed on what the problems were, what the solutions 
were, and then the issues that we needed to address to solve the problem." Another 
person explained that, "In trying to create the right framework, and trying to create the 
right frame of mind, I'm the one that led the discussions after we kicked it off.. .and 
listened to the departments.. .and trying not to excite the workforce but to at least create 
an understanding of why we're doing it, what the process is, giving them a heads up." 
Several of the leaders talked about the significance of modeling new behavior and 
leading by example in their attempts to inspire and challenge their employees and 
themselves to rise to the occasion and seek higher levels of performance and 
achievement. One of those leaders stated, "I try to do all those things to inspire others; to 
model the behavior that I would like to see in others. Try to maintain a positive attitude 
[and] care for people; help them grow [and] challenge them to excel." Similarly, a fellow 
department director said: 
It's just more of making sure that the organization.. .and the deputy directors 
understand that change is gonna happen. We either take advantage of the 
opportunity and let's change some things now. And to the point where you send 
202 
the message.. .if you really don't like it, maybe you should look for another 
job.. .because it's not gonna get any easier.. .I'm saying that you need to be 
adaptable to change. You need to push yourselves and your counterparts so that 
we are able to do the best job we can. 
Response to research question #2. Once again, the second research question 
asked the following: 
What are the mid and upper level managers 'perceptions and ex post facto 
assessments about the efficacy of their approaches and what data and assessment 
mechanisms were used in these assessments? 
The research participant's perceptions and ex post facto assessments regarding the 
efficacy of the restructuring process were previously discussed in Chapter V and were 
summarized in that chapter in Table 2. Similar to the findings in Case 1, Table 2 
suggested that more than half of the leaders viewed the efficacy of the restructuring 
process in a favorable way in spite of the fact that conclusive judgments, at the time of 
the interviews, were also considered premature by most of the interviewed leaders. This 
was because most of the city departments had not yet begun their departmental 
restructuring processes using the prescribed method of business process reengineering. 
As a result, most of the participants indicated that their departmental change/restructuring 
processes were, in most cases, not yet implemented. Nevertheless, since most of them 
had led their organizations before and during the major restructuring created by the 
inception of the strong mayor government (for approximately eight to nine months), their 
perceptions of the efficacy of their departmental change/restructuring processes should be 
given serious consideration. 
As was the situation in the previous case, Playa Vista leaders generally indicated 
that they were effective in their use of varied approaches and strategies to motivate their 
employees and revitalize their organizations. As shown in Table 8, six of the participants 
(55%) said they were effective, two of the participants (18%) indicated they were 
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somewhat effective, and three (27%) felt it was too soon to tell. 
City of Playa Vista 







Leader 1 X X 
Leader 2 X 
Leader 3 X 
Leader 4 X 
Leader 5 m x i 
Leader 6 lllllll X jj 
Leader 7 
Leader 8 s i ® x il X 
Leader 9 X 
Leader 10 llllilll x III III® ||i 
Top Leader 
Leaders who believed their efforts were effective used phrases such as "we're 
effective in that people feel like they've been heard" (referring to her leadership in 
preparing her department for implementation of departmental restructuring) and "I think 
its working. We still manage to smile, like and respect each other" (referring to use of 
coping strategies in dealing with growing workloads). Those leadership team members 
who said their efforts were somewhat effective used characterizations such as "they have 
been effective but they could be better" and "absolutely effective in revitalizing the 
division" when talking about the need for continuous communication skills development 
during change efforts and effectuating a smooth departmental transition in a previous 
reorganization. 
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The lack of references to any systematically collected data should seem familiar 
to anyone who has read the previous case. In Playa Vista, as in Brightwood, the tools to 
assess these leaders' efficacy in motivating and revitalizing their subordinates were 
mostly non-existent or informal (with the exception of two leaders who made references 
to some generalized employee feedback surveys which could not be produced). 
Specifically, the information in Table 9 shows that informal discussions, management 
meetings and bi-annual strategic planning meetings comprised the informal types of 
assessment mechanisms. Though a few of the leaders acknowledged the value of such 
mechanisms, for the most part, interviewees admitted that there was neither the time, an 
articulate plan nor staff available for implementing an assessment of their city's change 
effort and their leadership of it. 
Table 9. 
Citv of Plava Vista 
Assessments used to measure efficacy in motivatinq/revitalizinq 
Formal Informal 
Non-
Existent Types Used 
Leader 1 X Informal discussions 
Leader 2 X Surveys, Retreats, mtgs. 
Leader 3 X Management mtgs. 
Leader 4 • H H 
Leader 5 X 
Leader 6 X Strategic Ping. Mtgs every 6 mos. 
Leader 7 X 
Leader 8 Ml 
Leader 9 X 
Leader 10 X Employee Survey 
Top Leader X 
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Response to research question #3. Once again, the third research question 
asked the following: 
Can the mid and upper level managers' descriptions of the formal strategies, 
methods and approaches be linked to one or more leadership approaches or 
orientations in the literature? 
Table 6 in the previous case links the strategies that at least some of the leaders in 
this city engaged in with particular leadership theories and theorists. Readers are 
encouraged to review this table in the context of the Playa Vista case, as well. 
Response to research question #4. Here, again, is Research Question # 4: 
To what extent are the research participants 'perceptions congruent? Are 
managers 'perceptions similar or different than those of their subordinates? 
Once again, the grounded survey responses of the participating leaders' 
subordinates were used here to triangulate the interview data obtained at the Playa Vista 
case site and can be used to address Question # 4. In particular, five of the questions from 
the survey tool focused on the employees' perceptions of their leaders'/managers' 
approaches and methods in motivating and revitalizing them and others. Those questions 
and the responses to them are listed below: 
1. Did your organizational leaders make efforts to encourage and/or incentivize you 
to stay on with the organization during the merger or restructuring actions 
described earlier? 
Yes- 38.1% (8 Total Responses) 
No- 57.1% (12 Total Responses) 
Cannot Recall- 4.8% (1 Response) 
2. If you answered yes to #1 above, please check and/or fill-in all of the methods or 
approaches your organizational leaders used to motivate employees to stay on 
with the organization during the departmental merger or restructuring: 
Group Meetings/Forums/Discussions 100% (6 Responses) 
Email/Website Announcements & Communications 66.7% (4 Responses) 
Morale/Team Building A ctivities 83.3% (5 Responses) 
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More Training or Cross-Training 16.7% (1 Response) 
Reassurances/Positive Attitude/Future Vision 116.7% (7 Responses) 
Other (please specify) 16.7% (1 Response) 
3. Of the motivational methods or approaches identified in question #2 above, 






18.2% (2 Responses) 
27.3% (3 Responses) 
9.7% (1 Response) 
27.3% (3 Response) 
18.2% (2 Response) 
4. Please rate your organizational leaders' overall efforts to motivate you and other 
employees (including his/her communication methods and motivational 
approaches) during the departmental merger or restructuring: 
No Methods Used 




22.7% (5 Responses) 
31.8% (7 Responses) 
4.5% (1 Response) 
22.7%> (5 Responses) 
18.2% (4 Responses) 
5. Please rate your organizational leaders' effectiveness in leading the department 
during the departmental merger or restructuring (i.e. communicating the vision, 
seeking employee buy in, motivating and team building, modeling core values and 
behaviors, etc.): 
Not Very Effective 42.9% (9 Responses) 
Somewhat Effective 4.8% (1 Response) 
Moderately Effective 19% (4 Responses) 
Highly Effective 28.6% (6 Responses) 
No Opinion 4.8% (1 Response) 
6. Do you feel that the departmental merger or restructuring process/will be 
successful? 
Yes- 33.3% (7 Responses) 
No-19% (4 Responses) 
Too Early To Say- 38.1% (8 Responses) 
Unsure- 9.5% 2 Responses) 
On the whole, the employees' survey responses in all five questions above 
revealed some interesting variances between the perceptions of the subordinate 
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employees and the perceptions of their managers that were revealed in the interview data 
that was discussed in Chapter IV and research questions #1 and #2 above. Essentially, the 
employee respondents acknowledged that: (1); meetings/forums/discussions, morale/team 
building activities, and reassurances/positive attitude/future vision were the most 
frequently identified methods or approaches used to motivate employees by the 
interviewed leaders; and (2) positive attitude was identified as the most effective 
approach to motivate employees to stay. On the other hand, the respondents indicated 
that: (3) more than half of the members of the leadership team made no efforts to 
encourage and/or incentivize employees to stay during restructuring; (4) 40.9% of them 
rated their organizational leaders' overall efforts to motivate employees during 
restructuring from moderately effective to highly effective; (5) 31.8 % of them rated their 
organizational leaders' overall efforts to motivate employees during restructuring not 
very effective; (6) 22.7% of the respondents said their organizational leaders used no 
motivational methods; (7) less than one half of them (47.6%) rated their organizational 
leaders' effectiveness in leading the department during the restructuring from moderately 
effective to highly effective; and (8) 42.9% of them rated their organizational leaders' 
effectiveness in leading the department during the restructuring not effective. 
To sum up, these data reveal a low degree of congruence between the interview 
and survey participants when comparing the leaders' perceptions in Tables 2 and 8 with 
the survey findings. Essentially, there appears to be a fair degree of disagreement that the 
leaders encouraged their employees to stay and that they were not as effective in 
motivating their employees and leading their departments during the restructuring. 
Discussion of Both Cases in Relation to the Four Research Questions 
Strategies, methods and leadership approaches 
I will conclude this summary of the case study findings by looking across the two 
cases and noting similarities and differences with respect to each case's answer to a 
particular research question. With respect to Research Question # 1 about the strategies, 
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methods, and leadership approaches used by leaders forced to respond to change, there 
are far more similarities than differences. In both cases, leaders used a range of strategies, 
but the same list of strategies, methods, and leadership approaches can be applied to each 
case. The only real difference is that in the second case, individual leaders tended to use 
fewer strategies, methods and approaches than in the first case. Collectively, however, all 
of the strategies on the list supported by the literature were employed by at least some 
individuals in each site. 
Ex post facto assessments of efficacy and the basis for these assessments 
There was also little variation across the two cases in terms of what each case said 
about the second question that was focused on assessing the efficacy of the strategies 
employed and on the methods used to make assessments. In both cases, leaders generally 
considered their approaches successful. To be sure, there were more leaders who adopted 
a wait-and-see attitude in the second case than in the first, but this could be attributed to 
the fact that the second city had just embarked on a major process of business process 
reengineering. 
Unfortunately, there was also agreement about one other point: In neither case 
was there much in the way of formal assessment procedures. A few people mentioned 
such things as employee surveys, but in both cases these seemed to be generic rather than 
specifically focused on the change effort and the tactics leaders employed to mitigate 
against its potentially negative consequences. 
Linkages between the strategies and methods used and leadership approaches 
recommended in the literature 
As was noted in the summaries of both cases presented in this chapter, the 
strategies, methods, and leadership approaches that were employed in both cases were 
quite consistent with what was discussed in the literature. Table 6, which is included in 
the first case summary in this chapter, articulates specific linkages between the practices 
employed, on the one hand, and particular leadership theories and theorists, on the other. 
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Congruence between research participants' perceptions and the perceptions of their 
subordinates 
As might be expected there was some discrepancy between the leaders' mostly 
positive views (gleaned from interview data) and the views of their subordinates 
(accessed through the study's grounded survey) about how effective the leaders strategies 
were in managing the change processes and mitigating their negative effects. In actuality, 
however, the discrepancy appeared mostly in one case, the case of Playa Vista. 
The response to one survey question captures this discrepancy fairly well. While 
most of the leaders were generally positive about what was happening, this is how the 
Playa Vista subordinates responded to the question, Do you feel that the departmental 
restructuring process was/will be successful? Only one third of the respondents said yes, 
19 percent said no, 38 percent said too early to say and 9.5 percent said unsure. Although 
a few of the leaders also indicated that it was too early to judge the success of the change 
initiative, none provided a negative response to comparable interview questions and 
most, in fact, viewed their efforts and the efforts of their colleagues as either effective or 
very effective. 
Implications for Further Research 
This study examined what leaders in two cities located in one section of the 
country did during periods of great economic stress to keep the government functioning 
and keep the morale of government employees as high as possible. In both of the cities 
terminating employees was largely avoided during the period studied by the use of a 
variety of other strategies or because both cities had a number of employees who were 
eligible to retire or could got jobs in other cities. It is not clear, however, whether 
terminations can be avoided in the future if the economic downturn continues. 
Since it is not likely that the economy and, consequently, city budgets will 
rebound quickly, it would be helpful to study what has happened in other cities in other 
parts of the country and to compare the results of those studies with the two case studies 
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that have been reported in this dissertation. It also would make sense to conduct a follow-
up study of the two cases that were reported here to see if the situations change 
significantly over time and new types of strategies that respond to changes are needed in 
the future. 
What is not clear, however, is whether some sort of theory about downsizing in 
the public sector can be developed and, ideally, tested in anything resembling a scientific 
way. I say this because of the idiosyncratic nature of even the two cases that were studied 
here. There were certainly some similarities between the situations in the two cities and 
city officials' responses in each of the contexts, but the differences are at least as 
important as the similarities in understanding what happened in each context. One 
wonders what would be lost if researchers moved to the abstract theory level and 
obliterated both geographic and temporal variations. Even if a theorist attempted to 
incorporate contextual variation into his or her theory, one wonders if a theory—which, 
by definition, simplifies things—could do justice even to the contextual variation found 
in the two cases reported here. 
One could certainly construct a theory about downsizing in public-sector 
organizations, of course. It is possible, however, that such a theory would conceal far 
more than it reveals. It is possible, in other words, that other researchers should be 
content with generating rich thick description (Geertz, 1973) of economic stress on public 
sector leaders and employees. 
Implications for Policy and Practice 
Even if formal theory is not—or should not—be constructed, the findings of this 
and similar studies can still be used heuristically by policymakers and government 
leaders to guide their interactions with and policymaking for employees who have to 
confront the possibility of losing their jobs or the fact that some of their colleagues had 
lost their jobs. Among the strategies that were described here were aggressive (and 
persistent) attempts to raise additional revenue as an alternative to dramatic downsizing; 
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restructuring so that city government was more efficient; reducing or eliminating public 
services; closing facilities or reducing the hours of service at those facilities; increasing 
fees for services or creating new fees for services, etc. 
None of these strategies are panaceas, of course, and many had costs associated 
with them. Voluntary retirements or employee resignations so employees can take jobs 
elsewhere in or out of government, for example, may rid a city bureaucracy of tired, over-
the-hill employees. The strategy also may result in the loss of the best and the brightest 
(e.g., employees who can easily get a job elsewhere) and, if the exodus is substantial, a 
loss of organizational memory. 
Thus, the major implication of this dissertation for policymakers and 
governmental leaders is to proceed with caution and to think carefully about the actions 
they take. The two cases that are the centerpiece of this dissertation provide food for 
thought; they do not prescribe courses of action. 
Conclusion 
As I write the conclusion of this chapter—and the dissertation, as a whole—I 
cannot help but think about the long, hard journey I have been on. Dissertation research 
and writing always takes time and effort, of course, but the journey to completion of this 
dissertation was especially arduous. Initially, I attempted to study the phenomenon of 
downsizing in the aerospace industry, but, despite many contacts in the industry, I could 
not get access. I shifted my focus, in part because I also had contacts in the city 
governments I ended up studying. Even with my contacts, access was not easy to come 
by and I was not permitted to implement a significant part of my design—the subordinate 
triangulation survey—in one of the cities. 
Making sense of what happened in each city entailed pursing innumerable twists 
and turns and seeing how each twist or turn in the story impacted the other twists and 
turns. I became so deeply involved in the details that it was difficult to write accounts of 
what had happened that were simple enough for a reader to understand yet complex 
212 
enough to reconstruct what had happened adequately. Even writing the accounts of what 
had happened in each city that hopefully come close to meeting the two criteria 
mentioned in the prior sentence, however, I was still so immersed in the details of my two 
stories that I could not, initially, even recall my research questions and, even when I 
became reacquainted with them, I had difficulty moving out the morass of the details of 
each story to answer the questions or, initially, to even know if the stories provided 
answers. In time—too much time, it sometimes seemed—the link between what I wanted 
to know initially and what I had learned by pursuing the twists and turns of two complex 
contexts became obvious to me. Even then, however, I had to engage in the tricky 
business of making the relationships obvious to a reader. 
If I have succeeded at all, it is as much a testament to a readers' patience as it is to 
any ability or hard work on my part. Because, in the end, the questions I have asked do 
not have simple answers. One must always understand tentative answers in the contexts 
from which they came and both an understanding of the strategies that were employed in 
other contexts and a knowledge of the contexts, themselves, must be factored into 
decisions that are made in other places and times. 
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Letter of Introduction and Request for Participation in Study- Case #1 
January 3, 2006 
Jane Doe (pseudonym) 
City Manager 
Dear Ms Doe: 
I am a doctoral student at the University of San Diego conducting a dissertation research study entitled 
"Revitalization, Reinvigoration and Motivation of Survivors in Changed, Restructured and Downsized Organizations: 
A Study of Leadership Challenges in Post-Modern Organizations." The purpose of this study is to conduct empirical 
research on managers' perceptions of the efficacy of their efforts in revitalizing their organizations and motivating 
those who remain in the organization after change, restructuring or downsizing have occurred. In addition, I anticipate 
that this study will serve as a framework for developing information on best practices in the effective revitalization and 
motivation of surviving workforces in change, restructured or downsized organizations. Since this research is a vital 
component of my fulfillment of a doctoral degree in Leadership Studies from the School of Education at the University 
of San Diego (USD), I am writing to request your assistance. 
As recently discussed, I believe your organization would make an excellent environment in which to 
investigate the issues alluded to above. Therefore, I am requesting permission to conduct research in your company. If 
permission is granted, I plan to interview members of the leadership team and conduct an anonymous survey of their 
subordinate employees. My primary data source will be from interviews. Key leadership team members to be 
interviewed will include: Human Resources Director or Deputy Director; Engineering Director; Planning Director or 
Principal Planner; Community Services Director or Recreation Superintendent; Finance Director or Deputy Director; 
Public Works Director or Superintendent; Police Chief or Battalion Chief; Fire Chief or Battalian Chief; City Librarian 
or Principal Librarian; or other key leaders as identified through interviews. These interviews would last no longer than 
one hour each and will be arranged so as not to interfere with interviewees current work responsibilities. On occasion, 
there may be a need to contact an interviewee to clarify a point that is less than clear, but these follow-up contacts will 
be in the form of brief telephone calls or email messages. 
In all instances, participation in interviews will be voluntary and each participant will be required to sign a 
consent form (see enclosed Consent Form) before the interview takes place. I will also review pertinent documents 
(i.e., organizational newsletters, organization-wide communications, etc.) that are made available to me and conduct an 
anonymous survey of subordinate employees. By way of information, please know that this research study will also 
require approval by the Institutional Review Board of the University of San Diego. 
At this time, I respectfully request from you formal written permission to conduct research at 
(see enclosed Letter of Acceptance). Once this letter has been received, I will follow-up 
with a telephone call within one week to confirm receipt and also arrange interview appointments convenient to the 
participants' schedules. If you have any questions or concerns, please do not hesitate to contact me (619 223-6684 or 
ronbaza@sbcglobal.net). or my chairperson, Dr. Robert Donmoyer (619 260-7445 or donmover@sandiego.edu). 
I thank you in advance for allowing me to conduct my research at . The insights that 
this research should produce will hopefully assist others and myself in further understanding effective leadership 
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Letter of Introduction and Request for Participation in Study-Case #2 
January 3, 2006 
Jane Doe (pseudonym) 
Chief Operating Officer 
Dear Ms Doe: 
I am a doctoral student at the University of San Diego conducting a dissertation research study entitled 
"Revitalization, Reinvigoration and Motivation of Survivors in Changed, Restructured and Downsized Organizations: 
A Study of Leadership Challenges in Post-Modern Organizations." The purpose of this study is to conduct empirical 
research on managers' perceptions of the efficacy of their efforts in revitalizing their organizations and motivating 
those who remain in the organization after change, restructuring or downsizing have occurred. In addition, I anticipate 
that this study will serve as a framework for developing information on best practices in the effective revitalization and 
motivation of surviving workforces in change, restructured or downsized organizations. Since this research is a vital 
component of my fulfillment of a doctoral degree in Leadership Studies from the School of Education at the University 
of San Diego (USD), I am writing to request your assistance. 
As recently discussed with , I believe your organization would make an excellent 
environment in which to investigate the issues alluded to above. Therefore, I am requesting permission to conduct 
research in your company. If permission is granted, I plan to interview members of the leadership team and conduct an 
anonymous survey of their subordinate employees. My primary data source will be from interviews. Key leadership 
team members to be interviewed will include: Human Resources Director or Deputy Director; Engineering Director or 
Deputy Director; Finance Director or Deputy Director; Public Works Director or Deputy Director; Police Chief or 
Deputy Police Chief; Fire Chief or Deputy Fire Chief; City Librarian or Deputy Director; or other key leaders as 
identified through interviews. These interviews would last no longer than one hour each and will be arranged so as not 
to interfere with interviewees current work responsibilities. On occasion, there may be a need to contact an interviewee 
to clarify a point that is less than clear, but these follow-up contacts will be in the form of brief telephone calls or email 
messages. 
In all instances, participation in interviews will be voluntary and each participant will be required to sign a 
consent form (see enclosed Consent Form) before the interview takes place. I will also review pertinent documents 
(i.e., organizational newsletters, organization-wide communications, etc.) that are made available to me and conduct an 
anonymous survey of subordinate employees. By way of information, please know that this research study will also 
require approval by the Institutional Review Board of the University of San Diego. 
At this time, I respectfully request from you formal written permission to conduct research at 
(see enclosed Letter of Acceptance). Once this letter has been received, I will follow-up 
with a telephone call within one week to confirm receipt and also arrange interview appointments convenient to the 
participants' schedules. If you have any questions or concerns, please do not hesitate to contact me (619 223-6684 or 
ronbaza@sbcglobal.net). or my chairperson, Dr. Robert Donmoyer (619 260-7445 or donmover@sandiego.edu). 
I thank you in advance for allowing me to conduct my research at . The insights that 
this research should produce will hopefully assist others and myself in further understanding effective leadership 




3731 Wildwood Road 
San Diego, CA 92107 
Appendix E 
Informed Consent Form 
234 
Informed Consent Form 
Ronald Baza, a Doctoral student in the Leadership Studies Program in the School of Education at the 
University of San Diego, is conducting a study about revitalization and motivation of survivors in changed 
and restructured organizations. This research is part of a dissertation in partial fulfillment for a doctoral 
degree at USD. Below are the procedures and conditions under which participants in the study agree to: 
• The purpose of this research is to understand managers' perceptions of the effectiveness of their efforts 
in revitalizing their organizations and motivating those who remain in the organization after change 
and restructuring has occurred. 
• You will be given the opportunity to ask questions regarding this research and the researcher will 
answer all questions to your satisfaction prior to your agreement to participate in this study. 
• The duration of each interview will be approximately one hour. The interview will be audio taped and 
later transcribed (by the researcher and/or a professional transcriber). Although only one interview is 
anticipated, the researcher may conduct a follow-up session (via email or telephone) to allow for 
pursuing possible follow-up questions, clarifications or researcher omissions. You will have the 
opportunity to review and edit your transcription prior to the end of the research. 
• Tapes, transcriptions and research artifacts will be kept in a locked cabinet and/or on a password-
protected computer. Data will be destroyed five years after the dissertation has been completed and 
approved. 
• No risks are anticipated other than those encountered in daily professional life. Efforts will be 
undertaken to keep the identities of participants confidential. For example, pseudonyms will be used 
for organization members who are interviewed as part of this study (i.e., tapes, transcriptions and 
research artifacts). However, those familiar with your organization's recent change/restructuring 
efforts may still be able to identify participants. Thus, confidentiality cannot be guaranteed even 
though every effort will be made to provide it. 
• Benefits for participating in this study might include the beneficial effects from reflecting on and 
sharing your experience and perspective about the change/restructuring process and the revitalization 
of the organization and motivation of survivors in the changed/restructured organization. Also, you 
will be contributing knowledge to our understanding of this topic. 
• Participation in the study is completely voluntary and you can withdraw at any time with no penalty. 
Data collected prior to your withdrawal will not be used unless you agree in writing to let these data be 
used. 
• If you have questions or concerns at any point, you are encouraged to contact Ronald Baza (619 223-
6684 or ronbaza@sbcglobal.net) or his chairperson, Dr. Robert Donmoyer (619 260-7445 or 
donmover@sandiego.edu). 
• The information collected will be used in Ronald Baza's dissertation and presentations and, possibly, 
in other additional publications or presentations emerging from this study. 
• There is no agreement, written or verbal, beyond that which is expressed on this consent form. 
I, the undersigned, have read and understood this form, and consent to the research it describes to me. 
Signature of Participant Date 
Printed Name of Participant 
Signature of Witness Date 
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Interview Guide 
(A) Organization Context/Background 
• Please describe each of the entries that you recorded on the Significant 
Organizational Change Milestones Chart that was provided to you prior to this 
interview. How did the events on the organizational change milestones chart 
personally affect you? 
(B) Process Information 
• How was the change/restructuring/downsizing process introduced to the 
organization (FY 05/06, FY 04/05, FY 03/04)? Who introduced the 
change/restructuring/downsizing process? What methods of communication were 
used to introduce the change/restructuring/downsizing? If no formal methods of 
communication were used, then what methods could have been used? 
• Can you describe step-by-step the process your organization went through in 
implementing the change/restructuring/downsizing process (FY 05/06, FY 04/05, 
FY 03/04)? If no formal process was utilized, then what process(es) could have 
been utilized? 
• What documents or data/information did the organization provide to support this 
process (FY 05/06, FY 04/05, FY 03/04)? What practices or procedures were 
developed to guide management in this process? If no documents/data or 
practices/procedures were produced or developed, than what documents/data or 
practices/procedures could have been produced or developed? 
• What roles did key members of the leadership team perform or assume during the 
process (FY 05/06, FY 04/05, FY 03/04)? What roles did other important 
participants perform or assume during the process? Are there any other 
individuals that were important in the process? If no one performed/assumed a 
leadership role, then what key leaders or other important participants could have 
performed/assumed a role? 
• What strategies, methods or approaches were utilized by the leadership team to 
revitalize the organization and motivate those who remained in the organization 
after the change/restructuring/downsizing (FY 05/06, FY 04/05, FY 03/04)? Did 
other important participants play a role in implementing those leadership 
strategies or approaches? If no strategies, methods or approaches were utilized, 
then what strategies, methods or approaches could have been utilized to revitalize 
the organization and motivate the survivors? 
• Who drove the process (FY 05/06, FY 04/05, FY 03/04)? What was your 
involvement in driving the process at your level? What did other directors, 
managers or non-management staff do to drive the process? If no one drove the 
process, then who could have driven the process? 
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(C) Experiential Information 
• Please tell me about your personal experience with the 
change/restructuring/downsizing process (FY 05/06, FY 04/05, FY 03/04)? 
• What specific strategies, methods or approaches did you participate in or initiate 
in order to revitalize your organization and motivate your subordinate employees 
who remained in your organization after the change/restructuring/downsizing (FY 
05/06, FY 04/05, FY 03/04)? 
• Please describe how you implemented those strategies, methods or approaches 
and tell me what you did during those implementations (FY 05/06, FY 04/05, FY 
03/04)? 
• How effective were these strategies and approaches in your implementation of the 
change/restructuring/downsizing process within your own organization (FY 
05/06, FY 04/05, FY 03/04)? What strategies were ineffective? How do you know 
a strategy was successful or unsuccessful? 
• What were some of the obstacles you encountered in implementing those 
strategies, methods or approaches in your organization (FY 05/06, FY 04/05, FY 
03/04)? What did you do to overcome those obstacles? 
• Did you utilize the assistance or support of other important participants in 
implementing those strategies, methods or approaches (FY 05/06, FY 04/05, FY 
03/04)? What exactly was their role? 
• Please describe the organizational and individual outcomes or reactions that 
resulted from your implementing those strategies, methods or approaches (FY 
05/06, FY 04/05, FY 03/04)? In what way did these outcomes or reactions 
influence the change/restructuring/downsizing process in your organization? How 
did these outcomes or reactions influence your behavior or actions as a leader? 
• What are some of the strategies, methods or approaches that you would like to 
have participated in or initiated (FY 05/06, FY 04/05, FY 03/04) that you may not 
have had an opportunity to participate in? Do you feel that those approaches could 
have influenced the process differently? How? 
• Please describe how you or others have assessed those strategies, methods or 
approaches (FY 05/06, FY 04/05, FY 03/04)? Were there any informal 
assessment or feedback mechanisms used? What formal and informal assessment 
data are available? 
• Please describe the factors that were key to your decision to remain in the 
organization after the change/restructuring/downsizing? 
(D) General Questions/Information 
• Do you feel the change/restructuring/downsizing process was successful (FY 
05/06, FY 04/05, FY 03/04)? In what ways do you feel the 
change/restructuring/downsizing process met the organization's objectives? Fell 
short? — 
• What factors do you feel were important to the change/restructuring/downsizing 
process' success or failure (FY 05/06, FY 04/05, FY 03/04)? 
• What factors do you feel were key to the decision of some of your subordinates to 
remain in the organization after the change/restructuring/downsizing? 
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• What are some things that people would now say about the 
change/restructuring/downsizing process (FY 05/06, FY 04/05, FY 03/04)? 
• What are some things that people would now see in the organization that they 
would not have seen before? 
• What are things you would hear people say about the organization as a result of 
the change/restructuring/downsizing process that they would not have said 
before? 
(E) Leadership Information 
• What is your perspective of leadership? How do you define leadership? 
• What are the characteristics of effective leadership? How would you describe 
your leadership style? 
• How was your experience in the recent change/restructuring/downsizing process 
influenced by your role as a leader or as a person in a position of authority? 
• Do you feel you were an effective leader in revitalizing your organization and 
motivating your subordinate employees after the 
change/restructuring/downsizing? Why or why not? 
• What suggestions would you have for leaders at other organizations as they 
attempt to revitalize their organization and motivate their subordinate employees 
after change/restructuring/downsizing? 
• What factors do you feel were key to the decision of some of your leadership 
peers to remain in the organization after the change/restructuring/downsizing? 
(F) Closing Questions 
• Are there any individuals that you recommend I interview who would be a 
valuable resource? 
• Are there any individuals that I should interview who would have a different view 
of the change/restructuring/downsizing process than what you have described? 
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Interview Guide 
(A) Organization Context/Background 
• Please tell me about each of the entries/events that you recorded on the 
Significant Organizational Change Milestones Chart. How did each of these 
organizational change milestone events personally affect you and your 
organization? 
(E) Process Information 
• How was/is the change/restructuring process introduced/being introduced to the 
organization (FY 05/06, FY 04/05, FY 03/04)? Who introduced/will introduce the 
change/restructuring process? What methods of communication were used/will be 
used to introduce the change/restructuring process? If no formal/informal methods 
of communication were used, then what formal/informal methods, if any, will be 
used in the future to introduce/implement the change/restructuring process? OR 
What formal/informal methods, if any, will be used in the future to 
introduce/implement the change/restructuring process? 
• Can you walk me through the process your organization went through/is going 
through in implementing the change/restructuring process (FY 05/06, FY 04/05, 
FY 03/04)? If no formal process was/is being utilized, then what type of formal 
process, if any, will be used in your future implementation plans? 
• What documents or data were/is being provided to the organization to support this 
process (FY 05/06, FY 04/05, FY 03/04)? What practices or procedures were 
developed to guide management in implementing this process? If no data or 
practices were produced or developed, than what, if any, data or practices will be 
produced or developed to support the process or guide management in 
implementing the process? 
• What role did/are you perform(ing) during the change/restructuring process? 
What roles did/are other key members of the executive leadership team 
perform(ing) during the process (FY 05/06, FY 04/05, FY 03/04)? What roles 
did/are other important participants perform(ing) during the process? Are there 
any other individuals that were/will be important in the process? 
• Who drove/is driving the change/restructuring process (FY 05/06, FY 04/05, FY 
03/04)? What was/is your involvement in driving the process at your level? What 
did/are other executive leadership team members, department directors or deputy 
directors do/doing to drive the process? 
• What strategies, methods or approaches were/are being utilized by the executive 
leadership team to revitalize the organization and motivate those who remain(ed) 
in the organization after the change/restructuring process (FY 05/06, FY 04/05, 
FY 03/04)? Did/are any other important participants play/playing a role in 
implementing any revitalization or motivation strategies or approaches? If no such 
strategies, methods or approaches were/are being utilized, then what, if any, 
strategies, methods or approaches will be used in the future to revitalize the 
organization and motivate the survivors? 
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(F) Personal Experiential Information 
• Please tell me about your personal experience with the change/restructuring 
process (FY 05/06, FY 04/05, FY 03/04)? How has it personally affected you? 
How has it affected members of your executive leadership team? 
• What specific strategies, methods or approaches did/are/will you personally 
participate(ing) in or initiate(ing) in order to revitalize and motivate members of 
your executive leadership team who remain(ed) in your organization after the 
change/restructuring (FY 05/06, FY 04/05, FY 03/04)? 
• Please describe how you implemented/are implementing/will implement those 
strategies, methods or approaches (revitalize/motivate) and tell me what you 
did/are doing/will do during those implementations (FY 05/06, FY 04/05, FY 
03/04)? 
• How effective were/are these strategies and approaches (revitalize/motivate) in 
your implementation of the change/restructuring process within the organization 
(FY 05/06, FY 04/05, FY 03/04)? What strategies were/are ineffective? How do 
you know a strategy was successful or unsuccessful? 
• What were some of the obstacles you personally encountered in implementing 
those strategies, methods or approaches (revitalize/motivate) in your organization 
(FY 05/06, FY 04/05, FY 03/04)? What did you do to overcome those obstacles? 
• Did you utilize the assistance or support of other important participants in 
implementing those strategies, methods or approaches (FY 05/06, FY 04/05, FY 
03/04)? What exactly was their role? 
• Please describe the organizational/individual outcomes or reactions that resulted 
from your implementing those strategies, methods or approaches 
(revitalize/motivate) (FY 05/06, FY 04/05, FY 03/04)? In what way did these 
outcomes or reactions influence the change/restructuring process in your 
organization? How did these outcomes or reactions influence your behavior or 
actions as a leader? 
• What are some of the strategies, methods or approaches (revitalize/motivate) that 
you would like to have participated in or initiated (FY 05/06, FY 04/05, FY 
03/04) that you may not have had an opportunity to participate in? Do you feel 
that those approaches could have/could influence(d) the process differently? 
How? 
• Please describe how you or others have assessed those strategies, methods or 
approaches (revitalize/motivate)(FY 05/06, FY 04/05, FY 03/04)? Were there any 
formal/informal assessment or feedback mechanisms used? What, if any, formal/ 
informal assessment data are available? 
• Please describe the factors that are/will be key to your decision to remain in the 
organization after the change/restructuring? 
(G) General Questions/Information 
• Do you feel the change/restructuring process was/is/will be successful (FY 05/06, 
FY 04/05, FY 03/04)? In what ways do you feel the change/restructuring process 
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met/is meeting/will meet the organization's objectives? Fell/is falling/will fall 
short? 
• What factors do you feel were/are/will be important to the change/restructuring 
process' success or failure (FY 05/06, FY 04/05, FY 03/04)? 
• What factors do you feel were/are/will be key to the decision of some of your 
subordinates to remain in the organization after the change/restructuring? 
• What are some things that people now say about the change/restructuring process 
(FY 05/06, FY 04/05, FY 03/04)? 
• What are some things that people now see in the organization that they would not 
have seen before? 
• What are things you would hear people now say about the organization as a result 
of the change/restructuring process that they would not have said before? 
(F) Leadership Information 
• What is your perspective of leadership? How do you define leadership? 
• What are the characteristics of effective leadership? How would you describe 
your leadership style? 
• How was/is/will your experience in the change/restructuring process 
influenced/being influenced/be influenced by your role as the top leader in the 
organization? 
• Do you feel you were/are/will be an effective leader in revitalizing your 
organization and motivating your subordinate employees after the 
change/restructuring? Why or why not? 
• What suggestions would you have for leaders at other organizations as they 
attempt to revitalize their organizations and motivate their employees after 
change/restructuring? 
• What factors do you feel are/will be key to the decision of some of your executive 
leadership team to remain in the organization after the change/restructuring? 
(G) Closing Questions 
• Are there any individuals that you recommend I interview or talk with who would 
be a valuable resource in this research project? 
• Are there any individuals that I should interview who would have a different view 
of the change/restructuring process than what you have described? 
